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Abstract	
This	thesis	aims	to	educate	the	reader	on	the	different	characteristics	of	crowdfunding,	such	
that	entrepreneurs	who	are	considering	how	to	raise	funds	for	their	new	project	can	make	
more	 informed	decisions.	 The	 thesis	 does	 this	 by	 extensively	 reviewing	 existing	 literature,	
both	 on	 crowdfunding	 and	 on	 related	 financing	 methods.	 The	 authors	 also	 examine	 the	
leading	 European	 crowdfunding	 markets	 in	 terms	 of	 performance,	 the	 crowdfunding	
platforms	 that	 operate	 and	 legal	 characteristics	 in	 the	 crowdfunding	 environment.	
Crowdfunding	involves	an	entrepreneur	creating	an	Internet	campaign,	with	the	aim	to	raise	
small	amounts	of	money	from	a	large	amount	of	people	–	the	crowd.	The	main	focus	of	this	
thesis	 is	 on	 reward	 and	 equity	 crowdfunding,	 as	 these	models	 are	 found	most	 suited	 for	
startups	with	 limited	credit	and	performance	history.	Reward	crowdfunding	 is	essentially	a	
pre-purchasing	model,	where	future	customers	are	invited	to	pre-purchase	a	product	before	
production	has	begun.	Equity	crowdfunding	 is	 the	offering	of	private	companies’	equity	 to	
the	general	public.	The	thesis	also	examines	the	possibilities	that	Norwegian	entrepreneurs	
have	 in	 regard	 to	 crowdfunding.	 For	 the	 time	being,	 the	 reward	model	 seems	 to	be	more	
feasible	 for	 Norwegian	 entrepreneurs,	 seeing	 that	 cross-border	 transactions	 are	 better	
facilitated	for	this	model,	while	the	equity	model	faces	more	challenges.	Two	case	studies	of	
successfully	crowdfunded	businesses	are	presented,	one	by	 reward	crowdfunding	and	one	
by	equity	crowdfunding,	in	order	to	illustrate	practical	aspects	of	crowdfunding	campaigns.	
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Preface	
	
This	thesis	is	a	part	of	our	Masters	of	Science	degree	in	Economics	and	Business	
administration	at	the	Norwegian	School	of	Economics,	written	during	the	autumn	of	2015.	
The	thesis	is	written	within	our	major,	business	analysis	and	performance	management.		
	
This	is	an	exploratory	study	on	the	concept	that	is	crowdfunding.	Crowdfunding	is	a	more	
democratic	way	for	consumers	to	express	demand	and	influence	the	production	of	
enterprises.	We	believe	knowledge	about	the	concept	is	highly	relevant	for	entrepreneurs	
today.	The	evolvement	of	Web	2.0.	made	two-way	communication	with	a	large	a	crowd	
possible,	potentially	bringing	valuable	product	feedback	in	addition	to	capital.	In	the	
Sundvolden	decleration	(2013),	the	Norwegian	government	expressed	intention	to	
strengthen	innovation	and	establishment	in	all	parts	of	the	country,	by	focusing	on	
entrepreneurs	and	startups.	Further,	the	government	expressed	intention	to	establish	an	
innovation	platform	to	help	connect	entrepreneurs	with	private	capital,	while	also	
considering	to	connect	this	with	tax	incentives.	We	believe	this	increases	the	relevance	of	
crowdfunding	today.	
	
The	work	process	has	been	challenging,	as	the	amount	of	academic	knowledge	and	
information	on	the	subject	is	limited	due	to	the	industry’s	young	age.	Despite	this,	we	as	
authors	have	benefitted	much,	seeing	that	crowdfunding	and	entrepreneurship	in	general	is	
a	common	interest	of	ours.	
	
We	would	like	to	thank	Rotem	Shneor	from	the	Nordic	Crowdfunding	Alliance	for	a	helpful	
discussion	on	the	topic	of	Nordic	crowdfunding.	We	would	also	like	to	thank	Sigbjørn	Groven	
from	Future	Home	and	Dan	Hesketh	from	Someone.io	for	taking	the	time	to	discuss	
crowdfunding	campaign	complications	with	us.	Lastly,	we	would	like	to	pay	our	sincere	
gratitude	to	our	supervisor,	Michael	Kisser,	for	his	guidance	throughout	this	process.	His	
assistance	and	contribution	helped	us	complete	a	thesis	that	we	believe	contains	
informational	and	practical	value.	
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1. Introduction		
One	of	the	main	obstacles	that	the	startup-environment	faces	is	raising	capital	(Cosh,	
Cumming	and	Hughes,	2009).	In	their	quest	to	change	the	world,	many	entrepreneurs	who	
seek	to	start	a	business	end	up	with	no	external	support.	Banks	typically	require	collateral	of	
the	firms	it	issues	loans	to,	meaning	loan	financing	is	unavailable	to	many	startups	as	they	
rarely	fulfill	this	requirement.	Furthermore,	the	problem	of	asymmetric	information	for	
investors	is	enhanced	due	to	lack	of	available	historical	data.	Venture	capital	investments	are	
available	to	some,	although	these	institutions	prefer	to	invest	relatively	large	amounts	and	
usually	only	do	so	if	the	potential	upside	is	significant.	In	addition,	venture	capitalist	firms	
seem	to	be	adjusting	their	investing	strategies	in	favor	of	later	stage	companies,	due	to	
lower	uncertainty	and	a	more	precise	valuation	process	(EY,	2013).		
	
Crowdfunding	has	emerged	as	a	rapidly	growing	form	of	fundraising.	This	global	
phenomenon	accounts	for	large	amounts	of	capital	and	is	currently	in	an	evolvement	phase,	
where	both	the	general	population	and	government	officials	are	becoming	more	aware	of	
the	potential	that	it	brings.	As	a	result,	crowdfunding	may	develop	to	be	an	alternative	
source	of	capital	for	entrepreneurs	in	need	of	financing.		
	
The	focus	of	this	thesis	is	on	the	entrepreneur	and	how	she	may	take	advantage	of	the	
potential	benefits	that	crowdfunding	brings.	Characteristics	of	crowdfunders	are	therefore	
examined	with	the	perspective	of	an	entrepreneur,	meaning	the	attractiveness	of	
crowdfunding	as	an	investment	opportunity	for	investors	is	only	briefly	touched	upon.		
	
The	thesis	starts	by	briefly	presenting	applied	research	methods.	Chapter	3	presents	the	
concept	of	crowdfunding,	where	six	different	crowdfunding	models	are	discussed	
individually	in	order	to	highlight	unique	characteristics.	Chapter	4	contains	a	discussion	on	
the	existing	literature	in	the	field	of	crowdfunding,	signaling	and	venture	capital	
investments.	The	crowdfunding	industry	and	leading	crowdfunding	markets	are	presented	in	
chapter	5	and	6,	respectively.	In	the	industry	overview,	global	volumes	and	trends	are	
studied	on	an	overall	basis,	whereas	the	market	overview	examines	specific	domestic	
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markets	in	regard	to	evolvement,	volumes,	trends,	legislation	and	regulation.	Chapter	7	
presents	an	analysis	of	the	Norwegian	crowdfunding	market.	
		
Chapter	8	provides	a	detailed	discussion	on	why	and	how	an	entrepreneur	should	use	
crowdfunding,	including	an	analysis	of	five	different	crowdfunding	platforms	and	two	case	
studies.	Lastly,	chapter	9	summarizes	the	paper	and	presents	the	authors’	final	thoughts	on	
the	subject.		
	
2. Research	methods	
Throughout	this	exploratory	study,	the	authors	have	relied	on	secondary	data	to	a	large	
extent.	Market	and	industry	statistics,	institutional	and	academic	research	reports,	and	
government	press	releases	have	provided	much	insight	in	the	relatively	unexplored	topic	of	
crowdfunding	and	alternative	finance.	Media	coverage	on	crowdfunding	has	increased	in	
recent	years.	However,	the	authors	found	most	online	news	articles	outdated	and	
uninformative,	because	of	the	frequent	changes	within	the	industry.		
	
Furthermore,	primary	data	has	been	collected	through	a	qualitative	approach.	Email	
correspondence,	informal	questionnaires	and	minor	interviews	have	been	performed	in	
order	to	gain	further	insight	and	understanding	in	the	practical	aspects	of	crowdfunding.			
	
The	authors	have	administered	the	resources	and	data	with	caution,	assessing	credibility	and	
relevance.	The	cited	statistics	have	been	crosschecked	in	order	to	assess	its	validity,	whereas	
the	academic	literature	has	been	internally	discussed	in	in	order	to	ensure	its	soundness	and	
relevance.	
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3. What	is	crowdfunding?	
3.1. Definition	
Scholars	define	crowdfunding	in	many	different	ways,	but	the	essentials	are	usually	the	
same:	An	entrepreneur	or	private	person	creates	an	Internet	campaign,	aiming	to	raise	small	
amounts	of	money	from	a	large	amount	of	people	-	the	crowd.	The	goal	of	the	campaign	
varies	between	which	crowdfunding	model	is	used.	The	European	Commission	defines	
crowdfunding	as:	
	
“…	An	emerging	source	of	financing	involving	open	calls	to	the	public,	generally	via	the	
internet,	to	finance	projects	through	donations,	monetary	contributions	in	exchange	for	a	
reward,	product	pre-ordering,	lending,	or	investment”	(European	Commission,	2015a).	
	
Furthermore,	crowdfunding	can	be	divided	into	two	main	subcategories:	financial	and	non-
financial	crowdfunding.	The	differences	are	explained	in	the	following	section.	
	
3.2. Financial	&	non-financial	crowdfunding		
Financial	crowdfunding	involves	an	expectation	for	the	crowdfunder	to	make	a	financial	
return	on	his	investment,	i.e.	the	motivation	and	incentives	to	invest	are	usually	financially	
based.	Three	crowdfunding	models	fall	under	this	definition:	equity,	loan	and	royalty	
crowdfunding.	However,	even	though	there	is	a	possibility	for	the	crowdfunder	to	make	a	
financial	return,	he	might	also	care	about	non-financial	returns,	e.g.	the	positive	feeling	of	
helping	a	local	corner-stone	business	by	investing	in	its	equity,	or	of	helping	a	student	pay	
for	education	by	lending	him	money	through	a	crowdfunding	platform	(CFP).		
	
Further,	financial	crowdfunding	enables	crowdfunders	to	invest	in	private	debt	and	private	
equity.	This	opportunity	expands	the	market	portfolio.	Including	crowdfunding	as	an	
investment	alternative	therefore	gives	the	investor	a	bigger	potential	to	diversify	and	to	find	
her	optimal	portfolio.	To	the	extent	that	the	market	value	of	the	crowdfunding	universe	is	
not	marginal,	one	can	argue	that	the	efficient	frontier	shifts	to	the	upper	left	when	adding	
crowdfunding	as	an	investment	alternative.	One	can	therefore	argue	that	it	is	desirable	for	
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investors	to	include	crowdfunded	debt/equity	as	an	investment	opportunity,	because	they	
would	potentially	gain	the	same	return	for	less	risk	or	higher	returns	for	the	same	risk.	
	
Non-financial	crowdfunding	is	the	opposite,	as	there	is	no	direct	possibility	for	the	
crowdfunder	to	make	a	financial	return	on	her	investment.	Reward	and	donation	
crowdfunding	are	examples	of	non-financial	crowdfunding,	although	the	crowdfunder’s	
motivation	in	each	model	might	differ.	
	
There	are	currently	six	different	crowdfunding	models.	These	will	be	explained	in	the	next	
section.	However,	throughout	the	thesis,	the	main	focus	will	be	on	reward	and	equity	
crowdfunding.	
	
3.3. Crowdfunding	models	
3.3.1. Equity	crowdfunding	
Equity	crowdfunding	is	the	act	of	offering	securities	to	the	general	public	by	privately	owned	
businesses,	usually	through	the	Internet.	The	model	allows	businesses	to	offer	a	proportion	
of	their	equity	for	a	predetermined	price,	so	that	anyone	can	acquire	a	share	in	the	privately	
held	company	(Pierrakis	&	Collins,	2013).		
Risk	and	return	
Under	equity	crowdfunding,	a	crowdfunder’s	return	is	linked	to	the	future	success	of	the	
business	they	invest	in.	This	gives	the	potential	for	greater	reward,	as	the	value	of	the	equity	
might	increase	if	the	business	becomes	profitable.	However,	it	also	presents	higher	risk	for	
the	crowdfunder.	Equity	owners	are	typically	the	last	to	be	compensated,	should	the	
business	go	bankrupt.	Another	risk	regarding	equity	crowdfunding	is	the	risk	of	dilution	of	
ownership	(Massolution,	2015).	Financing	conducted	by	venture	capital	(VC)	firms	
sometimes	include	anti-dilution	protection,	so	that	if	future	equity	is	bought	at	a	lower	price	
than	what	the	VC	firm	paid	in	the	previous	funding	round	(commonly	referred	to	as	“down	
round”),	the	VC	firm’s	ownership	share	is	adjusted	accordingly	(Kaplan	and	Strömberg,	
2004).	This	is	not	the	case	for	many	equity	crowdfunding	campaigns,	and	therefore	poses	an	
additional	risk	for	crowdfunders	(Massolution,	2015).		
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A	potential	challenge	for	issuers	of	crowdfunded	equity	is	having	to	communicate	directly	to	
hundreds	or	even	thousands	of	investors.	Many	CFPs	(e.g.	Seedrs)	recognize	this	challenge,	
and	their	solution	is	to	raise	funds	in	a	Special	Purpose	Vehicle	(SPV).	The	SPV	becomes	the	
shareholder	of	the	entire	issue	and	places	a	single	party	to	represent	the	interest	of	all	of	the	
crowdfunders	(Massolution,	2015).	
An	example	of	equity	crowdfunding	is	presented	below.	Legal	aspects	regarding	equity	
crowdfunding	are	examined	in	chapter	6-7.	
Example:	BrewDog	
The	Scottish	craft	beer	brewery	BrewDog	has	taken	advantage	of	the	possibilities	that	equity	
crowdfunding	presents.	The	business	has	previously	initiated	three	equity	crowdfunding	
campaigns,	the	first	one	in	2010,	and	is	currently	running	a	fourth	one.	Their	current	
campaign	lasts	from	April	2015	until	April	2016.	They	call	their	campaigns	“Equity	for	Punks”	
and	have	more	than	14	500	shareholders	invested	in	their	(private)	company	(BrewDog,	
2015a).	
	
Image	from	BrewDog’s	“Equity	for	Punks	IV”	prospectus	
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Their	current	campaign	aims	to	raise	approximately	$	41	million	(£	25	million)	by	selling	526	
316	B	shares	(BrewDog,	2015a).	As	of	October	2015,	they	have	raised	more	than	$	16,4	
million	(£	10	million),	setting	the	world	record	of	money	raised	through	equity	crowdfunding	
(BrewDog,	2015b).	However,	All	Street,	an	analyst	firm	dedicated	to	analyzing	crowdfunding	
investments,	seems	to	think	that	the	equity	is	overpriced:		
“…	it	is	difficult	to	see	how	investors	will	make	a	financial	return	on	this	deal	given	the	high	
valuation	of	£305	million.	No	financial	forecast	has	been	disclosed	so	there	is	very	
little	clarity	as	to	how	the	company	will	hit	the	revenue	targets	required	to	generate	a	
risk	adjusted	return	for	investors”	(Williams-Grut,	2015).	
The	All	Street	analyst	also	points	out	that	their	calculations	shows	a	price-earnings	ratio	of	
115,	substantially	higher	than	other	brewery	companies	(Williams-Grut,	2015).	Furthermore,	
BrewDog	states	in	their	prospectus	that	they	do	not	intend	to	pay	any	dividends	in	the	near	
future,	and	will	instead	reinvest	potential	profits	in	the	business	(BrewDog,	2015a).		
3.3.2. Loan	crowdfunding	
Loan	crowdfunding2	is	a	financing	model	where	crowdfunders	lend	money	via	CFPs	(e.g.	
LendingClub,	Zopa),	either	directly	or	indirectly	to	potential	borrowers.	Loan	CFPs	typically	
permit	both	private	persons	and	businesses	to	apply	for	loans.	
	
Risk	and	return	
The	borrowers	in	need	of	funds	consult	the	relevant	platform	for	a	loan	quote.	By	investing,	
the	crowdfunders	receive	a	debt	instrument	that	specifies	the	terms	of	future	repayment.	
Borrowers	post	loan	listings	on	CFPs,	but	the	details	of	the	loans	(e.g.	total	amount,	interest	
and	duration)	will	be	determined	by	the	CFP	and	the	perceived	risk	of	the	borrower	(e.g.	
credit	risk,	requested	amount	and	financial	history).	Crowdfunders	lend	their	funds	by	
reviewing	the	loan	listings	that	potential	borrowers	have	posted.	They	can	then	select	the	
listings	that	meet	their	criteria	regarding	risk,	duration	and	return.	The	platform	itself	earns	
its	income	by	taking	an	administrative	fee	and/or	a	percentage	of	the	loaned	amount	
(Massolution,	2015).	
	
																																																						
2	Also	called	peer-2-peer	lending	(P2P),	peer-2-business	lending	(P2B),	marketplace	lending	and	crowdlending	
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Financial	return	is	found	to	be	the	greatest	motivation	for	crowdfunders	choosing	this	
model.	Furthermore,	security	(i.e.	that	their	money	is	secure)	and	risk	rating	(given	by	the	
CFP)	are	important	factors	(Pierrakis	and	Collins,	2013).	However,	intrinsic	motivation	may	
also	be	important	to	some	(often	referred	to	as	“social	lending”	or	“impact	investors”).	
	
3.3.3. Reward	crowdfunding	
Reward	crowdfunding	offers	crowdfunders	non-financial	benefits	in	exchange	for	their	
pledge	(Ahlers,	Cumming,	Günther	and	Schweizer,	2015).	The	most	common	reward	
crowdfunding	model	is	essentially	a	pre-purchasing	platform.	Before	production	has	begun,	
future	customers	are	invited	to	pre-purchase	a	product	so	that	the	project	gets	enough	
funding	to	be	realized.	This	also	provides	intangible	benefits	to	the	funders.	The	incentive	to	
participate	in	such	crowdfunding	campaigns	is	therefore	the	crowdfunders’	desire	for	
reward	but	also	inner	motivation	(Pierrakis	&	Collins,	2013).		
	
Examples	
During	fall	2012	the	company	Cloud	Imperium	Games	launched	a	campaign	on	the	reward	
CFP	Kickstarter.	They	announced	their	plans	for	Star	Citizen,	a	space	galaxy	video	game	that	
takes	place	in	the	30th	century.	Within	the	first	month	they	raised	a	record	amount	of	more	
than	$6	million	(Roberts,	2015).	They	later	took	the	crowdfunding	campaign	to	their	own	
platforms,	and	in	2015,	Guiness	World	Records	(2015)	gave	it	the	title	“most	crowdfunded	
project	(overall)”	with	almost	$40	million	raised	in	march	2014.	As	of	December	2015,	the	
company	had	more	than	doubled	that	amount	to	$100	million,	from	more	than	1	million	
different	crowdfunders	(Cloud	Imperial	Games,	2015).	This	put	the	video	game	maker	in	line	
with	giants	such	as	Bungie	(creator	of	Halo)	and	Rockstar	North	(creator	of	GTA)	when	it	
comes	to	development	budget.	The	Star	Citizen	release-date	has	yet	to	be	announced.		
	
Another	reward	crowdfunding	project	was	the	“Greek	bailout	fund”3.	The	campaign	starter,	
Thom	Feeny	(UK),	had	no	relation	to	Greece	other	than	the	desire	to	assist	the	Greek	people	
in	the	financial	distress	they	experienced	at	the	time.	He	started	the	campaign	on	the	CFP	
																																																						
3	This	campaign	could	be	characterized	as	a	donation	campaign	rather	than	a	reward	campaign,	but	due	to	
funders	receiving	perks	from	contributing	(e.g.	feta	cheese,	wine,	Greek	holiday	for	two),	the	campaign	falls	
under	reward	crowdfunding	
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Indiegogo,	to	crowdfund	Greece’s	national	debt	with	a	goal	of	€1,6	billion.	On	July	6,	2015	
the	campaign	ended	with	a	raised	amount	of	€1	930	577	in	8	days	(Indiegogo,	2015b).	The	
project	did	not	reach	its	goal,	so	the	money	was	returned	to	the	crowdfunders.	However,	
this	demonstrates	how	quickly	funds	can	be	gathered.		
	
Price	differentiating	
This	financing	model	also	gives	the	entrepreneur	the	ability	to	price	differentiate	her	
customers.	By	setting	different	reward	levels	based	on	the	size	of	the	pledge,	the	
entrepreneur	can	identify	and	exploit	her	customers’	willingness	to	pay.	In	the	case	of	Star	
Citizen,	one	reward	level	could	be	prioritized	shipment	of	the	game	the	moment	it	is	
finished.	Another	level	could	include	virtual	goods	inside	the	game.	An	example	of	this	is	the	
“Javelin	Destroyer”,	a	virtual	space	ship	in	limited	supply	of	200	and	a	price	of	$2	500	each.	
Cloud	Imperium	Games	sold	all	200	in	less	than	a	minute,	earning	the	company	$500	000	in	
funding	for	further	development	of	the	game	(Roberts,	2015).		
	
All-or-nothing	versus	Keep-it-all	
When	an	entrepreneur	starts	a	reward	crowdfunding	campaign,	she	must	decide	what	kind	
of	goal	model	she	wants.	What	happens	if	the	entrepreneur	does	not	meet	her	
predetermined	funding	goal?	Does	she	keep	the	money	anyway	and	initiate	an	underfunded	
project,	or	is	the	money	returned	to	the	funders?	Two	models	regarding	this	are	often	
referred	to	as	the	all-or-nothing	(AON)	model	and	the	keep-it-all	(KIA)	model.	
	
Many	crowdfunding	platforms	only	accept	AON	models,	where	the	entrepreneur	takes	all	
the	risk	regarding	whether	she	gets	funded	or	not	(e.g.	Kickstarter,	FundedByMe).	If	the	
project	does	not	reach	its	funding	goal,	every	funder	is	reimbursed	and	the	entrepreneur	
gets	nothing.	In	the	KIA	model,	the	entrepreneur	keeps	the	money	that	is	pledged	even	if	
the	funding	goal	is	not	reached	(Cumming,	Leboeuf	and	Schwienbacher,	2015).	Chapter	8.2.1	
examines	implications	that	entrepreneurs	should	be	aware	of	when	deciding	between	AON	
or	KIA.	
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3.3.4. Donation	crowdfunding	
Donation	crowdfunding	is	one	of	the	non-financial	models.	Crowdfunders	typically	have	
intrinsic	motivation	to	donate,	and	returns	will	be	intangible	benefits	from	backing	the	
project	(Pierrakis	&	Collins,	2013).	As	with	all	crowdfunding	projects,	donation	projects	have	
a	predetermined	goal	of	how	much	money	they	aim	to	collect.	The	amount	different	
projects	set	to	reach	vary	a	lot	in	size.	One	can	find	projects	where	the	goal	is	$1	000	and	
projects	where	the	goal	is	>$500	000.	For	some	crowdfunding	models,	CFPs	typically	practice	
that	a	project	cannot	receive	more	funding	than	its	initial	goal,	i.e.	overfunding	is	not	
possible.	For	donation	crowdfunding,	however,	only	the	duration	of	the	campaign	limits	the	
amount	of	money	one	can	receive.	Furthermore,	projects	of	this	model	usually	have	an	
overall	goal,	e.g.	to	build	a	shelter	for	the	homeless,	to	fund	rehabilitation	costs	of	a	newly	
handicapped	family	member	or	to	fund	medical	care	for	a	certain	amount	of	people	in	a	
conflicted	zone.		
	
	
Indiegogo	started	its	own	charity	crowdfunding	campaign	to	support	the	victims	of	the	earthquake	in	
Nepal,	spring	2015.	As	of	September	7,	2015	there	are	287	ongoing	campaigns	related	to	this	cause	
and	total	funding	amounted	to	$2.62	million.	
	
Differences	and	similarities	to	non-profit	organizations	
Mentioned	predetermined	goals	is	a	distinct	difference	between	donation	crowdfunding	and	
traditional	non-profit	charity	organizations.	Charity	organizations	(e.g.	UNICEF,	Red	Cross)	
work	as	umbrella	organizations	for	several	different	projects	and	causes,	where	the	goal	is	
more	abstract.	Donated	money	is	allocated	between	many	projects	not	necessarily	known	
by	the	donator.	For	donation	crowdfunding,	the	crowdfunder	donates	directly	to	a	specific	
project.		
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Regarding	donations	to	both	crowdfunding	campaigns	and	to	non-profits,	a	number	of	
factors	motivates	the	giver,	where	sympathy,	empathy,	guilt,	happiness	and	identity	are	the	
strongest	determinants	(Gerber,	Hui	and	Kuo,	2013).	
	
3.3.5. Royalty	crowdfunding	
In	royalty	crowdfunding4,	the	entrepreneur	receives	funds	from	crowdfunders	in	exchange	
for	a	royalty	fee	or	a	certain	percentage	of	future	sales	or	profits	from	the	project	
(Massolution,	2015).		
	
Special	characteristics	
This	method	differs	from	the	other	crowdfunding	methods	in	the	way	that	it,	for	both	
parties,	has	more	contractual	freedom.	Royalty	crowdfunding	could	be	a	viable	solution	for	
some	entrepreneurs,	as	they	have	fewer	obligations	to	the	crowdfunders	until	the	project	
starts	to	earn	income,	contrary	to	equity	and	loan	crowdfunding:	Royalty	crowdfunding	
circumvent	traditional	equity	concerns,	like	market	fluctuations.	In	addition,	if	the	
entrepreneur	uses	crowdfunded	debt	to	finance	her	project,	she	will	have	an	obligation	to	
pay	periodic	installments	with	interest,	regardless	of	the	income	of	the	project.	The	
entrepreneur	who	uses	royalty	based	crowdfunding	is	only	obligated	to	pay	out	a	
predetermined	percentage	of	her	profit,	or	a	fixed	royalty	fee.		
	
By	using	royalty	crowdfunding,	the	project	is	prone	to	complications	between	crowdfunder	
and	the	entrepreneur.	Firstly,	the	payout	for	the	investor	is	a	direct	result	of	the	
achievements	of	the	project.	As	with	equity	investments,	it	is	then	important	to	ensure	that	
the	entrepreneur	puts	high	effort	in	the	project	by	having	aligned	interests	with	the	investor.	
Secondly,	if	a	business	uses	this	crowdfunding	model	for	an	isolated	project,	that	project’s	
profit	will	also	depend	on	how	the	business	allocates	its	fixed	costs.	If	not	mentioned	in	the	
agreement,	it	would	then	be	optimal	for	the	entrepreneur	to	allocate	a	high	amount	of	fixed	
costs	to	the	project,	so	that	she	has	to	share	less	of	the	profits	with	the	investor.	It	is	
therefore	essential	for	both	parties	to	have	a	good	understanding	of	the	contract	that	is	
signed.	
																																																						
4	also	referred	to	as	revenue	sharing	
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3.3.6. Hybrid	crowdfunding	
Hybrid	crowdfunding	is	a	combination	of	different	crowdfunding	models.	There	may	be	
benefits	for	both	entrepreneurs	and	crowdfunders	by	using	this	funding	model	(De	Buysere,	
Gajda,	Kleverlaan	and	Marom,	2012).	E.g.	if	an	entrepreneur	uses	a	combination	of	reward	
and	loan	crowdfunding,	the	crowdfunder's	payoff	is	both	financial	and	non-financial.	This	
might	be	a	good	alternative	for	many	crowdfunders	regarding	their	initial	motivation	for	
investing	(e.g.	if	they	want	to	consume	the	product,	but	also	desire	financial	return).	For	the	
entrepreneur,	it	provides	the	possibility	to	customize	her	optimal	way	of	raising	funds.		
Hybrid	crowdfunding	gives	both	crowdfunder	and	entrepreneur	flexibility,	but	the	model	
currently	accounts	for	only	a	small	part	of	the	total	crowdfunding	volume	(Massolution,	
2015).	
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4. Literature	review	
It	is	uncertain	if	crowdfunding	supports	or	challenges	existing	theories	about	how	startups	
raise	capital.	This	uncertainty	is	emphasized	in	a	report	by	EY	&	University	of	Cambridge	
(Wardrop,	Zhang,	Rau	and	Gray,	2015),	which	claims	that	the	phenomenon	is	under-studied	
and	often	misunderstood.	This	chapter	provides	a	literature	review	on	crowdfunding	and	
venture	capital	investments.	Both	topics	share	certain	similarities,	and	it	is	therefore	
meaningful	to	discuss	venture	capital	when	assessing	the	characteristics	of	crowdfunding.		
	
4.1. Literature	review:	Crowdfunding	
4.1.1. Financial	perspective	
Belleflamme,	Lambert	and	Schwienbacher	(2013)	argue	that	crowdfunding	should	be	
considered	a	distinct	form	of	financing	that	centers	on	funding	from	the	crowd	rather	than	
professional	investors	(i.e.	individuals	who	specialize	in	making	risky	investments)	or	
individuals	who	have	a	personal	link	(family	and	friends)	to	the	entrepreneur.	Furthermore,	
in	their	theoretical	research	they	examine	the	characteristics	of	reward	and	equity	
crowdfunding.	For	reward	crowdfunding,	they	summarize	three	characteristics:	
	
First,	a	reward	crowdfunding	campaign	often	involves	pre-purchasing	a	good	that	is	yet	to	be	
available	on	the	market.	The	entrepreneur	presents	the	traits	of	the	final	good	and	offer	
several	different	reward	levels	that	the	crowdfunder	can	choose	from.	Second,	mentioned	
reward	levels	reveal	consumers’	willingness	to	pay	and	let	the	entrepreneur	price	
discriminate	between	two	groups:	Consumers	who	enjoy	higher	utility	from	consuming	the	
good	will	be	ready	to	pay	more	to	secure	additional	community	benefits	arising	from	
crowdfunding,	than	other	consumers,	who	will	wait	until	the	product	is	available	on	the	
market	at	a	lower	price	(Belleflamme	et	al,	2013).	This	contradicts	the	economic	perception	
that	if	one	purchases	something	in	advance,	before	knowing	the	quality	of	the	purchased	
good,	one	ought	to	be	compensated	with	discounts	(Dana	Jr.,	1988).	Third,	crowdfunders	
identify	themselves	as	members	of	the	production	process	and	may	participate	in	
community-based	experiences.	This	ranges	from	the	act	of	pledging	money	to	direct	
involvement	in	the	production.	Belleflamme	et	al.	(2013)	call	this	“community	benefits”,	and	
is	an	advantage	of	crowdfunding	over	traditional	funding,	as	this	involvement	can	enhance	
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the	crowdfunders’	experience	with	the	good.	They	argue	that	community	benefits	exist	for	
both	reward	and	equity	crowdfunding.	For	equity	crowdfunding,	community	benefits	are	
linked	to	the	investment	experience,	while	for	reward	crowdfunding,	they	are	linked	to	the	
consumption	experience	(Belleflamme	et	al.,	2013).	Examples	of	investor	community	
benefits	may	be	the	feeling	of	belonging	to	a	group	of	individuals	who	contributed	to	the	
very	existence	of	the	product,	while	consumption	community	benefits	may	be	voting	rights	
regarding	the	design	of	the	product.	If	such	additional	benefits	for	the	crowdfunder	
(consumption	or	investment	benefits)	exist,	they	should	be	focused	on	and	amplified	by	the	
entrepreneur	in	order	to	maximize	the	potential	of	crowdfunding.	
	
Further,	Belleflamme	et	al.	(2013)	argue	that	the	size	of	the	entrepreneur’s	capital	
requirement	affects	the	optimal	choice	of	crowdfunding	model	(they	only	consider	reward	
versus	equity	crowdfunding).	If	the	capital	requirement	is	large,	the	surplus	from	price	
discrimination,	and	therefore	also	reward	crowdfunding,	is	reduced.	The	entrepreneur	is	
then	forced	to	distort	the	optimal	pricing	structure	to	attract	more	people	to	pre-order;	if	
not,	she	may	not	be	able	to	raise	enough	money	to	begin	production.	The	larger	this	
distortion,	the	smaller	is	the	additional	payoff	from	price	discrimination.	Belleflamme	et	al.	
(2013)	argue	that	if	the	capital	requirement	is	large,	profit-sharing	(e.g.	equity	
crowdfunding)	is	the	better	alternative.	This	is	because	they	assume	individuals	are	
heterogeneous	with	respect	to	community	benefits	under	pre-ordering,	i.e.	individuals	
experience	different	increase	in	utility,	but	homogeneous	under	profit	sharing,	i.e.	
individuals	experience	identical	increase	in	utility.	The	entrepreneur	can	then	more	easily	
exploit	community	benefits	with	profit	sharing	than	with	pre-ordering	(Belleflamme	et	al.,	
2013).	Their	work	is	based	on	theoretical	analysis.	Hence,	in	order	for	their	results	to	occur,	
many	assumptions	have	to	be	made	that	might	not	always	fit	the	real	crowdfunding	world.	
Even	so,	when	an	entrepreneur	considers	which	crowdfunding	model	to	go	for,	the	findings	
of	Belleflamme	et	al.	(2013)	could	prove	useful.	
4.1.2. Motivation	and	deterrents	
As	mentioned,	crowdfunders	might	differ	from	traditional	investors	in	many	ways.	This	is	
likely	to	apply	to	the	funder’s	motivation,	whether	it	is	regarding	the	decision	to	donate,	
pledge,	invest	or	lend	to	a	crowdfunding	campaign.	Unfortunately,	there	is	limited	research	
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by	scholars	in	this	area.	One	exploratory	study	by	Gerber	and	Hui	(2013)5,	examines	what	
motivates	and	deters	entrepreneurs	and	crowdfunders	from	participating	in	reward	
crowdfunding.	For	entrepreneurs,	they	find	that	one	of	the	main	reasons	for	initiating	a	
crowdfunding	campaign	is	raising	funds.	Other	important	factors	are	to	expand	awareness	of	
the	entrepreneur’s	work,	to	form	connections	with	supporters,	desire	for	approval,	to	
maintain	control	of	the	project,	and	to	learn	new	fundraising	skills	(Gerber	and	Hui,	2013).		
	
For	crowdfunders,	a	strong	motivation	to	pledge	seem	to	be	collection	of	rewards.	However,	
while	many	supporters	are	motivated	to	collect,	others	are	motivated	to	“give”,	the	
researchers	point	out.	Helping	others	(i.e.	the	entrepreneur)	seems	to	be	another	strong	
motivation	for	reward	crowdfunders,	both	for	family	and	friends	(F&F)	and	supporters	not	
known	well	by	the	entrepreneur.	Third,	being	part	of	a	community	of	like-minded	individuals	
and	interacting	with	them	and	the	entrepreneur,	motivated	some	interviewees	(Gerber	and	
Hui,	2013),	consistent	with	suggestions	by	Belleflamme	et	al.	(2013)	that	community	benefits	
exist.	Finally,	supporting	a	cause	motivated	some,	i.e.	the	desire	to	help	a	project	be	realized	
and	see	it	succeed	(Gerber	and	Hui,	2013).	
	
Furthermore,	Gerber	and	Hui	(2013)	also	find	potential	deterrents	to	start	or	fund	a	reward	
crowdfunding	campaign.	For	entrepreneurs,	the	belief	of	being	unable	to	attract	supporters,	
e.g.	that	the	product’s	target	crowd	was	too	small	or	that	the	the	crowd	was	unlikely	to	visit	
a	CFP,	or	being	unable	to	develop	satisfactory	rewards,	were	concerns	in	the	funding	
decision	progress.	Other	entrepreneurs	feared	public	failure	and	exposure,	e.g.	ruining	
chances	of	future	investment,	personal	embarrassment	or	other	people	stealing	their	ideas.	
Some	felt	angel	investors	and	venture	capitalists	could	be	less	likely	to	fund	future	ventures	
if	the	entrepreneur	had	already	failed	in	crowdfunding.	Lastly,	the	time	and	resource	
commitment	necessary	to	achieve	crowdfunding	success	was	considered	a	barrier	to	some,	
e.g.	having	to	reply	to	a	large	group	of	supporters	(Gerber	and	Hui,	2013).	Interviewed	
crowdfunders	were	mainly	concerned	about	waiting	for	and	not	receiving	rewards	and	
ineffective	use	of	funds.	One	crowdfunder	also	mentioned	she	disliked	the	KIA	(keep-it-all)	
model,	and	that	the	AON	(all-or-nothing)	model	provided	a	sense	of	security,	as	the	risk	of	
																																																						
5	Their	research	consists	of	qualitative	data	collection	through	interviews	of	83	US-based	participants	from	
three	different	CFPs;	Kickstarter,	Indiegogo	and	RocketHub	(Gerber	and	Hui,	2013)	
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the	entrepreneur	initiating	an	underfunded	project	would	be	removed	(Gerber	and	Hui,	
2013).	
	
Gerber	and	Hui’s	qualitative	investigation	of	crowdfunding	sheds	light	on	some	questions	
regarding	crowdfunding.	However,	their	research	is	solely	based	on	entrepreneurs	and	
funders	from	the	reward	crowdfunding	segment,	and	only	from	three	different	reward	CFPs.	
Entrepreneurs	and	crowdfunders	on	other	CFPs,	and	especially	in	other	crowdfunding	
models,	might	have	different	motivations	to	start	or	support	a	venture.		
	
Another	study	on	motivation	of	crowdfunders	is	that	of	Cholakova	and	Clarysse	(2015)6.	In	
addition	to	analyzing	the	motivation	of	investors	on	reward	and	equity	crowdfunding	
campaigns,	they	explore	the	impact	of	having	a	project	on	both	types	of	campaigns	
simultaneously	on	investors’	decision	to	support	the	project.	Their	analysis	of	investor	
motivation	is	built	on	the	mentioned	findings	of	Gerber	and	Hui	(2013),	i.e.	collect	rewards	
(extrinsic),	help	others,	be	a	part	of	a	community	and	support	a	cause	(intrinsic),	in	addition	
to	the	need	to	trust	the	entrepreneur	(Cholakova	and	Clarysse,	2015).	Their	survey	has	three	
steps:	(1)	the	respondents	are	asked	to	decide	whether	they	want	to	pledge	to	a	presented	
reward	crowdfunding	campaign	and	why.	(2)	the	respondents	are	informed	that	the	same	
project	is	also	available	on	an	equity	CFP,	and	are	asked	whether	they	would	invest	and	why.	
(3)	The	respondents	are	given	the	opportunity	to	reconsider	their	investment	decisions	so	
far	and	decide	again	the	amount	they	want	to	keep	in	the	project	as	a	pledge	(if	any)	and	the	
amount	they	want	to	invest	as	equity	(if	any)	(Cholakova	and	Clarysse,	2015).		
	
The	researchers	find	a	significant	relationship	between	desire	to	collect	reward	and	decision	
to	pledge	(i.e.	extrinsic	motivation).	The	need	to	trust	the	entrepreneur	is	also	found	to	be	a	
significant	motivator.	However,	contrary	to	what	some	of	the	interview	objects	of	Gerber	
and	Hui	(2013)	said	motivated	them	to	pledge,	Cholakova	and	Clarysse	(2015)	find	no	
significant	relationship	between	the	intrinsic	motivators	(help	others,	be	a	part	of	a	
community	and	support	a	cause)	and	the	decision	to	pledge.	I.e.	community	benefits	among	
																																																						
6	They	surveyed	all	registered	investors	from	Symbid,	a	CFP	from	the	Netherlands	that	accepts	both	reward	and	
equity	crowdfunding	campaigns,	as	well	as	a	mix	of	the	two.	155	out	of	454	responded	to	their	survey	
(Cholakova	and	Clarysse,	2015).	
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crowdfunders	(Belleflamme	et	al.,	2013)	are	not	found.	The	findings	of	Cholakova	and	
Clarysse	(2015)	applied	to	both	reward	and	equity	crowdfunding,	i.e.	pledging	and	investing.	
	
Therefore,	for	an	entrepreneur	who	is	considering	to	launch	a	reward	crowdfunding	
campaign,	a	balance	between	attractive	reward	and	trust	seems	important	in	order	to	
achieve	crowdfunding	success.		
	
Furthermore,	they	find	that	after	the	respondents	have	been	given	the	option	to	replace	
their	investment	into	either	reward,	equity	or	a	combination	(step	3	in	the	survey),	having	
invested	for	equity	at	step	2	had	a	significant	positive	relation	to	also	keeping	a	pledge	into	
the	project	at	step	3.	As	Cholakova	and	Clarysse	(2015)	point	out,	this	contradicts	predictions	
of	cognitive	evaluation	theory	(Deci	&	Ryan,	1985)	and	research	by	Heyman	and	Ariely	
(2004),	who	have	shown	that	when	individuals	are	presented	monetary	and	nonmonetary	
incentives	simultaneously,	they	tend	to	favor	a	monetary	perspective	despite	the	presence	
of	nonmonetary	information.	This	suggests	that	the	respondents	should	have,	when	
presented	the	option	to	reinvest,	redirected	all	their	money	into	equity	rather	than	as	a	
pledge	or	a	combination	(Cholakova	and	Clarysse,	2015).	Reasons	for	this	need	further	
research,	but	one	might	argue	that	once	an	individual	has	ownership	in	a	company,	buying	
products	from	that	company	indirectly	increases	the	value	of	his	equity.	An	entrepreneur	
considering	crowdfunding	might	benefit	from	such	an	effect.		
	
One	limitation	to	the	research	of	Cholakova	and	Clarysse	(2015)	is	that	they	only	surveyed	
registered	investors	from	a	single	CFP	(Symbid).	Equity	crowdfunding	campaigns	dominate	
this	platform,	which	might	indicate	that	most	of	surveyed	investors	already	had	a	money-
driven	decision-making	approach.	The	finding	that	intrinsic	motivation	was	insignificant	was	
therefore	more	likely,	as	predicted	by	mentioned	research	of	Heyman	and	Ariely	(2004).	If	
one	were	to	survey	crowdfunders	from	another	platform	where	reward	crowdfunding	is	
dominant,	e.g.	Kickstarter,	the	results	might	differ.	
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4.1.3. Signaling	
Equity	crowdfunding	
The	primary	target	investors	of	startups	on	equity	crowdfunding	platforms	are	often	
unsophisticated	investors.	Unsophisticated	investors	do	not	have	the	expertise	to	
comprehensively	research	and	evaluate	potential	investments,	and	as	their	invested	amount	
typically	is	small,	their	cost	of	doing	so	could	quickly	surpass	the	benefit.	The	interpretation	
of	signals	sent	from	the	entrepreneur,	then,	might	differ	from	what	is	predicted	by	
traditional	signaling	theory	(e.g.	Spence	(1973)).	At	worst,	if	the	small	investor	cannot	
interpret	any	credible	signals,	he	has	no	way	of	differentiating	low	quality	ventures	from	
high	quality	ventures.	This	could	create	the	problem	of	adverse	selection	(Akerlof,	1970).	A	
potential	consequence	might	be	that	the	equity	crowdfunding	market	enters	a	“market	for	
lemons”	state,	as	described	by	Akerlof	(1970).	
	
One	empirical	study	on	the	area	of	signaling	in	a	crowdfunding	context	is	that	of	Ahlers	et	al.	
(2015).	The	data	of	their	research	is	gathered	from	ASSOB	(Australian	Small	Scale	Offerings	
Board),	one	of	the	largest	equity	CFPs.	They	examine	which	crowdfunding	signals	and	
attributes	of	venture	quality	that	are	most	likely	to	induce	investors	to	commit	financial	
resources	during	equity	crowdfunding	campaigns.	
	
Furthermore,	as	claimed	by	Spence	(1973),	a	signal	must	be	observable,	costly	to	produce	
and	able	to	differentiate	among	competing	startups	in	order	for	it	to	be	effective.		
	
For	entrepreneurs,	the	findings	of	Ahlers	et	al.	(2015)	highlight	that	retaining	equity,	
providing	more	detailed	information	about	risks	and	human	capital	(i.e.	education	of	board	
members)	and	can	be	interpreted	as	effective	signals	among	crowdfunders,	and	hence	
increase	likelihood	of	funding	success.	This	suggests	some	similarity	between	equity	
crowdfunders	and	more	traditional	investors	(Downes	and	Henkel,	1982;	Wickham,	2006).	
	
A	potential	limitation	of	their	research,	however,	is	that	they	ignore	the	non-financial	aspect	
of	equity	crowdfunding.	Crowdfunders’	non-financial	motivation,	e.g.	if	the	investor	is	also	a	
consumer	of	the	product	and	has	a	strong	bond	with	the	brand,	might	also	apply	in	equity	
crowdfunding,	and	could	have	affected	the	chance	of	campaign	success	in	their	research.	
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Even	so,	the	findings	may	prove	useful	to	an	entrepreneur	who	is	considering	to	launch	an	
equity	crowdfunding	campaign.	
	
Reward	crowdfunding	
As	mentioned,	reward	crowdfunding	often	involves	pre-purchasing	of	goods	that	have	yet	to	
be	produced.	Funders	in	this	type	of	campaign	might	differ	from	those	of	e.g.	equity	
crowdfunding	campaigns,	as	they	are	consumers	of	a	product	rather	than	investors	in	a	
venture.		
	
Mollick	(2014)	examines,	based	on	empirical	research	of	data	from	the	reward	CFP	
Kickstarter,	whether	entrepreneurs	can	increase	their	likelihood	for	crowdfunding	success	if	
they	focus	on	preparedness	as	a	signal	of	quality.	For	measurement	of	preparedness,	he	
investigates	three	potential	determinants7:	if	the	campaign	pitch	has	a	video	(1),	whether	
projects	provided	updates	three	days	after	launch	(2)	and	if	the	campaign	pitch	had	spelling	
errors	(3).	His	results	indicate	that	both	providing	a	video	and	frequent	updates	increase	the	
chance	of	success	(by	26%	and	13%,	respectively),	and	that	spelling	errors	reduce	the	chance	
of	success	(by	13%).	These	findings	highlight	the	importance	of	preparedness	during	
crowdfunding	campaigns,	as	it	may	signal	product	quality	to	crowdfunders.		
	
One	potential	limitation	of	Mollick’s	(2014)	study	is	that	Kickstarter	only	permits	AON	
reward	campaigns	(Kickstarter,	2015a).	Other	reward	crowdfunding	sites,	like	Indiegogo,	
also	permits	KIA8	reward	campaigns	(Indiegogo,	2015a).	If	Mollick’s	(2014)	findings	also	
apply	to	KIA	reward	crowdfunding	campaigns	is	therefore	uncertain.	
	
Cumming	et	al.	(2015)	found	that	on	Indiegogo,	AON	campaigns	have	a	higher	chance	of	
meeting	its	funding	goal	than	KIA	campaigns:	34%	of	all	AON	campaigns	reached	their	goal,	
while	only	17%	of	KIA	campaigns	did	the	same.	They	argue	that	this	might	be	because	of	the	
signal	an	entrepreneur	gives	when	deciding	to	go	for	the	AON	model.	Spending	time	and	
effort	in	creating	a	crowdfunding	campaign	while	in	the	same	time	risking	not	to	receive	any	
																																																						
7	All	three	factors	are	mentioned	in	the	official	Kickstarter	blog	as	ways	to	stand	out:	
https://www.kickstarter.com/blog/so-how-can-i-make-my-project-stand-out	
8	Indiegogoo	refers	to	these	models	as	flexible	or	fixed	funding	
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funding	is	risky	and	costly	for	the	entrepreneur.	The	AON	model	might	then	signal	that	the	
entrepreneur	is	serious	about	production	and	that	she	will	not	go	forth	with	an	underfunded	
project.	This	reduces	risk	and	costs	for	the	crowd,	and	enables	the	entrepreneur	to	set	a	
higher	funding	goal.	The	research	also	shows	that	AON	campaigns	on	average	sought	to	raise	
$31	397,	versus	$20	478	for	KIA	campaigns.	
	
4.1.4. Social	network:	family	and	friends	
Conti,	Thursby	and	Rothaermel	(2011)	studied	the	importance	of	investment	by	F&F	in	early	
stage	ventures	when	applying	for	external	investment,	such	as	venture	capital	and	business	
angel	financing.	Their	findings	suggest	that	F&F	money	has	a	positive	impact	on	external	
investment.	However,	a	limitation	of	their	research	is	that	they	only	look	at	the	technology	
sector	(Conti	et	al.,	2011).	Is	F&F	money	also	important	for	crowdfunding?	Mollick	(2014)	
examines	the	effect	of	the	size	of	the	founder’s	social	network.	He	argues	that	this	is	often	
the	initial	source	of	significant	funding	for	many	projects,	and	is	therefore	equivalent	to	F&F	
money.	To	research	this,	he	examines	founders	on	the	CFP	Kickstarter.	By	looking	at	the	
founders’	Facebook	friends,	Mollick	(2014)	finds	that	founders	with	a	large	social	network	on	
Facebook	are	significantly	more	likely	to	be	successfully	funded	than	those	with	a	small	
social	network.	E.g.	for	an	average	project	in	the	Film	category,	he	finds	that	a	founder	with	
10	Facebook	friends	would	have	a	9%	chance	of	succeeding,	one	with	100	friends	would	
have	a	20%	chance	of	success,	and	one	with	1000	friends	would	have	a	40%	chance	of	
success	(Mollick,	2014).	However,	one	might	suspect	that	the	origination	of	this	finding	
could	also	come	from	the	credibility	that	a	large	Facebook	network	presents	(as	a	signal),	not	
only	from	the	part	that	it	is	likely	to	bring	more	F&F	money.	Funders,	at	least	of	larger	
Kickstarter	projects,	might	do	a	background	check	of	the	entrepreneur	before	pledging.	
Having	a	small	Facebook	network	may	then	weaken	the	entrepreneur’s	credibility,	maybe	
reducing	willingness	to	pledge	by	the	funder.	Also,	one	potential	limitation	of	the	study	
might	be	that	the	researcher	only	looks	at	founders’	Facebook	network,	not	other	social	
media	sites	like	LinkedIn	or	Instagram.	
Other	researchers	who	examine	the	importance	of	social	capital	in	crowdfunding	campaigns	
are	Zheng,	Li,	Wu	and	Xu	(2014).	They	study	Kickstarter	from	the	US	and	DemoHour	from	
China,	two	reward	CFPs.	Their	empirical	research	measures	the	degree	of	social	network	ties	
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as	the	number	of	fans	the	entrepreneur	has	on	either	Facebook	(the	U.S.)	or	Weibo	(China),	
and	they	find	that	social	network	ties	have	a	significant	positive	effect	on	the	likelihood	of	
crowdfunding	success	(Zheng	et	al.,	2014),	consistent	with	the	findings	of	Mollick	(2014).	
	
4.1.5. Geography	and	peer	effects	
Existing	theory	predicts	that	geographical	distance	is	important	for	investors	evaluating	early	
stage	entrepreneurial	ventures	(Florida	and	Kenney,	1988).	Investor	activities	such	as	
monitoring	of	progress	and	providing	input	are	cost-sensitive	to	distance.	Is	geographical	
distance	an	important	factor	for	early	stage	crowdfunders	as	well?	Agrawal,	Catalini	and	
Goldfarb	(2015)	examine	the	characteristics	of	investors	from	the	CFP	Sellaband9.	Their	
empirical	research	suggests	that	the	role	of	geographical	distance	seems	to	be	greatly	
diminished	for	crowdfunding	relative	to	other	financing	forms,	as	the	average	distance	
between	entrepreneur	(artist)	and	investor	is	approximately	5	000	km.	However,	they	also	
find	that	local	and	distant	investors	are	different:	Distant	investors’	desire	to	invest	increases	
as	the	entrepreneur	accumulates	capital,	whereas	local	investors’	desire	does	not.	Further,	
they	find	that	investors	from	the	entrepreneur’s	social	network	(i.e.	F&F)	are	
disproportionately	local,	and	that	F&F	invest	early	while	others	invest	late	(Agrawal	et	al.,	
2015).		
	
In	other	words:	geographical	distance	seems	less	important	for	crowdfunding,	but	F&F	(who	
are	most	likely	local)	invest	earlier	than	other	investors.	Distant	investors	are	also	responsive	
to	the	investment	decision	of	others.	Agrawal	et	al.	(2015)	therefore	speculate	in	their	
conclusion	that	early	investment	may	serve	as	a	signal	of	entrepreneurial	commitment,	and	
that	later	investors	may	use	this	signal	thereby	increasing	the	likelihood	of	further	funding	
and	access	to	distant	sources	of	capital.		
	
This	underlines	the	importance	of	social	network	for	crowdfunding	campaigns.	In	order	to	
reach	distant	sources	of	capital,	the	entrepreneur	has	to	utilize	her	social	network	and	gain	
momentum	for	her	crowdfunding	campaign.		
																																																						
9	Sellaband	is	a	music	CFP	that	allows	artists	to	raise	the	money	from	their	fans	and	the	SellaBand	community	
in	order	to	record	a	professional	album,	giving	a	percentage	of	future	profits	in	return.	
	 27	
A	potential	limitation	for	the	research	of	Agrawal	et	al.	(2015),	as	with	other	academic	
crowdfunding	reports,	is	that	they	only	examine	one	CFP.	If	their	findings	apply	to	other	
CFPs	is	uncertain.		
	
4.1.6. Reward	campaign	dynamics	
Empirical	research	of	Kuppuswamy	and	Bayus	(2015)	examines	funding	cycle	dynamics	of	
reward	crowdfunding	campaigns.	By	studying	data	from	Kickstarter,	they	find	that	the	
funding	cycle	typically	is	U-shaped:	More	funding	occurs	during	the	first	and	last	week	
compared	to	the	middle	of	the	campaign.	This	is	found	to	occur	for	all	type	of	reward	
campaigns,	no	matter	the	length	or	product	category.	They	argue	that	the	early	funding	
most	likely	comes	from	F&F	support,	while	the	latter	increase	in	funding	activity	might	occur	
because	of	a	relationship	between	two	effects:	a	goal-gradient	effect	and	a	deadline	effect.		
	
The	goal-gradient	effect,	as	proposed	by	Hull	(1932),	suggests	that	the	motivation	to	reach	a	
goal	increases	with	proximity	to	the	desired	end	state.	Kuppuswamy	and	Bayus	(2015)	argue	
that	this	effect	could	explain	some	of	the	sudden	increase	in	funding	activity.	Further	so	
when	the	deadline	effect	occurs,	i.e.	that	a	lot	of	activity	happens	at	the	end	of	an	
experience	(Webb	and	Weick,	1979).	The	two	effects	could	then	enhance	each	other	and	
create	a	spike	in	funding	activity	at	the	end	of	the	funding	cycle.		
	
Moreover,	Kuppuswamy	and	Bayus	(2015)	find	that	70%	of	backers	on	Kickstarter	only	
support	a	single	project,	and	that	95%	of	these	backers	joined	Kickstarter	and	pledged	in	the	
same	day.	Hence	serial	backers	seem	rare.	This	could	indicate	a	higher	dependency	on	social	
network	for	reward	campaigns.	
	
4.2. Literature	review:	Venture	capital	investments	
Many	startups	are	initially	financed	by	bootstrapping,	credit	cards	and	personal	loans	in	the	
entrepreneur’s	name.	In	addition,	many	turn	to	family	and	friends	for	financial	support,	
whether	it	is	sale	of	equity	or	loans.	If	these	financing	options	are	exhausted	or	unavailable,	
the	startup	may	try	to	obtain	a	business	loan	at	a	bank	or	try	to	sell	a	large	equity	stake.	
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Venture	capital	(VC)	firms	have	played	a	key	part	as	a	financial	intermediary	in	the	capital	
markets	by	supplying	capital	to	startups	in	need	of	financing.	
	
Jeng	and	Wells	(2000)	state	that	venture	capital	has	been	the	driving	force	behind	some	of	
the	most	vibrant	sectors	in	the	US	from	1980	to	2000.	Further,	Jeng	and	Wells	(2000)	
specifically	attribute	large	parts	of	the	successful	growth	of	companies	like	Microsoft,	
Compaq	and	Oracle,	to	venture	capital	financing.	They	also	claim	that	there	exists	a	
widespread	belief	that	venture	capital	firms	are	instrumental	in	bringing	innovations	to	
market	and	thereby	enhancing	economic	growth,	jobs	and	opportunities	for	further	
technological	innovation.	Venture	capital	is	a	young	industry	that	has	experienced	rapid	
changes.	It	is	possible	to	look	at	findings	and	data	for	the	past	and	the	present,	but	Gompers	
and	Lerner	(2001)	emphasize	that	the	value	of	these	insights	regarding	the	venture	capital	
industry	of	the	future	may	remain	unclear.	This	constraint	also	applies	to	the	case	of	the	
crowdfunding	industry.	The	industry	has	experienced	high	growth	for	the	past	five	years,	but	
due	to	its	young	age	it	might	be	challenging	to	ascertain	how	the	industry	will	look	in	the	
future,	solely	based	on	a	few	years	of	data.	
	
4.2.1. Demand	for	capital	
Entrepreneurs	might	follow	several	different	strategies	and	actions	in	order	to	attract	
attention	from	VCs.	This	also	applies	to	entrepreneurs	who	are	using	crowdfunding	as	a	
source	of	funding.	Hustedde	and	Pulver	(1992)	analyzed	data	from	318	active	startups	
seeking	capital	in	Minnesota	and	Wisconsin	(US).	The	results	showed	that	entrepreneurs	
who	did	not	seek	advice	in	the	funding	process	were	prone	to	be	less	successful	in	acquiring	
equity	finance	and	that	those	who	did	seek	advice	but	used	bankers	were	more	likely	to	fail	
in	acquiring	equity	finance.	Attorneys	appeared	to	contribute	positively	in	the	
entrepreneur’s	process	of	securing	equity	finance,	specifically	by	helping	with	marketing	and	
referrals	to	other	sources	of	capital	than	VCs.	In	addition,	the	study	found	that	less	
experienced	entrepreneurs	who	are	aggressive	in	seeking	funding	and	who	are	willing	to	
surrender	a	substantial	ownership	share,	are	the	most	successful	in	securing	equity	finance.	
In	contrast,	older	and	more	experienced	entrepreneurs	are	prone	to	have	difficulties	in	
acquiring	equity	financing	(Hustedde	and	Pulver,	1992).		
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Further,	VC-backed	firms	tend	to	have	higher	quality	management	teams	than	non-VC-
backed	firms,	as	suggested	by	Chemmanur,	Simonyan	and	Tehranian	(2011).	In	their	
research,	management	quality	is	measured	by	size	of	the	team,	percentage	of	team	
members	with	an	MBA	degree,	prior	managerial	experience	and	relevant	core	functional	
expertise.	This	may	imply	that	management	quality	(e.g.	MBA	degree)	serves	as	a	credible	
signal	that	reduces	information	asymmetry,	thereby	increasing	the	firm’s	attractiveness	
towards	VC	firms.	However,	the	research	of	Chemmanur	et	al.	(2011)	does	not	provide	an	
explanation	as	to	why	VC-backed	firms	tend	to	have	higher	quality	management	teams	(i.e.	
if	the	VC	prefer	high	management	quality	pre-investment	or	if	they	themselves	create	high	
management	quality	post-investment).		
	
A	different	approach	to	attract	attention	from	investors	has	been	researched	by	Davila,	
Foster	and	Gupta	(2003).	They	found	that	embarking	on	an	early	high-growth	strategy	in	
order	to	gain	attention	from	potential	capital	investors	might	not	be	the	most	effective	
strategy.	Their	results	suggested	that	companies	with	high	growth,	prior	to	any	VC	
investment,	did	not	appear	to	send	a	useful	signal	to	decrease	the	information	asymmetry	
between	the	entrepreneur	and	the	VC.	Thus,	VCs	at	the	time	of	the	study	did	not	tend	to	use	
high	growth	signals	as	a	significant	criterion	in	the	selection	process	(Davila	et	al.,	2003).	For	
crowdfunding,	signaling	could	be	an	important	component	in	the	time	before,	during	and	
after	the	campaign.	Therefore,	studying	the	practice	of	signaling	in	a	reward	or	equity	
crowdfunding	setting,	by	looking	at	parallels	between	research	on	the	topic	and	actual	cases	
where	it	has	been	implemented,	might	provide	valuable	insights.	
	
4.2.2. Uncertainty	for	the	supplier	of	capital	
Venture	capital	firms	are	generally	interested	in	young	companies	that	show	growth	
potential.	These	companies	also	come	with	a	corresponding	high	risk.	In	their	paper,	
Gompers	and	Lerner	(2001)	suggest	that	one	of	the	main	reasons	for	entrepreneurs	finding	
it	difficult	to	obtain	finance	is	information	asymmetry.		
	
Furthermore,	this	induces	a	principal-agent	problem	and	corresponding	agency	costs	
between	the	entrepreneur	and	the	venture	capital	firm.	This	problem	is	especially	difficult	
for	companies	with	intangible	assets	and	whose	performance	is	difficult	to	assess,	such	as	
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early	stage,	high-tech	companies	with	a	heavy	reliance	on	R&D	(Gompers	and	Lerner,	2001).	
In	terms	of	crowdfunding,	this	problem	translates	into	the	information	asymmetry	that	is	
present	when	crowdfunders	invests	in	an	equity	or	reward	campaign.	It	is	difficult	for	
crowdfunders	to	monitor	their	investments	and	in	many	cases	their	only	guarantee	is	the	
word	of	the	entrepreneur.	This	poses	an	interesting	issue	on	how	the	concept	of	
crowdfunding	deals	with	monitoring	and	information	asymmetry,	and	what	factors	
motivates	crowdfunders	to	invest	in	projects	in	spite	of	this.	
	
Kaplan	and	Strömberg	(2001)	found	that	there	are	limits	to	the	extent	to	which	VCs	are	
willing	to	monitor	and	support	their	portfolio	companies,	regarding	monitoring	costs	and	
involvement	costs.	By	employing	the	VCs	own	people	in	the	startup,	the	VC	will	be	able	to	
monitor	and	manage	the	startup	in	the	desired	direction.	The	research	of	Kaplan	and	
Strömberg	(2001)	suggested	the	VC	plays	a	role	in	forming	the	management	team	of	the	
portfolio	company,	pre-investment,	in	14%	of	the	investments.	In	addition,	their	research	
suggested	that	in	50%	of	the	investments,	the	VC	expected	to	play	a	role	in	the	management	
after	investing.	The	VCs	in	Kaplan	and	Strömberg’s	(2001)	study	were	worried	about	20%	of	
their	investments,	their	main	concern	being	that	the	investments	might	require	too	much	
time.	Even	though	this	research	was	done	over	a	decade	ago	and	the	fact	that	information	is	
now	generally	more	accessible,	one	can	argue	that	the	findings	of	Kaplan	and	Strömberg	
(2001)	still	holds	value	today,	as	the	motivation	of	the	different	actors	in	this	type	of	
transaction,	whether	VC	or	crowdfunding,	is	neither	fully	accessible	nor	transparent.	
	
In	general,	financial	intermediaries	take	on	a	role	of	monitoring	and	gathering	information	
about	individual	firms.	As	implied	in	the	section	above,	a	strategy	used	by	VCs	in	order	to	
monitor	and	control	its	investments	is	to	make	additions	or	substitutions	to	the	
management	of	the	portfolio	company.		
	
A	study	by	Hellmann	and	Puri	(2002)	examined	the	VCs	role	in	the	professionalization	of	
startups,	where	the	data	originated	from	170	young	high-tech	companies	in	Silicon	Valley,	
California.	Their	findings	suggested	that	VCs	played	a	“top-down”	role	at	the	portfolio	
company.	Firstly,	by	replacing	key	management	positions,	but	also	by	influencing	
developments	further	down	the	organization,	e.g.	introduction	of	stock	option	plans	for	
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employees	and	formulation	of	human	resource	policies.	Furthermore,	Hellmann	and	Puri	
(2002)	concluded	that	firms	with	venture	capital	funding	are	more	likely	and	faster	to	
replace	the	entrepreneur	with	an	external	CEO,	but	that	the	entrepreneur	still	functions	as	
an	employee	of	the	company.	The	study	emphasizes	that	in	the	context	of	venture	capital,	
the	investor	can	play	a	much	larger	role	than	just	a	monitoring	entity	(Hellmann	and	Puri,	
2002).	Monitoring,	advisory	and	professional	management	are	traits	that	crowdfunders	do	
not	provide	entrepreneurs	with,	seeing	that	the	common	crowdfunder	would	most	likely	
lack	the	experience	and	credibility	to	have	an	impact.	Therefore,	it	might	be	interesting	to	
investigate	if	CFPs	provide	entrepreneurs	with	some	of	the	same	qualities	that	venture	
capital	firms	provide	to	their	portfolio	companies,	and	how	this	affects	the	outcome	of	
crowdfunding	campaigns.		
	
4.2.3. What	determines	success?	
Gompers,	Kovner,	Lerner	and	Scharfstein	(2006)	did	a	study	on	serial	entrepreneurs	(i.e.	
entrepreneurs	of	one	or	more	successful	or	unsuccessful	ventures).	They	investigated	how	
the	skill	of	the	entrepreneur	and	the	VC	might	increase	the	chance	of	success.	The	research	
showed	that	entrepreneurs	who	previously	succeeded	have	a	higher	chance	of	success	in	
their	next	venture,	than	first-time	entrepreneurs	and	entrepreneurs	who	failed	in	their	
previous	venture	(Gompers	et	al.,	2006).	Chatterji	(2005)	found	that	an	entrepreneur	who	
uses	her	industry	experience	from	her	previous	employer	have	a	higher	chance	of	success	
than	her	competitors	who	lack	the	experience.	The	findings	above	might	seem	intuitive,	but	
they	contradict	the	claim	from	Kihlstrom	and	Laffont	(1979),	who	claimed	that	luck	is	the	
only	factor	that	determines	if	the	entrepreneur	is	successful	or	not.	
	
One	can	argue	that	the	success	of	a	venture	does	not	solely	rely	on	the	entrepreneur,	but	
also	on	the	characteristics	of	the	source	of	funding.	Companies	that	are	funded	by	more	
experienced	VC	firms	have	a	higher	chance	of	success	(Sørensen,	2004;	Kaplan	and	Schoar,	
2005;	Gompers	et	al.,	2006).	In	addition,	Chemmanur	et	al.	(2011)	find	that	both	
management	quality	and	VC-backing	can	contribute	positively	to	the	level	of	interest	from	
analysts	and	institutional	investors	in	the	event	of	an	IPO.		
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The	research	from	Gompers	et	al.	(2006)	suggests	that	VC	firms	are	not	just	risk-bearers	and	
suppliers	of	funds,	but	also	consultants	who	put	the	funds	in	the	right	hands	and	ensures	
that	it	is	used	effectively.	Furthermore,	the	study	shows	that	the	experience	of	the	VC	is	of	
less	importance	if	the	entrepreneur	has	a	history	of	successful	ventures.	This	may	indicate	
that	prior	success	is	a	signal	of	quality	or	that	VCs	add	little	value	to	talented	entrepreneurs	
(Gompers	et	al.,	2006).		
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5. Crowdfunding	Industry	overview	
5.1. Funding	volume	
On	a	global	basis,	the	total	crowdfunding	volume	amounted	to	$2.7	billion	in	2012,	$6.1	
billion	in	2013	and	$16.2	billion	in	2014.	For	2015,	the	total	volume	is	predicted	to	reach	
$34,4	billion	(Massolution,	2015).	In	comparison,	the	global	IPO,	venture	capital,	private	
equity,	and	debt	volume	in	2014	were	distributed	as	follows:	
	
Activity	 IPO	 Venture	Capital	 Private	Equity	 Debt	issuance	
Volume	 $258	billion	 $87	billion	 $252	billion	 $5	700	billion	
	
Table	1.	Global	funding	volume	for	2014.	Data	from	Harjani	(2014),	NVCA.org,	Bain	&	company	(2015)	
and	Thomson	Reuters	corporation	(2015),	respectively.	VC	includes	seed,	venture	and	buy-outs.		
	
	
Figure	1	-	Global	crowdfunding	volume,	2012-2014.	Data	from	Massolution	(2015).	
	
The	crowdfunding	volume	has	grown	exponentially,	but	one	can	see	that	crowdfunding	is	
still	relatively	small	compared	to	more	traditional	funding	sources.	Furthermore,	the	total	
crowdfunding	volume	is	unevenly	attributed	between	the	different	models.	
	
Loan	crowdfunding	has	had	the	largest	volumes	in	the	past	three	years,	mainly	due	to	high	
activity	in	the	UK	and	Asia.	Equity	crowdfunding	has	historically	been	subject	to	
cumbersome	regulation	and	legislation	in	some	countries,	which	made	the	model	a	difficult	
funding	option	to	work	with.	Today,	one	can	see	changes	in	regulation	and	legislation	in	the	
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US	and	European	countries,	which	are	likely	to	increase	the	growth	of	equity	crowdfunding	
for	both	markets.	Reward	crowdfunding	is	the	most	used	campaign	type,	and	has	
experienced	stable	growth	during	2012-2014,	but	it	has	not	attracted	the	biggest	volumes.	
This	may	partly	be	explained	by	the	belief	that	most	reward	campaigns	have	lower	capital	
needs	and	therefore	seek	less	funding.	In	2012,	royalty	and	hybrid	crowdfunding	were	not	
perfectly	identified	and	it	is	thus	difficult	to	find	exact	numbers	from	this	year.	In	2014	both	
models	experienced	growth,	but	their	funding	activity	and	volumes	are	still	lower	relative	to	
the	other	models.	
	
Model/Year	 2012	 2013	 2014	 Growth,	2013-2014	
Donation	 $999	m	 $1340	m	 $1940	m	 45%	
Reward	 $391	m	 $726	m	 $1330	m	 84%	
Loan	 $1190	m	 $3440	m	 $11	080	m	 223%	
Equity	 $118	m		 $395	m	 $1100	m	 182%	
Royalty	 N/A	 $59	m	 $273	m	 336%	
Hybrid	 N/A	 $117	m	 $487	m	 290%	
Total	volume	 $2700	m	 $6100	m	 $16	200	m	 	
	
Table	2.	Global	crowdfunding	volume,	2012-2014.	Data	from	Massolution	(2015),	Statista	(2015a)	and	
Statista	(2015b)	
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5.2. The	geography	of	crowdfunding	
	
Figure	2.	Geographical	distribution	of	volume,	2012-2014.	Data	from	Massolution	(2015)	
	
Crowdfunding	is	mainly	Internet-based	and	therefore	geographical	borders	affects	mostly	
equity	and	loan	crowdfunding,	due	to	differences	in	legislation	among	countries.	Donation	
and	reward	crowdfunding	are	models	that,	to	a	large	extent,	have	no	country	borders.	As	
mentioned	earlier,	Agrawal	et	al.	(2015)	found	that	the	role	of	geographical	distance	seems	
to	be	reduced	for	crowdfunding	relative	to	other	financing	forms.	The	world	market	can	be	
divided	into	the	following	regions:	North	America,	Europe,	Asia,	and	a	collective	group	is	also	
established	for	Oceania,	South	America	and	Africa,	due	to	their	relatively	small	market	size.	
The	main	emphasis	of	this	thesis	is	on	Europe,	due	to	the	higher	relevance	for	Norwegian	
entrepreneurs.	In	addition,	the	North	American	market	is	discussed	due	to	its	size	and	
maturity	in	regard	to	the	concept	of	crowdfunding.	
	
North	America	has	traditionally	been	the	region	where	the	largest	crowdfunding	amount	has	
been	raised,	and	the	region	has	continued	to	grow	exponentially	over	the	last	years.	Europe	
has	also	experienced	high	growth	for	the	past	three	years,	but	has	lost	a	big	share	of	total	
market	volume.	Furthermore,	the	market	for	crowdfunding	is	growing	at	a	high	rate	in	Asia.		
In	recent	years,	large	parts	of	the	Asian	population	have	experienced	an	increase	in	
purchasing	power,	which	make	Asian	consumers	more	accessible	and	give	them	an	
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increased	financial	power	to	affect	most	of	the	world’s	economic	arenas,	e.g.	through	stock	
exchange	or	Internet	shopping.		From	only	having	1%	of	total	volume	in	2012,	Asia	
accounted	for	21%	of	the	total	volume	in	2014,	primarily	consisting	of	loan-based	funds	from	
Chinese	CFPs	(Massolution,	2015).	Crowdfunding	volume	and	growth	rates	for	mentioned	
regions	are	shown	in	table	3	below:	
	
Annual	growth	rates	and	funding	volume	
Region/Year	 2012	 2013	 2014	
North	America	 92%	 $1610	m	 140%	 $3860	m	 145%	 $9470	m	
Europe	 65%	 $945	m	 43%	 $1350	m	 141%	 $3300	m	
Asia	 N/A	 $33	m	 245%	 $810	m	 320%	 $3400	m	
Oceania	 N/A	 $76	m	 -64%	 $27	m	 59%	 	$43	m	
South	America	 N/A	 $0,8	m	 268%	 $21	m	 167%	 $57	m	
Africa	 N/A	 $0,1	m	 6000%	 $6	m	 101%	 $12	m	
World	growth/Volume	 81%	 $2700	m	 126%	 $6100	m	 167%	 $16	200	m	
	
Table	3.	Crowdfunding	volume	and	growth	rate,	by	region.	Data	from	Massolution	(2015),	Statista	
(2015a)	and	Statista	(2015b)	
	
The	remaining	regions,	Oceania,	South	America	and	Africa,	only	account	for	a	fraction	of	the	
total	volume.	Intuitively,	an	explanation	for	this	might	be	that	these	regions	are	less	
developed	with	regard	to	technology	and	legislation	(except	for	Australia)	and	can	therefore	
not	adapt	as	quickly	to	the	growth	potential	that	crowdfunding	provides.		
	
Special	for	North	America	are	the	previous	barriers	on	equity	crowdfunding.	The	US	is	
currently	changing	legislation	in	regard	to	equity	crowdfunding,	which	will	probably	facilitate	
growth	in	the	US	equity	crowdfunding	sector.	This	is	further	discussed	in	section	6.5.	
	
5.3. The	crowdfunding	platforms	-	CFPs			
The	market	has	experienced	growth	in	the	number	of	crowdfunding	platforms.	The	reasons	
for	the	increase	in	CFPs	could	be	coherent	with	the	reasons	for	the	increased	funding	
volume,	i.e.	the	general	public	awareness	of	the	concept,	technological	advances,	and	less	
cumbersome	legislation.	In	addition,	there	are	several	“make-your-own-CFP”	providers,	
	 37	
reducing	the	cost	and	complexity	of	creating	a	CFP.	In	the	early	2000s,	there	were	very	few	
online	crowdfunding	platforms	while	today,	there	are	over	1250	active	platforms.		
	
	
Figure	3.	Number	of	CFPs,	globally.	2007-2014.	Data	from	Massolution	(2015)	
	
5.3.1. Distribution	of	volume	
In	North	America,	the	top	5	and	top	10	CFPs	have	traditionally	accounted	for	most	of	the	
domestic	market.	In	2011,	the	top	5	CFPs	in	North	America	were	responsible	for	73%	of	the	
total	volume	and	the	top	10	CFPs	were	responsible	for	89%.	In	2014,	these	indicators	have	
changed	so	that	the	top	5	CFPs	now	makes	up	79%	(increase)	of	the	total	volume,	but	the	
top	10	makes	up	88%	(decrease).	This	implies	that	the	funding	volume	in	North	America	is	
primarily	funneled	through	the	biggest	CFPs	in	this	region.	Europe	however,	has	experienced	
the	opposite.	In	2011	the	top	5	European	CFPs	held	95%	of	the	European	market	share	and	
the	top	10	CFPs	held	97%	of	the	market	share.	In	2014	both	indicators	have	decreased	
significantly:	the	top	5	and	top	10	CFPs	are	now	responsible	for	64%	and	75%,	respectively	
(Massolution,	2015).	Furthermore,	as	illustrated	in	figure	4	below,	the	European	
crowdfunding	volume	is	distributed	over	a	larger	number	of	CFPs	than	the	North	American	
crowdfunding	volume.		
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Figure	4.	Global	distribution	of	CFPs.	Data	from	Massolution	(2015)	
	
Based	on	the	authors’	research	on	different	CFPs,	it	is	also	found	that	European	CFPs	often	
specialize	in	a	particular	crowdfunding	model	or	service,	and	target	specific	investors	and	
entrepreneurs.	The	US	CFPs	on	the	other	hand,	might	specialize	in	a	crowdfunding	model,	
but	it	seems	that	they	typically	target	the	general	population	rather	than	a	segment	of	the	
population	(with	the	exception	of	equity	crowdfunding).	
	
Lastly,	the	CFPs	in	North	America	are	regulated	under	the	same	US	legislation,	whereas	the	
CFPs	in	Europe	are	commonly	regulated	under	the	legislation	of	the	country	of	residence.	
This	may	imply	that	the	European	market	actually	needs	more	CFPs	in	different	countries	in	
order	to	meet	the	demand	from	crowdfunders	and	entrepreneurs.	However,	this	
explanation	is	subject	to	change,	since	the	continuous	evolvement	of	crowdfunding	in	
Europe	promotes	change	in	legislation	on	a	domestic	level	but	also	on	a	EU/EEA	level.	
	
5.3.2. Crowdfunding	platforms	by	model	
Platforms	offer	different	services	to	both	crowdfunder	and	entrepreneur.	Some	platforms	
contain	several	of	the	different	crowdfunding	models	but	have	main	emphasis	on	one	
model,	while	other	platforms	specialize	on	one	of	the	models	only.	Even	though	two	CFPs	in	
the	same	country	might	specialize	in	e.g.	equity	crowdfunding,	their	requirements,	services	
and	offerings	could	be	different.	For	example,	the	UK	equity	CFPs	Crowdcube,	Seedrs	and	
SyndicateRoom	differ	substantially:	on	SyndicateRoom,	a	business	angel	acts	as	the	lead	
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investor	and	negotiates	the	terms	of	the	deal.	These	terms	will	apply	to	both	the	angel	and	
the	crowdfunders	who	wishes	to	invest	after	the	angel.	On	Crowdcube,	crowdfunders	hold	
shares	directly,	and	on	Seedrs,	all	the	shares	are	pooled	in	a	special	purpose	vehicle	(SPV),	
where	Seedrs	acts	as	a	nominee	on	behalf	of	all	its	crowdfunders.		
	
Reports	on	1250	CFPs	indicate	the	following	global	distribution	on	CFPs	based	on	
crowdfunding	model,	where	the	model	that	the	CFP	has	main	emphasis	on	is	registered:	
	
	
Figure	5.	Distribution	of	CFPs	based	on	crowdfunding	model.	Data	from	Massolution	(2015)	
	
Due	to	their	relatively	new	entrance,	hybrid	and	royalty	crowdfunding	CFPs	only	account	for	
a	small	share.	There	is	a	majority	of	reward	and	donation	CFPs,	arguably	because	reward	and	
donation	crowdfunding	tend	to	be	less	strictly	regulated,	thus	making	it	easier	to	provide	the	
service.	Loan	CFPs	also	have	a	substantial	share	of	total	CFPs.	This	is	probably	due	to	its	high	
volume	($11,08	billion	in	2014,	68,4%	of	total	crowdfunding	volume)	and	growth,	which	
could	signal	lucrative	business	opportunities.	The	large	number	of	equity	CFPs	might	seem	
counterintuitive,	as	equity	crowdfunding	has	been	premature	in	many	markets.	A	possible	
explanation	may	be	that	operating	equity	CFP	is	profitable,	since	historically	the	actors	
involved	have	been	high	net	worth	individuals	and	business	angels.	
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5.3.3. Characteristics	of	crowdfunding	platforms	
It	is	often	free	to	become	a	member	on	CFPs,	but	crowdfunders	typically	pay	a	small	
percentage	of	the	invested	amount	which	the	CFPs	label	as	a	transaction	fee.	Entrepreneurs	
will	on	the	other	hand	be	subject	to	a	larger	cost.	Some	CFPs	operate	with	a	fixed	initial	fee	
when	the	entrepreneur	starts	her	campaign,	and	a	success	fee	that	incurs	if	the	funding	goal	
is	reached.	The	success	fee	is	a	percentage	that	is	typically	between	5-10%	of	the	total	
amount	of	funds	raised.	In	comparison,	underwriter	spread	for	an	IPO	is	approximately	7%	
of	issue	gross	proceeds	(Lee,	Lochhead	and	Ritter,	1996;	Chen	and	Ritter,	2000;	PwC,	2015).		
	
The	fee	that	most	CFPs	charge	if	a	campaign	is	successful	helps	align	interests	with	
entrepreneurs,	while	also	reducing	the	entrepreneurs’	risk	of	losing	money	if	the	campaign	
should	fail.	However,	it	could	potentially	also	damage	investor-entrepreneur	relationships	
regarding	the	true	quality	of	the	project	(which	occurs	due	to	information	asymmetry).	
Previous	entrepreneurship	theory	(e.g.	Wickham,	2006)	suggests	that	entrepreneurs	have	
incentives	to	be	overly	optimistic	(i.e.	understate	risk)	about	their	business	plan	when	
presenting	it	to	investors,	in	order	to	get	a	higher	compensation	for	their	equity	(or	product).	
Rational	investors	should	anticipate	this	behavior	and	therefore	take	their	money	elsewhere,	
forcing	the	entrepreneur	to	choose	less	preferred	investors10.	If	crowdfunders,	assumed	to	
be	less	sophisticated	than	traditional	investors,	recognize	such	overly	optimistic	action	is	less	
likely	but	requires	more	research.	Conversely,	one	might	think	that,	in	the	long	run,	CFPs	are	
dependent	on	investors	receiving	a	return	on	investment.	Otherwise,	the	CFP	could	earn	a	
bad	reputation	and	be	avoided	by	crowdfunders.	This	could	reduce	the	likelihood	of	CFPs	
influencing	entrepreneurs	to	present	overly	optimistic	business	plans.	However,	as	
crowdfunders	are	argued	to	be	motivated	by	more	than	financial	factors,	some	might	care	
less	about	a	low	or	negative	return	on	investment,	which	in	turn	could	reduce	the	CFPs’	
potential	reputation	problem.		
	
As	mentioned,	CFPs	that	specialize	in	the	same	model	often	differ	from	one	another	by	
providing	the	crowdfunder	and	the	entrepreneur	with	different	tools	and	services,	and	by	
targeting	different	segments	of	the	market.	Some	reward	CFPs	may	only	accept	projects	
																																																						
10	Both	the	entrepreneur	and	the	investor	are	then	worse	off	than	if	they	had	agreed	on	a	realistic	business	
plan,	thereby	resulting	in	the	well-known	prisoner’s’	dilemma	(Wickham,	2006)	
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related	to	culture	(e.g.	film,	music	and	art),	while	some	reward	CFPs	only	may	accept	
innovative	technology	projects.	Some	equity	CFPs	in	Europe	only	allow	high	net	worth	
individuals,	business	professionals	and	angel	investors	to	invest	through	their	platform.	By	
limiting	the	investors	to	a	group	of	resourceful	individuals,	equity	campaigns	have	the	
potential	to	be	fully	funded	within	hours	or	days.	Further,	the	services	CFPs	provide	may	be	
professional	marketing	assistance,	legal	documentation	and	post-campaign	advisory.		
	
When	an	entrepreneur	initiates	a	reward	or	equity	campaign,	the	CFP	typically	requires	the	
entrepreneur	to	provide	sufficient	information	about	her	project.	This	is	part	of	the	due-
diligence	process	that	most	CFPs	perform	when	assessing	whether	or	not	a	project	should	be	
featured	on	their	CFP.	This	process	varies	a	lot	in	complexity.	Some	equity	CFPs	require	
detailed	legal	documentation,	business	plans	and	financial	forecasts,	while	some	reward	
CFPs	only	require	a	business	idea	pitch	in	the	form	of	text	or	short	video.	Because	of	the	
differences	in	what	is	required	from	the	CFP,	it	is	important	the	entrepreneur	uses	a	CFP	that	
meets	her	needs.		
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6. Crowdfunding	market	overview	
This	chapter	examines	the	leading	markets	for	crowdfunding	in	Europe.	The	chapter	starts	
by	explaining	the	current	regulatory	situation	for	cross-border	transactions	in	Europe,	
followed	by	a	brief	overview	of	the	crowdfunding	activity	in	the	UK,	Germany	and	France.	
Lastly,	recent	changes	in	the	North	American	regulation	and	legislation	are	presented.	
	
6.1. Europe		
Differences	in	regulation	among	EU	and	EEA	countries	can	make	it	difficult	for	both	
crowdfunders	and	entrepreneurs	to	make	cross	border	transactions.	Furthermore,	the	legal	
frameworks	of	European	countries	were	initially	not	engineered	for	the	new	concept	that	is	
equity	crowdfunding.	To	simplify	the	equity	crowdfunding	process,	many	European	
countries	are	now	introducing	new	domestic	laws	for	regulating	crowdfunding	activity.	
These	new	rules	might	be	appropriate	for	the	domestic	activity,	but	for	the	purpose	of	cross	
border	crowdfunding	transactions	it	may	have	a	hampering	effect	(Gabison,	2015).	
Therefore,	a	harmonization	of	legislation	and	regulation	for	crowdfunding	in	the	EU	and	EEA	
might	benefit	the	European	crowdfunding	activity.		
	
In	September	2015,	the	European	Commission	published	“The	action	plan	on	building	a	
capital	markets	union”.	In	the	report,	the	commission	recognizes	crowdfunding	as	an	
alternative	financing	form	for	startups	and	small	and	medium	enterprises	(SMEs),	and	they	
further	highlight	the	need	for	regulation	and	legislation	that	can	make	crowdfunding	
accessible	between	member	countries.	The	European	Commission	is	set	to	publish	a	new	
statement	on	these	issues	and	possible	solutions	in	the	first	quarter	of	2016.	Until	then,	they	
are	only	monitoring	and	gathering	information	in	regard	to	the	European	crowdfunding	
activity	(The	European	Commission,	2015b).	
	
Currently,	a	possible	solution	to	cross	border	crowdfunding	transactions	in	the	EU	and	EEA	is	
The	Market	in	Financial	Instruments	Directive	(MiFID).	MiFID	is	an	EU	law	that	provides	
regulations	related	to	investment	services	for	all	the	31	member	states	of	the	EEA	(ESMA,	
2014).	The	main	objective	of	the	directive	is	to	protect	investors	and	increase	competition	in	
investment	services.	By	obtaining	a	MiFID	license,	a	CFP	can	have	operations	in	its	residing	
	 43	
country	and	in	member	countries	of	the	EEA.	Investors	and	entrepreneurs	who	use	MiFID	
licensed	CFPs	are	also	subject	to	the	domestic	legislation	in	their	country	of	residence	
(ESMA,	2014).		
	
In	order	to	obtain	a	MiFID	license,	CFPs	have	to	consult	with	the	financial	supervisory	
authority	of	their	resident	country.	In	April	2015,	the	Finnish	CFP	Invesdor	obtained	a	MiFID	
license	from	the	Finnish	Financial	Authority,	becoming	the	first	European	CFP	to	have	a	
license	to	offer	services	across	the	EEA.		
	
6.2. The	United	Kingdom	
The	UK	accounts	for	a	substantial	amount	of	the	global	crowdfunding	volume.	This	is	mainly	
due	to	the	large	amount	of	loan	crowdfunding	activity:	UK	CFPs	lent	out	$1,32	billion	to	
individuals	and	$997	million	to	businesses	in	2014,	as	illustrated	in	table	4	below.	Total	UK	
crowdfunding	amounted	to	$2,5billion	(Wardrop	et	al.,	2015).	
	
Model	 Growth	2012-2014	 Volume	2014	
Loan	-	Business	 253%	 $997	million	
Loan	–	Individuals	 113%	 $1	320	million	
Equity	 420%	 $147	million	
Reward	 176%	 $45	million	
Donation	 100%	 $4	million	
	
Table	4.	UK:	Average	three-year	crowdfunding	growth	rates	and	volumes,	2012-2014.	Data	from	
Wardrop	et	al.	(2015)	
	
Loan	crowdfunding	in	the	UK	follows	the	exponential	growth	the	global	market	has	
experienced.	In	regard	to	the	crowdfunding	industry,	reward	crowdfunding	has	had	a	stable	
growth	for	the	last	three	years,	whereas	equity	crowdfunding	in	the	UK	has	experienced	high	
growth.	This	is	illustrated	in	figure	6.	Possible	explanations	for	the	high	growth	may	be	the	
establishment	of	more	specialized	equity	CFPs,	more	suitable	regulation	and	legislation,	
along	with	the	general	development	of	crowdfunding.		
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Figure	6.	UK:	Crowdfunding	volume,	2012-2014.	Data	from	Wardrop	et	al.	(2015)	
	
Compared	to	the	other	European	markets,	the	relationship	between	UK	equity	
crowdfunding	investments	and	venture	capital	investments	in	UK	companies	is	high,	at	
13,3%11.	This	may	suggest	that	equity	crowdfunding	is	becoming	more	of	a	real	substitute	to	
traditional	equity	financing	for	startups	(Groom,	2015).	Special	for	the	UK,	there	seems	to	be	
a	trend	where	more	and	more	institutional	investors	participate	in	the	crowdfunding	
market.	Bruce	Davis,	a	representative	the	UK	crowdfunding	association	(UKCFA),	emphasizes	
that	this	could	be	a	problem	for	the	future	UK	crowdfunding	market,	seeing	that	smaller	
investors	(the	real	crowd)	might	be	crowded	out	by	institutions	(Wardrop	et	al.,	2015).	For	
entrepreneurs,	however,	this	situation	could	increase	supply	of	funds,	thereby	potentially	
making	it	easier	to	obtain	funding.	
	
																																																						
11	Equity	CF	/	(VC	startup	+	VC	later	stage)	=	147	/	(523+583)	≈	0,133.	Numbers	from	figure	7.	
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Figure	7.	Startup	and	later	stage	venture	investments	in	UK	companies,	relative	to	equity,	business	loan	
and	reward	crowdfunding,	2012-2014.	Data	from	EVCA	(2015)	and	Wardrop	et	al.	(2015)	
	
Legislation	and	regulation	in	the	UK	
The	Financial	Conduct	Authority	(FCA)	regulates	crowdfunding	in	the	UK,	and	crowdfunding	
activity	falls	under	the	legal	framework	of	the	Financial	Services	and	Markets	Act	2000	
(FSMA)	(Solar	plaza,	2015).	According	to	the	FSMA,	a	company	can	raise	up	to	€5	million	in	a	
12-month	period	and	unsophisticated	investors	can	invest	up	to	€10	000	in	a	12-month	
period	(Gabison,	2015).	In	addition,	unsophisticated	investors	must	pass	an	
“appropriateness	test”	in	order	to	show	the	CFP	that	they	understand	the	risks	that	are	
involved	in	equity	crowdfunding.	Foreign	investors	are	allowed	to	invest	through	UK	CFPs,	
but	they	would	still	be	subject	to	domestic	legislation	from	their	resident	country	(Gabison,	
2015;	FCA,	2015).		
	
In	2014	the	FCA	introduced	new	rules	related	to	solicitation.	UK	CFPs	and	companies	using	
the	UK	CFPs	to	raise	funds	can	only	make	direct	offers	to	investors	who	qualify	as	a	high	net	
worth	individual,	a	sophisticated	investor	or	individuals	who	confirm	they	intend	to	invest	
less	than	10%	of	their	net	assets	in	crowdfunding	securities	(FCA,	2015).	
	
Crowdfunding	investments/pledges	are	available	to	foreign	crowdfunders.	In	regard	to	
entrepreneurs,	most	UK	CFPs	require	that	the	company	that	seeks	to	raise	funds	is	a	UK	
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limited	liability	company	(LLC)	or	limited	liability	partnership	(LLP).	Through	email	
correspondence	with	Seedrs,	a	UK	equity	CFP,	the	authors	found	that	Seedrs’	business	
model	allows	foreign	companies	to	raise	money	through	their	platform.	Other	UK	CFPs	that	
were	studied	(e.g.	Crowdcube,	SyndicateRoom)	did	not	encourage	foreign	companies	to	
raise	funds	through	their	platform.		
	
To	incentivize	investment	in	early	growth	companies	and	startups	in	the	UK,	Her	Majesty’s	
Revenue	and	Customs	(HMRC)	offer	the	Seed	Enterprise	Investment	Scheme	(SEIS)	and	the	
Enterprise	Investment	Scheme	(EIS)	to	UK	taxpayers	who	invest	in	qualifying	companies	
(Seedrs,	2015a).		
	
SEIS	is	designed	for	investments	in	startups	and	gives	the	investor	50%	of	the	amount	
invested	in	eligible	SEIS	companies,	back	to	the	investor	in	the	form	of	income	tax	relief.	
Furthermore,	if	an	investor	is	subject	to	capital	gains	tax	from	other	investments	and	has	
reinvested	his	capital	gains	in	shares	in	a	SEIS	eligible	company,	he	can	receive	50%	of	the	
invested	amount	in	capital	gains	tax	relief.	At	disposal	of	the	SEIS	eligible	shares,	should	it	
result	in	capital	gains	or	a	loss,	the	investor	will	be	exempt	from	capital	gains	tax	or	receive	
loss	relief	(Gov.UK,	2015a).	
	
EIS	is	designed	for	investment	in	companies	who	are	in	a	later	stage	than	startups.	By	
investing	in	EIS	eligible	companies,	the	investor	will	receive	30%	of	the	invested	amount	in	
income	tax	relief.	The	capital	gains	tax	obligation	from	an	investment	in	an	EIS	eligible	
company	can	be	deferred	if	the	capital	gains	are	reinvested	in	another	EIS	eligible	company.	
In	addition,	capital	gains	from	disposing	of	the	EIS	shares	or	a	potential	loss	if	the	investment	
fails,	can	result	in	capital	tax	exemption	or	loss	relief	(Gov.UK,	2015b).	
	
	
	
	
	 47	
6.3. Germany	
Total	German	crowdfunding	amounted	to	$184,2	million	in	2014.	(Wardrop	et	al.,	2015)	A	
distribution	of	crowdfunding	growth	rates	and	volume	for	Germany	is	shown	in	table	5	
below:	
Model	 Growth	2012-2014	 Volume	2014	
Loan	-	Business	 101	567%	 $8,1	million	
Loan	–	Individuals	 101%	 $106,6	million	
Equity	 174%	 $39,5	million	
Reward	 119%	 $22,3	million	
Donation	 57%	 $7,7	million	
	
Table	5.	Germany:	Average	three-year	crowdfunding	growth	rates	and	volumes,	2012-2014.	Data	from	
Wardrop	et	al.	(2015)	
	
Relative	to	the	rest	of	the	European	market,	there	has	been	equity	crowdfunding	activity	in	
Germany	for	some	time.	Table	5	illustrates	that	the	German	crowdfunding	environment	has	
not	experienced	the	same	growth	as	other	markets	in	the	time-span	2012-2014,	which	might	
be	due	to	the	fact	that	Germany	has	had	overall	crowdfunding	activity	prior	to	2012.		There	
has	been	crowdfunding	activity	in	Germany	since	2006.	Several	reward	CFPs	emerged	in	
2010,	and	in	2011,	more	equity	CFPs	entered	the	market	(ECN,	2015).	
	
	
Figure	8.	Germany:	Crowdfunding	volume,	2012-2014.	Data	from	Wardrop	et	al.	(2015)	
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German	equity	crowdfunding	volume	amounts	to	4,8%12	of	venture	investment	in	German	
companies,	which	is	considerably	lower	than	in	the	UK.	Investments	from	VC	and	private	
equity	firms	in	German	startups	have	historically	been	high,	and	are	almost	at	the	same	level	
as	in	the	UK.	Contrary	to	other	European	equity	CFPs,	many	German	equity	CFPs	specialize	in	
seed	and	startup	funding.	This	is	an	important	trait,	as	the	general	requirements	for	
launching	a	seed	capital	campaign	are	less	strict.	Intuitively,	when	a	company	seeks	seed	
funding,	one	will	not	expect	said	company	to	have	a	long	track	record	of	revenues	or	verified	
financial	statements	for	the	last	two	years.		
	
	
Figure	9.	Startup	and	later	stage	venture	investments	in	German	companies,	relative	to	equity,	
business	loan	and	reward	crowdfunding,	2012-2014.	Data	from	EVCA	(2015)	and	Wardrop	et	al.	(2015)	
	
Legislation	and	regulation	in	Germany	
German	CFPs	operate	through	the	German	Investment	Act	and	the	German	Small	Investor	
Protection	Act.	Most	of	the	investment	opportunities	that	German	CFPs	offer	are	governed	
by	the	obligation	to	publish	a	prospectus,	but	the	German	legislators	have	introduced	a	
“crowdfunding	exception”.	This	exception	excludes	equity	crowdfunding	from	several	
requirements,	including	the	requirement	of	publishing	a	prospectus	as	long	as	the	company	
raises	less	than	€2,5	million	(Solar	plaza,	2015;	Klöhn,	Hornuf	and	Schilling,	2015).	
	
German	platforms	that	offer	crowdfunders	equity	from	public	and	private	companies	are	
performing	financial	services	according	to	German	law,	and	are	thus	subject	to	the	German	
																																																						
12	Equity	CF	/	(VC	startup	+	VC	later	stage)	=	40	/	(512+326)	≈	0,048.	Numbers	from	figure	9	
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Banking	Act	and	furthermore	required	to	have	a	license	from	the	German	Federal	Financial	
Supervisory	Authority13	(BaFin)	(ECN,	2015).	Research	by	the	authors	of	this	thesis,	however,	
find	that	most	German	equity	CFPs	operate	under	an	exemption	from	this	requirement.	In	
fact,	instead	of	offering	equity,	German	equity	CFPs	operate	as	an	investment	broker	or	
contract	broker	that	offer	crowdfunders	subordinated	loans	and/or	profit-participation	
loans.	By	performing	these	services,	the	German	equity	CFPs	are	only	subject	to	acquire	a	
license	under	the	German	Trade,	Commerce	and	Industry	Regulation	Act,	which	is	a	far	less	
comprehensive	process	to	obtain	than	the	BaFin	license	(ECN,	2015).	
	
The	type	of	security	(i.e.	subordinated	loans	and/or	profit-participation	loans)	that	investors	
receive	when	investing	through	German	equity	CFPs,	can	be	characterized	as	something	in	
between	of	equity	and	debt.	The	company	seeking	funding	signs	a	loan	contract	with	a	non-
fixed	interest	rate,	where	the	future	payments	to	investors	depends	on	the	future	
performance	of	the	company	(ECN,	2015).	If	the	company	is	sold	to	a	larger	investor	(exit),	
the	investors	receive	financial	compensation	relative	to	their	initial	investment.	If	the	
company	is	not	sold	during,	or	at	the	end	of	the	loan	period,	a	valuation	of	the	company	is	
performed	and	investors	are	paid	out	a	share	in	the	company	value	according	to	their	initial	
investment.	The	initial	security	that	investors	receive	when	investing,	does	not	have	voting	
rights	and	the	security	ranks	below	other	types	of	debt	in	an	insolvency	proceeding	
(Companisto,	2015).	
	
In	order	to	protect	crowdfunders,	German	law	states	that	an	individual	may	only	invest	up	to	
€1000	in	crowdfunding	projects	during	a	12-month	period.	However,	if	the	individual	can	
provide	the	CFP	with	an	income	statement	that	proves	that	he	or	she	has	liquid	assets	of	at	
least	€100	000,	he	or	she	can	invest	up	to	€10	000	(Kelly,	2015).	Solicitation	by	German	CFPs	
is	allowed,	but	has	strict	rules.	Most	importantly,	advertisements	for	investment	
opportunities	have	to	include	warning	notices	that	explains	the	risks	a	crowdfunder	will	face	
(Klöhn,	et	al.	2015).		
	
																																																						
13	During	2014,	only	one	company	sought	financing	through	this	platform	model	(ECN,	2015).	
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Most	German	CFPs	are	open	to	foreign	crowdfunders.	However,	the	authors	found,	through	
email	correspondence	with	German	CFPs	(Companisto	and	Seedmatch),	that	foreign	
entrepreneurs	would	have	to	incorporate	a	German	limited	company	(GmbH	or	UG)	as	a	
holding	company	for	the	shares	of	the	actual	company	that	seeks	funding.	This	would	incur	
transaction	costs,	legal	work	and	additional	taxation,	which	could	reduce	the	attractiveness	
for	Norwegian	entrepreneurs	to	choose	German	CFPs.	
	
6.4. France	
During	2014,	$106	million	was	funded	through	individual	loan	crowdfunding	and	$10,7	
million	through	business	loan	crowdfunding.	Reward	crowdfunding	accounted	for	the	
second	highest	volume,	$46,9	million	while	equity	and	donation	crowdfunding	accounted	for	
$35,4	million	and	$5,9	million,	respectively	(Wardrop	et	al.	2015).	
	
Model	 Growth	2012-2014	 Volume	2014	
Loan	-	Business	 3	443%	 $10,7	million	
Loan	–	Individuals	 172%	 $106	million	
Equity	 94%	 $35,4	million	
Reward	 170%	 $46,9	million	
Donation	 97%	 $5,9	million	
	
Table	6.	France:	Average	three-year	crowdfunding	growth	rates	and	volumes,	2012-2014.	Data	from	
Wardrop	et	al.	(2015)	
	
In	October	2014,	the	French	government	passed	laws	to	facilitate	business	loan	
crowdfunding.	This	resulted	in	a	high	growth	rate	for	this	segment,	and	the	establishment	of	
over	70	domestic	companies	that	offer	crowdfunded	business	loans	to	French	businesses	
(Yoshimura,	2015).	
	
The	French	Government	seems	to	try	to	foster	the	crowdfunding	environment.	The	French	
Public	Investment	Bank	(PBI)	has	established	a	website	dedicated	to	French	CFPs	and	French	
crowdfunding	projects,	creating	a	gathering	point	for	the	French	crowdfunding	market.	The	
director	of	innovation	at	BPI	France,	Paul	Francois	Fourier,	further	emphasizes	that	
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crowdfunding	is	now	a	race	in	which	the	different	European	markets	are	positioning	
themselves	to	win	(Wenzlaff,	2014).		
	
	
Figure	10.	France:	Crowdfunding	volume,	2012-2014.	Data	from	Wardrop	et	al.	(2015)	
	
France,	as	well	as	Germany,	has	a	low	equity	crowdfunding	volume	relative	to	venture	
capital	investments,	at	approximately	3%14.	Total	investments	in	French	startups	have	
historically	been	lower	than	investments	in	German	and	UK	startups,	but	for	later	stage	
ventures,	French	companies	have	received	substantially	more	funding	than	German	later	
stage	ventures	(EVCA,	2015).	
	
	
Figure	11.	Startup	and	later	stage	venture	investments	in	French	companies,	relative	to	equity,	
business	loan	and	reward	crowdfunding,	2012-2014.	Data	from	EVCA	(2015)	and	Wardrop	et	al.	(2015)	
	
																																																						
14	Equity	CF	/	(VC	startup	+	VC	later	stage)	=	25	/	(388+439)	≈	0,03.	Numbers	from	figure	11.	
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Legislation	and	regulation	in	France	
As	mentioned,	new	regulations	for	French	crowdfunding	went	into	effect	in	October	2014.	
French	equity	CFPs	offering	equity	must	now	either	obtain	a	license	as	a	“crowd-sourced	
investment	advisor”	(CIP)	or	a	license	as	a	financial	service	provider	(PSI).	CFPs	under	the	CIP	
license	works	as	an	intermediary	between	the	crowdfunder	and	entrepreneur.	The	CIP	CFP	
can	issue	securities	from	French	public	companies	(SA)	and	French	private	companies	(SAS).	
The	latter	has	to	provide	audited	financials	for	the	previous	two	years.	The	maximum	
amount	a	SA	or	SAS	can	raise	through	a	French	CIP	CFP	is	€1	million	in	a	12-month	period.	
Investors	face	no	limitations	in	regard	to	how	much	they	can	invest,	but	CFPs	are	responsible	
to	check	whether	investors	have	enough	funds	so	that	a	potential	loss	does	not	leave	them	
in	a	personal	financial	crisis	(ACPR	Banque	de	France,	2014;	Solar	plaza,	2015).	The	CIP	CFP	is	
the	most	common	CFP-type	in	France,	but	it	can	only	offer	its	services	in	France,	restricting	
the	crowd	to	French	residents.			
	
If	a	platform	has	the	PSI	structure,	a	€125	000	capital	requirement	for	the	CFP	is	required	by	
law.	Companies	using	the	PSI	CFP	can	raise	up	to	€5	million	in	a	12-month	period.	In	
addition,	the	crowd	is	not	restricted	to	France	but	to	the	entire	EEA.	Under	the	PSI	license,	
the	CFP	can	sell	securities	directly	to	investors,	i.e.	not	just	working	as	an	intermediary	as	CIP	
CFPs	do	(Torris,	2015).		
	
The	French	CFP	Alternativa	was	in	2012	split	in	two	business	units,	AM	France	and	
Alternativa.fr.	AM	France	is	a	PSI	CFP	and	Alternativa.fr	is	a	multilateral	trading	facility	
(MTF),	which	enables	investors	to	trade	securities	in	a	secondary	market.	AM	France	and	
Alternative.fr	only	offer	services	to	sophisticated	investors	and	SA	companies.	When	
companies	raise	funds	through	AM	France,	they	are	simultaneously	listed	on	Alternativa.fr	
(Torris,	2015).	The	opportunity	to	trade	in	a	secondary	market	makes	equity	crowdfunding	
securities	more	liquid	for	crowdfunders,	which	is	an	area	the	equity	crowdfunding	industry	
in	most	countries	have	found	challenging	to	address.		
	
6.5. Recent	regulatory	changes	in	the	United	States	
The	SEC	regulates	equity	crowdfunding	in	the	US	through	the	Securities	Act	from	1933	and	
through	various	state	and	federal	regulations	(Solar	plaza,	2015).	Historically,	it	has	been	
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problematic	for	US	startups	to	raise	funds	through	equity	crowdfunding,	as	the	rules	have	
been	cumbersome	and	not	customized	to	fit	the	concept	of	crowdfunding	for	startups.	In	
addition,	only	accredited	investors15	have	been	allowed	to	invest	in	private	companies	in	the	
US.	Currently,	there	are	approximately	8	million	accredited	investors	in	the	US,	equal	to	2,5%	
of	the	total	US	population	(Barnett,	2015).	Traditionally,	if	a	US	private	company	wants	to	
sell	its	equity,	it	has	to	register	with	the	SEC	or	meet	the	exemption	criterions	that	are	set	
forth	by	Regulation	D.	Both	alternatives	bear	significant	costs	in	the	form	of	complex	
legislative	and	regulatory	burdens	(SEC,	2014).	Consequently,	this	has	made	the	offering	of	
equity	difficult	for	early	stage	companies	and	startups	in	need	of	seed	funding.		
	
On	April	5,	2012,	president	Barrack	Obama	signed	the	“Jumpstart	our	business	startups	act”	
(JOBS	act)	into	law.	The	JOBS	act	comprises	of	seven	titles,	with	the	aim	to	encourage	
funding	of	US	small	businesses	by	relaxing	various	securities	regulations	(SEC,	2015b).	For	
entrepreneurs	and	crowdfunding,	two	important	changes	are	the	SEC’s	adoption	of	
Regulation	A+	(title	IV)	and	Regulation	Crowdfunding	(title	III).	
	
6.5.1. JOBS	act	title	IV,	Regulation	A+	(currently	in	effect)	
Regulation	A+,	which	was	adopted	on	March	25,	2015,	gives	private	companies	the	
opportunity	to	raise	capital	from	both	accredited	and	non-accredited	investors.	Under	
Regulation	A+,	US	and	Canadian	companies	can	choose	to	offer	securities	up	to	$20	million	
(tier	1)	or	$50	million	(tier	2),	in	a	12-month	period.	If	the	company	decides	to	offer	
securities	for	a	maximum	of	$20	million,	it	can	decide	whether	to	adhere	to	tier	1	or	tier	2.	If	
the	company	offers	securities	under	tier	1,	it	will	have	no	limitations	regarding	the	number	
of	non-accredited	investors	or	the	amount	that	non-accredited	investors	can	invest.	
Furthermore,	under	tier	1,	companies	are	subject	to	individual	state	laws	if	they	choose	to	
sell	their	securities	in	other	states	than	the	state	where	the	company	resides.	Under	tier	2,	
non-accredited	investors	may	only	purchase	shares	in	private	companies	for	up	to	10%	of	
their	annual	income	or	net	worth,	whichever	is	greater.	The	tradeoff	by	choosing	tier	2,	
																																																						
15	Based	on	the	SEC’s	definition,	an	accredited	investor	is	an	individual	who	has	an	income	exceeding	$200	000	
in	each	of	the	two	previous	years,	or	has	joint	income	with	a	spouse	exceeding	$300	000	in	each	of	the	two	
previous	years.	Alternatively,	an	accredited	investor	can	be	an	individual	whose	net	worth,	or	joint	net	worth	
with	a	spouse	exceeds	$1	million,	excluding	the	value	of	his/her/their	primary	residence	(SEC,	2015a).	
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relative	to	tier	1,	is	that	tier	2	offerings	are	exempt	from	the	different	state	laws	in	which	the	
security	is	sold.	This	can	save	the	company	both	time	and	money	(SEC,	2015c).	
	
While	Regulation	A+	offerings	are	subject	to	less	extensive	reporting	and	less	disclosure	
requirements	than	offerings	that	are	made	under	Regulation	D,	it	is	still	a	lengthy	and	time-
consuming	process	that	is	not	very	suitable	for	startups.	Regulation	A+	is	often	referred	to	as	
the	“Mini	IPO”.	Offerings	under	tier	1	and	tier	2	would	therefore	suit	companies	that	are	not	
looking	for	seed	funds,	but	rather	companies	that	are	passed	that	stage.	The	main	factor	
that	is	important	for	equity	crowdfunding	in	regard	to	Regulation	A+,	is	that	non-accredited	
investors	are	allowed	to	invest.	
	
6.5.2. JOBS	act	title	III,	Regulation	Crowdfunding16	
The	SEC	adopted	the	Regulation	Crowdfunding	rules	on	October	30,	2015.	Under	regulation	
Crowdfunding,	the	required	legal	paperwork	and	disclosure	process	is	reduced	relative	to	
previous	regulations.	In	addition,	the	security	offering	can	be	done	through	a	registered	
crowdfunding	portal	(i.e.	CFP)	rather	than	traditional	brokers,	which	might	be	cheaper	for	
entrepreneurs.	Under	this	type	of	offering,	a	US	limited	company	can	raise	a	maximum	of	$1	
million	through	crowdfunding	offerings	in	a	12-month	period.	Further,	for	a	12-month	
period,	any	individual	with	an	annual	income	or	net	worth	less	than	$100	000	can	invest	an	
aggregate	of	$2000,	or	5%	of	the	lesser	of	his	annual	income	or	net	worth	in	crowdfunding	
offerings.	For	the	same	period,	if	an	individual’s	income	or	net	worth	is	equal	to	$100	000	or	
more,	he	can	invest	10%	of	the	lesser	of	his	annual	income	or	net	worth	(SEC,	2015d).		
	
Regulation	prior	to	the	JOBS	act	did	not	allow	any	public	solicitation	for	private	companies.	
Under	regulation	Crowdfunding,	companies	can	use	email	and	social	media	(e.g.	LinkedIn,	
Facebook,	Instagram)	to	offer	investment	opportunities.	In	contrast	to	Regulation	A+,	
Regulation	Crowdfunding	gives	startups	in	need	of	seed	funds	an	opportunity	to	address	a	
large	crowd	without	having	to	go	through	a	long	and	costly	process.	Regulation	
Crowdfunding	may	therefore	be	characterized	as	the	beginning	of	real	equity	crowdfunding	
in	the	US	(Guzik,	2015).	
																																																						
16	In	effect	from	early	2016	
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However,	as	a	foreign	entrepreneur	it	might	prove	difficult	to	raise	funds	through	equity	
crowdfunding	in	the	US.	Through	email	correspondence	with	US	equity	CFPs,	albeit	prior	to	
the	adoption	of	regulation	crowdfunding,	the	authors	found	that	US	equity	CFPs	are	willing	
to	work	with	foreign	entrepreneurs	only	if	the	entrepreneur	incorporates	a	US	limited	
company.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	 56	
7. The	Norwegian	crowdfunding	market	
This	section	examines	the	current	situation	for	crowdfunding	in	Norway,	in	addition	to	
crowdfunding	volumes	in	the	Nordic	region	(Norway,	Denmark,	Sweden,	Finland	and	
Iceland).	The	section	also	briefly	reviews	the	activity	of	traditional	sources	of	capital	for	
Norwegian	entrepreneurs	and	startups.	Lastly,	the	regulatory	challenges	that	crowdfunding	
platforms	face	in	Norway	is	discussed.	
	
7.1. Market	situation	for	Norwegian	crowdfunders	and	entrepreneurs	
There	are	a	limited	number	of	CFPs	in	Norway	which	together	cover	reward,	donation	and	
equity	crowdfunding,	e.g.	momsmeanbusiness.com	(reward),	NewJelly.com	(reward	&	
equity)	and	bidra.no	(reward	and	donation).	The	CFPs	mentioned	have	several	successful	
projects	that	have	been	financed	100%	or	more.	Still,	the	Norwegian	CFPs	seem	to	develop	
and	operate	at	a	slower	pace	than	its	competitors	in	Europe	and	in	the	US.	One	might	also	
argue	that	the	majority	of	the	Norwegian	crowd	is	less	informed	of	the	concept	of	
crowdfunding.	These	are	two	important	obstacles	that	the	Norwegian	crowdfunding	market	
needs	to	overcome.		
	
Through	email	correspondence	with	the	Finnish	CFP	“Invesdor”,	the	authors	found	that	a	
new	Invesdor	affiliate	will	become	operational	in	Norway	within	the	first	three	months	of	
2016.	Furthermore,	the	new	affiliate	will	operate	through	its	newly	obtained	MiFID	license.	
They	will	first	offer	equity	crowdfunding,	and	at	a	later	stage	introduce	loan	crowdfunding	to	
the	Norwegian	market.	Invesdor	already	has	experience	in	equity	and	loan	crowdfunding	
from	their	operations	in	Finland,	whereas	the	Norwegian	financial	crowdfunding	market	is	
practically	non-existent.	If	one	assumes	the	crowdfunding	market	in	Norway	follows	the	
same	trends	as	for	other	European	countries,	the	potential	for	a	financial	CFP	in	Norway	is	
high.	Currently,	there	are	no	CFPs	in	Norway	where	an	investor	can	make	a	financial	profit17.	
	
After	a	discussion	with	Dr.	Rotem	Shneor	(2015),	head	of	the	Nordic	Crowdfunding	Alliance	
(NCA),	the	authors	learned	that	as	a	measure	to	promote	growth	in	the	Nordic	crowdfunding	
																																																						
17	NewJelly	has	had	two	crowdfunding	campaigns	marked	as	equity	crowdfunding,	but	the	entrepreneurs	
explicitly	emphasize	that	a	financial	return	for	their	investors	is	not	a	priority.	
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market,	a	campaign	listed	on	a	NCA	partnered	CFP	would	also	be	featured	on	every	other	
CFP	that	is	a	partner	of	the	NCA.	This	could	help	solving	the	problem	of	a	limited	Norwegian	
crowd,	as	Norwegian	campaigns	will	then	also	be	listed	on	CFPs	in	Denmark	
(Booomerang.dk),	Finland	(Invesdor.com	and	Mesenaati.me)	and	on	Iceland	
(Karolinafund.com).	NCA	and	the	partner	CFPs	represent	over	30	000	individual	
crowdfunders,	distributed	among	the	Nordic	countries	(Nordic	Crowdfunding	Alliance,	
2015).		
	
As	mentioned,	Norwegian	crowdfunders	currently	have	limited	options	in	regard	to	financial	
crowdfunding.	A	Norwegian	crowdfunder	looking	for	non-financial	return	should	seek	out	
the	specific	project	that	he	wants	to	fund,	regardless	of	the	location	of	the	campaign.	If	he	
on	the	other	hand	is	looking	for	financial	return,	additional	factors	are	important,	e.g.	the	
legislation	and	regulation	of	the	country	in	which	the	CFP	resides,	domestic	legislation	and	
regulation	for	the	crowdfunder,	currency,	accessibility	and	reliability.	From	the	authors’	
research	and	correspondence	with	foreign	CFPs,	it	seems	loan	crowdfunding	for	Norwegian	
nationals	cannot	be	characterized	as	a	viable	investment	option.	However,	the	research	
suggests	that	equity	crowdfunding	in	Europe	may	be	a	realistic	investment	opportunity.	
Excluding	Nordic	CFPs,	several	European	equity	CFPs	(e.g.	Seedrs,	Crowdcube)	are	open	to	
foreign	investors.	Still,	investing	through	a	foreign	CFP	would	make	the	investor	subject	to	
both	domestic	and	foreign	legislation,	which	in	some	cases	might	be	problematic.	A	more	
harmonized	regulatory	framework	for	the	EU/EEA	could	help	mitigate	this	issue,	thereby	
benefitting	the	whole	European	crowdfunding	industry.		
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Figure	12.	The	Nordic:	Crowdfunding	volume,	2012-2014.	Data	from	Wardrop	et	al.	(2015)	
	
Despite	the	slow	development	of	crowdfunding	in	Norway,	crowdfunded	loans	to	individuals	
and	businesses	during	2014	in	the	Nordics	equaled	$115	million	and	$38	million	respectively.	
$12	million	was	raised	through	reward	campaigns,	while	donation	based	campaigns	raised	
approximately	$133	000.	During	2014,	equity	crowdfunding	activity	totaled	$5	million.	
	
	
Figure	13.	Equity	crowdfunding	volume	in	leading	European	markets	and	the	Nordics,	2012-2014.	Data	
from	Wardrop	et	al.	(2015)	
	
As	figure	13	illustrates,	the	Nordic	equity	crowdfunding	volume	has	not	yet	experienced	the	
same	growth	that	the	leading	markets	have.	A	collective	reason	for	low	Nordic	crowdfunding	
volumes	in	general	may	be	the	limited	crowd	of	the	Nordic	countries	relative	to	the	crowd	in	
the	UK,	Germany	and	France.	However,	for	equity	crowdfunding	in	the	Nordics,	the	low	
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volume	may	also	be	a	result	of	cumbersome	domestic	regulation	and	legislation.	Wardrop	et	
al.	(2015)	found	that	a	significant	amount	of	the	providers	of	alternative	finance	(i.e.	CFPs)	in	
the	Nordics	believed	that	current	legislation	and	regulation	in	their	country	was	excessive	
and	too	strict.	Contrary	to	France,	where	the	government	has	acknowledged	crowdfunding	
as	a	focus	area,	indications	are	that	Nordic	countries	lag	behind	in	the	process	of	facilitating	
equity	crowdfunding	on	a	domestic	level.	
	
	
	
Figure	14.	Reward	crowdfunding	volume	in	leading	European	markets	and	the	Nordics,	2012-2014.	
Data	from	Wardrop	et	al.	(2015)	
	
Reward	crowdfunding	has	fewer	legal	constraints	in	regard	to	cross-border	transactions.	This	
might	explain	why	the	Nordic	region	has	experienced	the	high	three-year	average	growth	of	
143%	in	this	segment.	Albeit,	the	Nordic	volume	is	still	low	compared	to	the	rest	of	the	
European	market.		
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Figure	15.	Business	loan	crowdfunding	volume	in	France,	Germany	and	the	Nordics,	2012-2014.	Data	
from	Wardrop	et	al.	(2015)	
	
In	the	above	table,	volumes	for	the	UK	is	excluded	in	order	to	increase	the	illustrative	effect	
of	the	other	markets.	Contrary	to	volumes	of	the	other	segments	of	crowdfunding,	business	
loan	crowdfunding	in	the	Nordics	is	higher	than	in	France	and	Germany.	As	previously	
explained,	French	business	loan	crowdfunding	activity	was	first	initiated	in	October	2014,	
when	proper	legislation	was	introduced.	Furthermore,	German	CFPs	providing	crowdfunded	
business	loans	are	required	to	have	a	partner	bank,	to	whom	they	pay	a	commission	on	
issued	loans,	making	margins	lower	and	operations	less	profitable	(Vasagar,	2015).	
		
One	major	obstacle	that	Norwegian	entrepreneurs	face	is	the	lack	of	Norwegian	funding	
sources	and	available	capital.	Dr.	Rotem	Shneor	(2015)	with	the	NCA	emphasizes	this	
problem	and	claims	the	solution	could	be	crowdfunding.	In	order	to	assess	this	claim,	it	is	
relevant	to	look	at	the	availability	of	capital	by	examining	startup/SME	lending	and	venture	
investments	in	the	Norwegian	market.	Both	loan	and	equity	crowdfunding	could	be	
characterized	as	substitutes	to	the	funding	sources	mentioned	above.	Theoretically,	the	
accessibility	of	crowdfunded	capital	is	higher	than	traditional	business	loans	and	venture	
capital,	if	one	assumes	that	banks	have	requirements	that	often	are	unrealistic	(e.g.	credit	
history	and	years	of	revenues)	for	most	startups.	Furthermore,	the	number	of	startups	
funded	via	VC	firms	is	only	a	fraction	of	the	number	of	startups	in	need	of	funding	(as	
illustrated	in	figure	17	below).	
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7.2. Venture	capital	activity	in	Norway	
In	2014,	venture	capital	and	private	equity	firms	(domestic	and	foreign)	invested	$74,4	
million	in	startup	ventures	and	$82,7	million	in	later	stage	ventures	in	Norway,	totaling	
$157,1	million.	In	addition,	the	Norwegian	private	equity	market	experienced	an	all	time	
high	investment	level	from	foreign	investors	in	2014	(NVCA.no,	2015).	
	
	
Figure	16.	Startup	and	later	stage	venture	investment	volumes	in	Norwegian	firms,	by	Norwegian	and	
foreign	VC	and	PE-firms,	2010-2014.	Data	from	EVCA	(2015)	
	
The	invested	amount	has	declined	for	the	past	four	years,	but	experienced	an	upturn	in	
2014.	Figure	16	illustrates	that	the	total	level	of	available	capital	has	decreased	in	the	past	
five	years.	In	addition	to	a	decrease	in	value	of	investments,	there	has	also	been	a	decrease	
in	number	of	investment	deals,	as	shown	in	figure	17.	
	
	
Figure	17.	Number	of	Norwegian	startup	and	later	stage	firms	invested	in	by	Norwegian	and	foreign	VC	
and	private	equity	firms,	2010-2014.	Data	from	EVCA	(2015)	
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By	examining	figure	16	and	figure	17	together,	one	can	see	there	is	a	gap	that	is	not	being	
filled.	If	one	assumes	that	entrepreneur	demand	for	capital	has	not	decreased	accordingly,	
this	leaves	Norwegian	entrepreneurs	with	a	more	limited	supply	of	investor	capital.	When	
the	supply	decreases,	the	competition	for	the	available	capital	intensifies	(given	above	
assumption).	Ultimately,	this	might	result	in	a	disruptive	innovative	environment,	where	
potentially	prosperous	businesses	and	entrepreneurs	either	fail	to	obtain	capital	or	lose	
motivation	due	to	the	unavailability	of	capital.	To	ensure	the	future	of	Norwegian	
innovation,	it	is	important	that	demand	is	met	with	supply,	but	it	seems	that	this	is	currently	
not	true	for	the	Norwegian	market.		
	
	
	
Figure	18.	Share	of	amount	invested	in	Norwegian	startups,	by	domestic	and	foreign	VC	and	PE	firms,	
2012-2014.	Data	from	EVCA	(2015)	
	
Venture	capital	and	private	equity	firms	that	invest	in	Norwegian	companies	tend	to	have	a	
preference	for	certain	sectors,	as	illustrated	in	figure	18.	Over	the	last	years,	more	than	50%	
of	total	funds	invested	have	been	invested	in	energy	&	environment	and	computer	&	
consumer	electronics.		
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7.3. SME	lending	in	Norway	
Figure	19	illustrates	the	outstanding	business	loans	in	Norway,	2007-2012.	As	one	can	see,	
the	amount	of	total	outstanding	business	loans	comprises	of	a	large	portion	of	SME	loans.		
	
	
Figure	19.	Outstanding	business	loans	issued	in	Norway,	2007-2012.	Data	from	OECD	(2015)	
	
The	explanation	for	the	big	portion	of	SME	lending	relative	to	total	business	loans	might	be	
twofold:	It	could	be	that	the	conditions	for	SMEs	to	obtain	loans	are	getting	more	relaxed,	or	
it	could	be	that	the	category	total	business	loans	is	not	representative	since	bigger	
companies	finance	themselves	through	other	sources	than	bank	loans.	
	
Large	firms	are	generally	able	to	finance	themselves	through	the	market	by	issuing	debt	and	
equity	securities,	making	them	less	dependent	on	bank	financing	(OECD,	2015).	Most	SMEs	
and	startups	do	not	share	this	benefit,	and	it	is	challenging	for	them	to	obtain	debt	
financing.	This	makes	them	more	vulnerable	to	changing	conditions	and	requirements	in	the	
credit	market,	which	could	potentially	make	it	more	difficult	to	obtain	debt	financing.		
	
Innovation	Norway	is	a	government	organization	that	helps	entrepreneurs,	startups	and	
SMEs	by	offering	them	advisory	services	and	financial	support.	The	financial	support	
Innovation	Norway	offers	is	high-risk	loans,	low-risk	loans	or	grants	(Innovation	Norway,	
2015a).	The	loans	are	priced	above	market	interest	rates,	and	premiums	vary	in	regard	to	
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the	lender’s	risk.	Furthermore,	the	maturity	is	up	to	ten	years,	which	is	often	the	duration	of	
the	project,	and	required	collateral	is	usually	below	the	collateral	that	banks	require.	The	
grants	provided	by	Innovation	Norway	are	normally	one	third	of	the	project	costs,	but	they	
also	vary	depending	on	the	company	size	(OECD,	2015).	In	order	to	obtain	such	grants,	
Innovation	Norway	must	find	the	company’s	application,	business	plan	and	growth	potential	
viable	and	within	scope.		
	
In	Innovation	Norway’s	annual	report	(2015b),	it	is	emphasized	that	Norwegian	startups	and	
growth	companies	need	to	grow	internationally.	Norwegian	businesses	with	good	
specialized	business-ideas	and	high	growth	potential	have	difficulties	realizing	their	growth	
potential	in	Norway,	due	to	the	small	Norwegian	market.	A	Norwegian	crowdfunding	market	
open	to	crowdfunders	abroad	could	help	bring	in	much	needed	capital	to	fund	future	
innovation	and	ventures	in	Norway.	
	
7.4. Legal	aspects	concerning	financial	crowdfunding	in	Norway	
Two	obstacles	for	financial	crowdfunding	in	Norway	are	the	Norwegian	concession	and	
prospect	rules.	The	concession	rules	state	that	some	entities	need	permission	from	legal	
authorities	to	initiate	business	activity,	while	the	prospect	rules	require	some	entities	to	
draft	a	prospect	when	offering	tradable	securities.		
	
7.4.1. Legal	challenges	for	equity	crowdfunding	in	Norway	
Stock	emission	
Equity	crowdfunding	requires	that	the	entrepreneur	is	a	juridical	person	in	the	form	of	a	
company,	since	the	exchange	consists	of	funds	for	ownership	(company	equity).	This	means	
that	the	entrepreneur	has	to	choose	between	different	company	structures.	The	most	
common	structure	in	Norway	is	“aksjeselskap/AS”,	the	Norwegian	equivalent	for	a	limited	
liability	company.	With	this	company	structure,	the	entrepreneur	and	other	share	owners	
bear	no	personal	responsibility	for	the	company’s	liabilities.	To	establish	an	AS,	one	needs	at	
least	NOK	30	000	initial	share	capital,	which	was	recently	reduced	from	NOK	100	000	(Altinn,	
2014).	The	low	personal	risk	and	low	capital	requirement	for	establishment	makes	the	
company	structure	well	suited	for	equity	crowdfunding.	Still,	there	are	a	few	legal	challenges	
regarding	equity	crowdfunding	for	this	company	structure.	The	Limited	Liability	Companies	
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Act	(1997)	states	that	only	(current)	share	owners	or	specifically	named	persons	may	be	
invited	to	buy	new	shares	during	an	emission,	cf.	asl.	§	10-1.	This	means	that	issuing	equity	
shares	in	a	company	through	a	crowdfunding	platform	to	the	public	may	in	fact	be	illegal	for	
an	AS.	However,	there	might	be	a	way	around	this	constraint.	As	mentioned	by	Hermansen	
(2014),	asl.	§	10-1	does	not	state	that	approaching	the	public	with	an	offer	to	later	buy	
equity	shares	is	illegal.	As	long	as	there	is	no	formal	commitment	either	by	the	entrepreneur	
or	the	investor	during	the	crowdfunding	process,	asl.	§	10-1	seems	not	to	be	violated.	The	
crowdfunding	campaign	can	then	instead	be	used	as	a	means	to	locate	potential	investors,	
with	no	formal	commitment,	and	then	in	the	next	round	the	company	can	specifically	name	
those	interested	in	a	formal	offer	towards	investors.	A	CFP	that	practices	equity	
crowdfunding	in	this	way	is	the	Swedish	FundedByMe.	Their	terms	of	service,	under	equity	
crowdfunding	section	3,	states	the	following:		
	
During	the	campaign,	a	Member	may	offer	to	participate	in	the	fundraising	by	specifying	the	
amount	such	Member	would	like	to	invest.	Any	offer	by	a	Member	to	invest	(including	
submission	of	a	specified	amount)	constitutes	a	non-binding	offer	to	invest	by	such	Member.	
Such	offer	may	thereafter	be	accepted	or	rejected	by	the	Company	being	subject	to	the	
Equity	Crowdfunding	Campaign	(FundedByMe,	2015a).	
	
Concession	rules	
According	to	the	Securities	Trading	Act	(2007),	Financial	securities	companies	in	Norway	
need	concession	from	legal	authorities	to	do	business,	cf.	vphl.	§	9-1.	The	first	sentence	
states	(translated	from	Norwegian):	“Investment	services	provided	on	a	commercial	basis	can	
only	be	provided	by	businesses	which	have	approval	for	this	from	the	department”.	
Furthermore,	investment	service	is	defined	as	“reception	and	dissemination	of	orders	on	
behalf	of	customer	regarding	one	or	more	financial	instruments	as	defined	in	§	2-2”,	cf.	vphl.	
§	2-1.	As	tradable	securities	fall	under	the	definition	of	financial	instrument,	cf.	vphl.	§	2-2,	it	
is	not	impossible	that	equity	CFPs	will	be	classified	as	a	securities	company	and	hence	need	
concession	from	legal	authorities.	This	might	increase	transaction	costs	and	complicate	the	
crowdfunding	environment.	
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Prospect	rules	
A	prospect	document	should	include	information	that	is	necessary	for	the	investor	to	be	able	
to	make	a	well-founded	assessment	of	the	issuer’s	financial	position	and	prospects,	and	of	
rights	concerning	issued	securities,	cf.	vphl.	§	7-13	first	section.	These	documents	can	be	
comprehensive	and	time-consuming	to	make,	and	is	therefore	a	potential	barrier	for	equity	
crowdfunding	in	Norway.	
	
Norwegian	companies	have	two	kinds	of	prospect	rules	that	might	apply	when	issuing	
shares:	Norwegian	prospect	rules	and	European	prospect	rules	(EEA	prospects).	The	former	
rules	have	less	demanding	information	requirement	than	the	latter	(PwC,	2012).	Norwegian	
prospect	rules	apply	when	issuing	shares	towards	150	people	or	more	and	at	a	total	value	of	
at	least	€1	million	during	a	12-month	period,	cf.	vphl.	§	7-2.	If	the	entrepreneur	issue	shares	
at	a	total	value	of	€5	million	or	more,	during	a	12-month	period,	she	must	instead	follow	the	
mentioned	EEA	prospect	rules,	cf.	vphl.	§	7-7.	This	means	that	as	long	as	the	crowdfunding	
campaign	is	either	focused	towards	less	than	150	people	or	collects	less	than	$	1	million,	the	
prospect	rules	do	not	apply.		
	
7.4.2. Legal	challenges	for	loan	crowdfunding	in	Norway	
Concession	rules	
Funding	activity	is	defined	in	the	The	Financial	Institutions	Act	(1988)	as	to	provide,	broker	or	
act	as	guarantee	for	credit	or	in	any	other	way	contribute	to	financing	of	businesses	other	
than	self-owned,	cf.	finansvl.	§	1-2.	Furthermore,	only	some	financial	institutions	have	the	
right	to	conduct	funding	activity,	e.g.	funding	firms,	cf.	finansvl.	§	1-4.	Funding	firms,	
however,	need	concession	to	operate,	cf.	finansvl.	§	3-3.	Finansvl.	§	1-4	also	states	that	
brokering	of	loans	is	not	limited	by	mentioned	paragraph.	A	loan	brokerage	firm	is	defined	
as	a	firm	that	does	no	other	funding	business	than	brokering,	cf.	finansvl.	§	1-5	second	
section.	This	means	that	if	a	CFP	were	to	structure	its	business	so	that	it	is	a	loan	brokerage	
firm,	meaning	it	never	actually	receives/sends	capital	from/to	the	
crowdfunder/entrepreneur,	it	seems	it	will	not	need	concession	to	operate.	It	will	then	act	
as	an	intermediary,	a	third	party,	and	only	organize	deals	between	investor	and	
entrepreneur	without	controlling	the	actual	transaction.	If	the	CFP	receives	money	from	the	
investor	and	then	itself	sends	it	to	the	entrepreneur,	it	will	be	defined	as	a	funding	firm	and	
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therefore	need	permission	from	legal	authorities.	Still,	loan	brokerage	firms	are	required	by	
law	to	deliver	a	report	about	their	business	on	a	form	of	which	the	authorities	determine,	cf.	
finansvl.	§	4-1.		
	
The	Swedish	CFP	previously	mentioned,	FundedByMe,	seems	to	have	structured	itself	as	to	
avoid	concession	challenges	similar	to	the	Norwegian	rules.	The	following	is	stated	in	its	
terms	of	service,	under	“fees	and	payment	terms”	section	1:		
	
Payment	for	funding	in	an	Equity	Crowdfunding	Campaign	shall	always	be	made	from	the	
Investor	to	the	Entrepreneur,	and	payment	of	a	Loan	within	Loan	Crowdfunding	shall	always	
be	made	from	the	Lender	to	the	Borrower,	and	shall	not	at	any	time	be	made	to	
FundedByMe.	All	payment	shall	be	made	in	accordance	with	the	instructions	set	forth	on	the	
Website,	e.g.	by	the	use	of	the	Payment	Service	Provider	as	specified	by	FundedByMe.	Hence,	
FundedByMe	shall	not	take	possession	of	Campaign	funds	at	any	time	(FundedByMe,	2015a).	
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8. Guide:	Why	and	how	to	use	crowdfunding	for	raising	capital	
8.1. Traditional	funding	versus	crowdfunding:	Cost	of	raising	funds	
There	are	several	factors	an	entrepreneur	should	evaluate	when	considering	whether	to	
raise	capital	by	traditional	funding	or	crowdfunding.	This	section	briefly	examines	a	few	
factors	that	could	affect	the	cost	of	raising	funds	when	comparing	the	two.	Traditional	
funding	is	used	as	an	umbrella	term	for	all	funding	that	is	not	crowdfunding,	while	
crowdfunding	is	used	as	an	umbrella	term	for	reward,	equity	and	loan	crowdfunding.		
	
Network	and	expertise	
In	the	literature	review,	it	is	stressed	that	traditional	funding	(e.g.	venture	capital	or	angel	
investment)	often	brings	additional	value	to	the	company	in	the	form	of	startup	expertise	
and	high	value	networks.	As	most	crowdfunders	are	assumed	to	be	small,	and	often	
unsophisticated,	it	is	unlikely	that	the	entrepreneur	will	receive	the	same	benefits	from	
crowdfunding.	And	if	some	of	the	potential	crowdfunders	possess	expertise	or	network	
beneficial	to	the	entrepreneur,	their	individual	gain	of	sharing	such	information	is	low	due	to	
their	low	stake	in	the	company.	The	alternative	cost	of	forgoing	such	value	should	be	
included	when	calculating	the	cost	of	raising	funds	via	crowdfunding.	
	
Furthermore,	as	venture	capitalists	or	angel	investors	sometimes	also	have	expertise	
regarding	the	product	or	industry,	and	valuation	of	startups	in	general,	the	asymmetric	
information	problem	might	be	lower	than	for	crowdfunding.	If	the	entrepreneur	is	of	high	
quality,	and	the	traditional	investors	recognize	this,	it	could	increase	their	willingness	to	pay	
a	fairer	price	for	the	equity	that	is	offered.	As	argued	in	the	literature	review,	this	
information	asymmetry	could	make	crowdfunding	more	attractive	to	low	quality	
entrepreneurs	and	lead	to	adverse	selection.	An	extreme	potential	consequence	of	this	is	
the	“market	for	lemons”,	as	described	by	Akerlof	(1970),	where	investors	are	unable	to	
identify	and	separate	low	quality	from	high	quality.	If	such,	investors	are	likely	to	require	
discounts	even	from	high	quality	investors,	as	they	cannot	identify	them	to	be	of	high	
quality.	This	should	theoretically	increase	the	cost	of	raising	funds	via	crowdfunding,	but	as	
research	on	the	behavior	of	crowdfunders	so	far	is	limited	it	is	too	early	to	argue	if	such	a	
statement	is	true	or	false.		
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A	counter-argument	to	the	asymmetric	information	problem	for	crowdfunding	is	the	
“wisdom	of	the	crowds”,	as	studied	by	Galton	(1907).	He	found	that,	during	a	contest	of	
guessing	the	weight	of	an	ox,	the	average	guess	from	a	sample	of	787	participants	was	
within	1%	of	the	correct	answer,	better	than	guesses	from	professionals	like	farmers	and	
butchers.	One	might	argue	that	the	wisdom	of	the	crowd	logic	might	apply	to	crowdfunding	
as	well.	That	is,	that	the	crowd	can	at	times	be	equally	or	more	effective	than	professional	
individuals	or	institutions	(e.g.	VC	or	angel	investors)	in	evaluating	projects,	thus	potentially	
reducing	the	possible	consequences	of	asymmetric	information.	
	
Marketing	feedback	
If	an	entrepreneur	successfully	raises	capital	through	reward	or	equity	crowdfunding,	she	
also	gets	valuable	marketing	information.	From	the	reward	model,	she	obtains	information	
about	the	demand	for	her	unfinished	product.	This	could	reduce	uncertainty	(i.e.	variance)	
about	future	demand.	From	the	equity	model,	she	receives	validation	from	a	high	amount	of	
people	that	they	see	value	in	her	project.	Importantly,	in	both	cases	she	also	gets	the	
opportunity	of	receiving	feedback	from	her	crowd.	This	potential	added	value	would	not	be	
gained	if	she	instead	raised	capital	through	traditional	funding	sources,	which	thereby	might	
indicate	a	lower	cost	of	raising	funds	via	crowdfunding	than	via	traditional	funding.	
	
Investor	management	
Capital	raised	via	traditional	funding	mechanisms	typically	involves	few	investors.	
Conversely,	crowdfunding	typically	involves	several	hundred	or	sometimes	even	thousands.	
While	a	large	crowd	potentially	comes	with	benefits	such	as	valuable	feedback,	the	time	
spent	and	costs	of	communicating	with	them	is	likely	to	be	higher	than	for	traditional	
funding.	This	could	increase	cost	of	raising	funds	via	crowdfunding	relative	to	traditional	
funding.		
	
Revealing	information:	Risk	of	imitation	and	increased	supplier	power.	
There	are	a	few	risks	linked	to	crowdfunding	that	are	less	severe	when	traditional	funding	is	
used.	One	is	the	risk	of	someone	imitating	the	business	idea.	It	lies	in	the	nature	of	
crowdfunding	to	disclose	important	product	details	to	the	public.	Depending	on	the	product,	
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some	risk	can	be	mitigated	by	patents	but	not	all.	Another	risk	is	that	potential	suppliers	may	
take	advantage	of	the	public	campaign	information	when	calculating	their	prices.	This	can	be	
solved	by	securing	supplier	contracts	prior	to	the	campaign,	but	still	has	the	potential	to	
increase	input	costs	for	the	entrepreneur.	While	it	could	be	difficult	to	calculate	the	costs	of	
mentioned	risks,	it	could	make	crowdfunding	more	expensive	relative	to	traditional	funding.		
	
Global	versus	local	
Traditional	funding	is	typically	only	available	from	investors	of	geographical	proximity	to	the	
entrepreneur,	due	to	reasons	argued	earlier.	The	selection	of	potential	investors	may	
therefore	sometimes	be	limited,	e.g.	if	she	lives	in	a	smaller	city	(although	demand	for	
capital	may	also	be	lower).	If	supply	of	capital	is	low	or	demand	is	high,	due	to	local	factors,	
the	entrepreneur	might	have	to	pay	a	higher	price	for	the	money	raised.	As	crowdfunding	is	
an	Internet	phenomenon,	it	is	potentially	borderless18.	If	she	has	a	high	quality	product	idea	
with	high	potential	demand,	she	could	exploit	investors/backers	with	the	most	willingness	to	
pay.	The	relative	value	added	of	this	effect	depends	on	local	factors	that	limit	traditional	
funding,	but	is	still	likely	to	reduce	the	cost	of	raising	funds	via	crowdfunding	compared	to	
traditional	funding.	
	
In	summary,	entrepreneurs	who	experience	less	problems	regarding	revealing	of	
information	about	their	product,	or	do	not	receive	much	additional	benefits	from	expertise	
and	network	of	institutional	investors,	should	consider	crowdfunding	as	a	viable	source	of	
capital.	
	
8.2. Choice	of	crowdfunding	model:	what	to	consider	
It	has	been	argued	that	startups	often	face	challenges	when	trying	to	obtain	funding.	
Startups	typically	own	little	assets,	making	bank	loans	more	difficult	to	get.	Furthermore,	the	
problem	of	asymmetric	information	for	investors	is	enhanced	due	to	lack	of	available	
historical	data.	VC	and	angel	investing	are	available	to	some,	but	they	prefer	to	invest	
relatively	large	amounts	and	usually	only	do	so	if	the	potential	upside	is	significant.	As	a	
																																																						
18	Although	for	reward	crowdfunding,	it	is	previously	mentioned	that	the	entrepreneur’s	social	network	is	
found	to	be	of	great	importance	and	account	for	a	high	amount	of	the	pre-sales.	As	most	of	the	entrepreneur’s	
social	network	is	likely	to	be	local,	this	relative	effect	is	diminished	for	reward	crowdfunding.	
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result,	crowdfunding	has	become	a	viable	fundraising	method.	There	are	however,	as	
mentioned	earlier,	several	crowdfunding	models	to	choose	from.	The	next	sections	will	try	
to	shed	light	on	how	the	models	differ	from	each	other	and	what	implications	an	
entrepreneur	should	be	aware	of	when	considering	crowdfunding19.	A	summarizing	table	
(table	7)	is	presented	at	the	end	of	the	subchapter,	consisting	of	reward,	equity	and	loan	
crowdfunding.	
	
8.2.1. Reward	crowdfunding	
Reward	crowdfunding	is	one	of	the	non-financial	crowdfunding	models.	Funders	of	these	
campaigns	do	not	expect	a	financial	return	on	their	pledge,	they	rather	expect	non-financial	
rewards	based	on	the	size	of	their	pledge.	The	model	is	often	compared	to	pre-purchasing,	
and	a	majority	of	the	crowdfunders	are	assumed	to	be	future	consumers	of	the	product.	
	
Funder	motivation	–	extrinsic	and	intrinsic	
As	described	in	the	literature	review,	the	motivation	behind	crowdfunders’	decision	to	
pledge	typically	varies.	However,	research	so	far	only	supports	or	rejects	predetermined	
hypothesis.	It	does	not	provide	objective	evidence,	as	crowdfunding	is	still	a	relatively	new	
phenomenon.	Still,	scholars	seem	to	agree	that	crowdfunders	of	reward	campaigns,	by	
varying	degree,	are	motivated	by	more	than	extrinsic	desires	(Belleflamme	et	al.,	2013;	
Gerber	and	Hui,	2013;	Pierrakis	and	Collins,	2013;	Cholakova	and	Clarysse,	2015).	That	is,	the	
crowdfunders	as	a	group	are	heterogeneous.	Four	motivators	are	described	by	literature:	
Desire	for	reward	(extrinsic),	the	act	of	helping	others,	being	a	part	of	a	community	and	
supporting	a	cause	(intrinsic).		
	
Crowdfunders	who,	in	addition	to	desiring	reward,	are	motivated	by	intrinsic	desires	could	
be	willing	to	pay	more	than	their	subjective	valuation	of	the	product	itself.	If	one	assumes	
that	these	motivations	exist,	it	gives	the	entrepreneur	an	opportunity	to	price	differentiate	
her	crowdfunders	by	carefully	designing	rewards	that	build	on	both	extrinsic	and	intrinsic	
desires,	and	to	exploit	their	different	willingness	to	pay.	Crowdfunders	can	then	self-select	
																																																						
19	A	general	weakness	of	the	guide	is	that	it	offers	little	insight	into	importance	of	product	theme	when	
considering	crowdfunding	(most	relevant	for	reward	crowdfunding).	The	literature	that	is	studied	typically	
examine	model	dynamics,	while	giving	less	attention	to	the	potential	implication	that	product	theme	has	on	
the	findings	(e.g.	if	technology	campaigns	share	characteristics	with	media	or	fashion	campaigns).		
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the	reward	that	fits	their	individual	preferences,	increasing	both	consumer	and	producer	
surplus.	This	consumer	discrimination	effect	is	one	of	the	main	strengths	of	reward	
crowdfunding.	Price	differentiating	is	not	possible	to	the	same	degree	with	other	
crowdfunding	models	or	traditional	financing	forms,	as	when	the	product	is	released	to	
market,	those	who	would	be	willing	to	pay	extra	in	order	to	help	realize	production	will	have	
to	pay	the	same	as	other	consumers.	Hence,	one	might	argue	that	reward	crowdfunding,	to	
some	extent,	expands	the	market	of	the	entrepreneur’s	product.	However,	this	price	
discrimination	effect	is	diminished	if	the	entrepreneur’s	capital	requirement	is	large	(as	
discussed	in	the	literature	review).		
	
Although	desire	for	reward	is	argued	to	be	the	greatest	motivator	for	most	crowdfunders	of	
this	type	of	campaign,	others	(e.g.	family	and	friends)	could	value	the	intrinsic	part	more	or	
even	pledge	without	planning	to	consume	the	future	product.	Entrepreneurs	with	this	in	
mind	could	create	reward	levels	that	focus	on	the	intrinsic	motivations,	e.g.	a	handwritten	
postcard	with	appreciations	from	the	entrepreneur	and	her	team	(emphasizing	the	“help	
others”	motivator),	or	exclusive	insight	and	updates	on	the	progress	of	the	project	or	voting	
rights	regarding	design	of	the	product	(emphasizing	the	“being	part	of	a	community”	
motivator).	Further,	depending	on	her	product,	the	entrepreneur	may	construct	her	
campaign	design	so	that	people	associate	with	these	desires.	If	the	product	focuses	on	social	
or	environmental	causes,	e.g.	an	innovative	water	cleanser	aimed	at	the	third	world	or	a	
more	energy-efficient	light	bulb,	one	might	think	that	some	of	the	potential	crowdfunders	
back	the	project	based	on	the	desire	to	support	a	cause	rather	than	the	desire	for	reward.	
The	communication	of	this	message	might	then	be	more	important	than	the	actual	rewards.		
	
Entrepreneur	motivation	–	reward	crowdfunding	is	more	than	just	financing	
The	main	motivation	of	most	fundraising	methods	is	to	raise	funds.	While	the	same	is	likely	
to	be	true	for	crowdfunding,	reward	crowdfunding	brings	more	than	just	financing.	It	could	
also	work	as	a	marketing	tool,	i.e.	a	way	to	expand	awareness	of	work	and	to	form	lasting	
connections	with	customers.	With	the	help	of	Web	2.0,	the	entrepreneur	and	more	
importantly	the	crowdfunders	may	use	their	social	media	platforms	to	influence	others	into	
supporting	the	crowdfunding	campaign.	If	the	campaign	reaches	the	right	crowd,	this	form	
of	marketing	could	prove	very	valuable	as	it	comes	from	other	consumers	and	not	just	the	
	 73	
entrepreneur	(i.e.	word-of-mouth	marketing	versus	marketing	investments).	Word-of-mouth	
customers	are	found	to	bring	more	long-term	value	to	firms	than	marketing-induced	
customers	(Villanueva,	Yoo	and	Hanssens,	2008)	and	also	come	at	a	much	lower	cost.	Also,	if	
the	campaign	is	successful	it	gives	the	entrepreneur	an	opportunity	to	build	a	fan	base	that	
otherwise	could	take	years	to	build,	by	e.g.	including	crowdfunders	in	the	production	and	
design	process.	Furthermore,	although	more	difficult	to	influence,	news	media	outlets	
sometimes	cover	crowdfunding	campaigns	which	further	increase	public	awareness	of	the	
project.	
	
In	addition	to	raising	funds,	expanding	awareness	of	work	and	establishing	connections,	
gaining	approval	is	found	to	be	a	motivation	for	some	entrepreneurs	(Gerber	and	Hui,	2013).	
If	an	entrepreneur	is	uncertain	that	there	exists	a	market	for	their	product,	reward	
crowdfunding	could	be	a	way	to	test	demand.	An	unsuccessful	campaign	might	indicate	that	
the	venture	is	risky	and	that	improvements	need	to	be	made	before	product	launch.	A	
successful	campaign	reduces	startup	risk	by	exposing	potential	demand	while	in	the	same	
team	securing	pre-orders	for	the	product.	Either	campaign	outcome,	the	entrepreneur	will	
have	increased	her	risk	knowledge	of	the	venture.		
	
Another	potential	benefit	from	gaining	approval	is	that	it	reduces	the	asymmetric	
information	problem.	Startups	typically	have	very	little	historical	data	to	present	when	
applying	for	external	finance.	Should	the	entrepreneur	need	more	capital,	e.g.	a	bank	loan	to	
improve	production	or	a	venture	investment	to	expand,	a	successful	crowdfunding	campaign	
could	serve	as	a	credible,	costly	signal	that	the	startup	is	of	quality20.	The	amount	of	money	
raised	and	number	of	supporters	could	then	be	seen	as	a	quantification	of	the	value	of	the	
startup.	
	
A	final	relevant	motivator	for	entrepreneurs	to	use	reward	crowdfunding	over	other	
fundraising	models	is	maintaining	control	of	the	startup.	Equity	crowdfunding	(and	
traditional	investment)	comes	at	the	expense	of	reduced	ownership	of	the	startup,	
																																																						
20	However,	early	(reward)	crowdfunders	might	feel	cheated	if	the	company	sells	ownership	to	external	sources	
at	a	later	stage,	as	happened	when	Oculus	Rift,	a	virtual	reality	headset	funded	on	Kickstarter,	was	acquired	by	
Facebook	in	2014:	http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/03/26/oculus-rift-kickstarter_n_5034511.html	
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sometimes	reducing	the	entrepreneur’s	creative	control	over	the	project.	However,	the	
crowd’s	ability	to	actually	implement	control	over	startups	is	not	well	documented.	
	
Idiosyncratic	risk,	return	and	signaling	
Crowdfunders	face	a	few	risks	when	backing	a	reward	crowdfunding	campaign,	which	
entrepreneurs	should	be	aware	of.	The	two	main	risks	are	fraud	and	ability	to	deliver	
reward.	While	the	fraud	rate	on	e.g.	Kickstarter	is	less	than	5%	(Mollick,	2014),	the	risk	of	
fraud	is	still	prominent.	The	capital	is	raised	up	front	and	there	is	no	clear	legal	obligation	
from	the	entrepreneur	to	deliver	the	promised	rewards.	Honest	entrepreneurs	with	this	in	
mind	should	focus	on	campaign	transparency,	so	that	crowdfunders	are	not	deterred	from	
backing	a	project	because	of	fear	of	fraud.	The	need	to	trust	the	entrepreneur	is	found	to	
positively	affect	likelihood	for	crowdfunding	success	(Cholakova	and	Clarysse,	2015).	Ability	
to	deliver	is	another	potential	risk.	Not	all	successful	crowdfunding	campaigns	eventually	
end	up	with	crowdfunders	receiving	their	rewards.	Given	high	information	asymmetry	
between	the	entrepreneur	and	the	crowdfunders,	crowdfunders	may	search	for	credible	
(costly	and	observable)	signals	(Spence,	1973)	that	reduce	risk	of	fraud	and	failure	to	deliver.	
Furthermore,	crowdfunders	of	reward	campaigns	are	assumed	to	be	less	sophisticated	than	
traditional	investors,	and	they	differ	from	traditional	investors	in	that	they	do	not	receive	
any	part	of	future	profits	from	the	company	they	pledge	to.	Instead,	they	are	likely	to	be	
future	consumers	of	the	product.	Traditional	effective	signals	may	therefore	be	less	effective	
for	this	type	of	funding,	e.g.	retaining	equity,	education	of	board	members	and	providing	risk	
details.	One	might	even	think	that	providing	too	much	details	of	risk	could	deter	those	
crowdfunders	whose	only	motivation	is	desire	for	reward,	as	the	risk	of	many	projects	is	high	
relative	to	the	objective	value	of	rewards.	
	
Research	suggests	that	preparedness21	positively	affects	likelihood	for	reward	crowdfunding	
campaign	success	(Mollick,	2014).	Including	a	well-made	video	and	regularly	providing	
campaign	updates	is	costly	and	time-consuming	for	the	entrepreneur,	and	could	therefore	
signal	determinacy	and	willingness	to	work	hard	for	the	project	to	succeed.	Grammatical	
errors	in	the	campaign	pitch	are	found	(by	Mollick,	2014)	to	negatively	affect	likelihood	for	
																																																						
21	Measured	by	inclusion	of	video	or	not,	whether	the	entrepreneur	provided	updates	three	days	after	launch	
and	if	the	campaign	pitch	had	any	spelling	errors	in	it.	
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campaign	success,	possibly	for	the	same	reasons	as	it	may	show	lack	of	determinacy.	All	
three	factors	are	also	easily	observed	by	the	crowdfunder.	This	suggests	that	backing	a	
campaign	might	be	related	to	the	rational	evaluation	of	the	likelihood	of	the	entrepreneur’s	
success	in	creating	the	product,	i.e.	ability	to	deliver	reward	(given	that	mentioned	factors	
are	good	indicators	of	entrepreneur	quality).	This	is	similar	to	other	types	of	venture	
financing,	but	the	complexity	of	the	signals	differs.		
	
Signaling	preparedness	is	therefore	important	for	entrepreneurs	considering	reward	
crowdfunding,	as	it	is	found	to	increase	chance	for	campaign	success	and	could	be	a	part	of	
the	crowdfunders’	risk	evaluation	of	the	project.		
	
All-or-nothing	versus	keep-it-all	
As	mentioned	earlier,	there	are	two	different	reward	crowdfunding	models:	The	AON	model	
and	the	KIA	model.	The	choice	of	model	affects	the	crowdfunder’s	risk	of	receiving	reward	in	
addition	to	the	entrepreneur’s	risk-return	tradeoff.	From	a	crowdfunder’s	perspective,	the	
risk	of	the	entrepreneur	initiating	an	under-funded	project	is	present	if	the	KIA	model	is	
used.	An	under-funded	project	is	associated	with	higher	risk	of	project	failure,	thus	the	KIA	
model	increases	risk	borne	by	the	crowd.	The	AON	model,	however,	shifts	the	risk	upon	the	
entrepreneur.	If	the	campaign	fails	to	reach	the	goal,	no	money	is	transferred	to	the	
entrepreneur.	From	an	entrepreneur’s	perspective,	the	KIA	model	allows	her	to	keep	
pledged	money	even	if	she	fails	to	reach	her	goal,	which	could	be	preferred	by	risk-averse	
entrepreneurs.	Choosing	the	AON	model	could	therefore	serve	as	an	effective	signal,	being	
both	costly	and	observable,	from	the	entrepreneur	to	the	crowdfunders:	It	could	signal	that	
the	entrepreneur	is	willing	to	risk	receiving	no	funding	at	all	and	that	she	will	only	initiate	the	
project	if	enough	capital	is	raised.	The	risk	of	receiving	no	funding	could	be	too	high	for	low	
quality	entrepreneurs	to	benefit	from	the	model,	hence	choosing	the	AON	model	could	also	
signal	entrepreneur	quality.	This	in	turn	could	let	the	entrepreneur	set	higher	funding	goals	
than	with	the	KIA	model,	as	the	risk	of	the	crowd	is	reduced.		
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A	study	by	Cumming	et	al.	(2015)	22		found	that	34%	of	all	AON	campaigns	reached	their	goal,	
while	only	17%	of	KIA	campaigns	did	the	same.	Also,	AON	campaigns	on	average	sought	to	
raise	$31	397,	versus	$20	478	for	KIA	campaigns.		
	
The	model	decision	is	therefore	a	risk-return	tradeoff:	The	AON	model	seems	to	increase	
likelihood	of	funding	success	and	also	lets	the	entrepreneur	set	a	higher	goal,	but	in	the	
same	time	it	brings	significantly	more	risk.	The	KIA	model	seems	to	have	lower	chance	of	
meeting	the	goal,	but	the	entrepreneur	is	still	secured	the	pledged	amount	if	the	campaign	
fails	to	do	so.	
	
However,	there	likely	are	situations	where	this	risk-return	relationship	regarding	AON	versus	
KIA	is	of	less	importance.	If	the	project’s	fixed	costs	are	very	low,	e.g.	as	for	mobile	app	
developers,	there	is	less	need	for	a	high	amount	of	crowdfunders	to	share	the	costs	among.	
She	can	then	initiate	the	project	even	if	she	gets	e.g.	40%	funding,	as	long	as	pledges	cover	
marginal	production	costs,	without	reducing	the	quality	of	the	project.	If	the	entrepreneur	
manages	to	clearly	signal	this	to	crowdfunders,	the	KIA	model	might	be	optimal.	
Furthermore,	not	all	reward	CFPs	offer	both	campaign	models,	e.g.	Kickstarter	which	only	
allows	the	AON	model.	The	crowdfunder	is	then	not	able	to	differentiate	the	AON	quality	
signal	from	those	of	other	entrepreneurs,	which	reduces	the	effectiveness	of	the	signal	
(Spence,	1973).		
	
Importance	of	social	network	and	geography	effects	
As	previously	argued,	startups	and	investors	face	additional	information	asymmetries	
regarding	the	quality	of	the	entrepreneur’s	project.	This	problem	may	be	even	greater	for	
early-stage	crowdfunding,	as	gathering	information	and	monitoring	progress	is	less	
beneficial	when	pledges	or	investments	are	small.	An	entrepreneur’s	social	network	is	then	
likely	to	be	of	importance	for	crowdfunding	campaigns.	Family	and	friends	(F&F)	have	
“inside”	information	about	project	quality	that	other	investors	cannot	obtain	themselves.	
Crowdfunders	may	therefore	interpret	the	investment	decision	of	others	as	a	signal	of	
project	quality	(i.e.	“herding”	behavior	(Banerjee,	1992)).		
																																																						
22	They	studied	Indiegogo,	a	reward	CFP	that	accepts	both	KIA	and	AON	models	
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Research	that	supports	this	suggestion	is	that	of	Mollick	(2014),	Zheng	et	al.	(2014)	and	
Agrawal	et	al.	(2015).	The	first	two	found	that	entrepreneurs	on	Kickstarter	who	had	many	
Facebook	friends	were	much	more	likely	to	achieve	campaign	success	than	those	who	had	
few.	Furthermore,	Agrawal	et	al.	(2015),	who	in	addition	examined	the	geography	of	
crowdfunding,	found	that	F&F	are	most	likely	local	and	that	they	invest	earlier	than	other	
investors.	They	also	found	that	distant	investors’	desire	to	invest	increases	as	the	
entrepreneur	accumulates	capital.	Even	though	there	are	considerable	limitations	to	
mentioned	research,	as	stated	in	the	literature	review,	one	can	try	to	draw	a	few	
observations:	
	
First,	a	large	network	of	F&F	seems	to	increase	chance	of	funding	success.	This	does	not	
necessarily	mean	that	adding	more	Facebook	friends	prior	to	launching	a	campaign	increases	
chance	for	funding	success.	The	source	of	the	effect	could	rather	be	the	increased	possibility	
of	F&F	money	that	a	large	social	network	brings.	The	Facebook	network	is	then	more	of	a	
proxy	for	the	entrepreneur’s	“offline”	network.	However,	one	might	also	argue	that	a	large	
Facebook	network	increases	the	entrepreneur’s	credibility.	A	dishonest	entrepreneur	
probably	would	not	link	her	Facebook	profile	to	the	campaign,	and	a	fake	profile	could	be	
less	likely	to	have	many	Facebook	friends.	
	
Second,	F&F	invest	earlier	than	other	investors,	which	is	important	because	other	investors	
are	suggested	to	be	affected	by	prior	investment	decisions.	A	reason	for	this	might	be	that	
F&F	(and	possibly	lead	investors	for	equity	crowdfunding)	are	likely	to	have	information	
about	entrepreneur	commitment	and	quality.	This	information	could	be	difficult	and	even	
unprofitable	to	obtain	for	other	crowdfunders,	as	the	cost	of	doing	so	would	be	high	relative	
to	average	pledged	or	invested	amount.	Other	crowdfunders	may	then	wait	and	see	
whether	the	entrepreneur	manages	to	obtain	funding	from	F&F.	If	this	interpretation	of	the	
signal	(early	investment	by	F&F)	is	correct,	however,	is	uncertain.	It	could	be	that	F&F	feel	
obliged	to	back	the	entrepreneur	due	to	social	contracts,	thereby	reducing	the	quality	of	the	
signal.	Even	so,	empirical	studies	argue	that	early	investment	is	important.	
	
Third,	the	findings	of	Mollick	(2014)	and	Zheng	et	al.	(2014)	originated	from	data	from	
Kickstarter	(and	DemoHour),	a	reward	CFP,	while	the	findings	of	Agrawal	et	al.	(2015)	
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originated	from	data	from	Sellaband,	a	profit-sharing	CFP.	Comparing	data	from	different	
CFPs	with	different	crowdfunding	models	is	a	potential	limitation	when	trying	to	make	
conclusions,	but	still,	it	could	also	indicate	that	mentioned	network	effects	apply	to	both	
reward	and	equity	crowdfunding.	This	is	not	too	unlikely,	as	even	though	the	crowd	of	the	
two	models	differ,	they	both	suffer	from	the	same	asymmetric	information	regarding	
entrepreneurial	quality	and	commitment.		
	
Moreover,	a	study	of	the	Kickstarter	community	found	that	70%	of	backers	on	Kickstarter	
only	support	a	single	project,	and	that	95%	of	these	backers	joined	Kickstarter	and	pledged	
in	the	same	day	(Kuppuswamy	and	Bayus,	2015).	In	other	words,	serial	backers	seem	rare.	
This	could	indicate	that	entrepreneurs	who	use	Kickstarter	attract	most	of	their	funding	by	
utilizing	their	social	network	of	friends	and	others	(i.e.	followers	who	indirectly	know	the	
entrepreneur	through	social	media	connection),	making	social	network	for	entrepreneurs	
even	more	important	for	reward	crowdfunding	than	for	other	crowdfunding	models	(where	
serial	investors	are	more	common).	
	
The	entrepreneur’s	social	network	is	therefore	likely	to	affect	the	campaign	outcome,	as	
early	support	seems	to	increase	the	likelihood	that	later	crowdfunders	also	support	the	
campaign.	One	can	not	yet	make	any	credible	conclusions	as	to	why	this	herding	
phenomenon	occurs,	but	since	most	early	support	typically	comes	from	F&F,	it	is	tempting	
to	suggest	that	it	occurs	due	to	the	signaling	effects,	e.g.	of	quality	and	commitment,	that	
comes	with	F&F	support.	However,	the	herding	behavior	might	also	come	from	the	fact	that	
the	closer	the	campaign	is	to	reach	its	goal,	the	higher	is	the	marginal	impact	of	each	pledge	
(for	AON	campaigns).	This	could	enhance	the	intrinsic	motivations	of	each	crowdfunder,	as	
they	may	feel	their	pledge	is	then	of	more	significance	for	the	entrepreneur	or	the	cause.	
Early	investment	from	F&F	might	then	initiate	a	“snowball	effect”,	as	the	marginal	impact	of	
each	pledge	only	increases	the	closer	one	is	to	the	goal.	
	
Either	way,	early	support	is	likely	to	positively	affect	the	chance	of	funding	success.	It	is	then	
important	for	entrepreneurs	who	consider	reward	crowdfunding	to	properly	utilize	their	
social	network.	However,	keeping	momentum	from	the	beginning	of	the	campaign	until	the	
end	is	very	difficult	and	rare,	as	will	be	discussed	in	the	following	section.	
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Reward	campaign	dynamics:	The	“Kickstarter	effect”	
The	funding	cycle	of	reward	crowdfunding	campaigns	often	follow	a	U-shape,	as	mentioned	
in	the	literature	review.	More	funding	occurs	during	the	first	(mostly	from	F&F)	and	last	
week	of	the	campaign	compared	to	the	middle	period.	This	illustrates	the	difficulty	of	
sustaining	and	increasing	funding	activity	throughout	the	campaign.	After	the	first	week	
there	is	typically	low	funding	activity,	no	matter	the	product	category	or	campaign	length.	
But,	if	enough	money	is	pledged	and	the	campaign	approaches	its	end,	the	U-shape	can	be	
explained	by	two	potential	effects:	the	goal-gradient	effect	and	the	deadline	effect.	The	
goal-gradient	effect	predicts	that	individuals’	motivation	to	reach	a	goal	increases	when	it	is	
near	its	desired	end	state.	As	discussed	in	the	previous	section,	this	effect	could	occur	since	
the	marginal	impact	of	each	pledge	increases	the	closer	the	goal	is,	creating	the	snowball	
effect.	However,	even	though	mentioned	effect	could	occur	anywhere	in	the	campaign	
cycle,	it	typically	occurs	in	the	end.	This	again	could	be	explained	by	the	deadline	effect,	
which	predicts	that	more	activity	typically	happens	close	to	the	deadline.	Together,	these	
effects	could	be	the	source	of	the	sudden	spike	in	funding	activity	towards	the	end	of	the	
campaigns	(commonly	referred	to	as	the	“Kickstarter	effect”23).		
	
Campaign	length	and	goal	size	
One	might	think	that	setting	a	longer	campaign	duration	(e.g.	90	or	60	days	rather	than	30)	
increases	chances	of	being	successfully	funded,	as	it	gives	crowdfunders	more	time	to	
discover	the	campaign.	However,	mentioned	U-shape	and	campaign	dynamics	(Kuppuswamy	
and	Bayus,	2015)	illustrate	that	most	campaigns	experience	low	funding	activity	in	the	
middle	of	the	funding	cycle,	no	matter	the	length.	Researchers	even	find	a	significant	
negative	relationship	between	campaign	duration	and	funding	success	(Mollick,	2014;	
Cumming	et	al.,	2015).	While	one	may	only	speculate	as	to	why	this	is	the	case,	as	
explanatory	research	on	the	area	is	limited,	statistics	contradicts	setting	longer	durations.	
One	reason	could	be	that	crowdfunding	campaigns	are	fatiguing	and	time-consuming	for	
entrepreneurs,	so	that	longer	durations	make	the	days	spent	trying	to	convince	the	crowd	
less	effective.	Another	could	simply	be	that	lower	quality	entrepreneurs	tend	to	choose	
longer	durations	(for	whatever	reasons),	or	that	longer	durations	signal	lack	of	confidence.	
																																																						
23	https://www.kickstarter.com/blog/the-kickstarter-effect	
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Further,	as	will	be	briefly	discussed	in	the	next	section,	empirical	research	suggests	that	
higher	goal	sizes	decreases	chances	for	funding	success.	If	entrepreneurs	with	high	funding	
goals	tend	to	set	longer	campaign	durations,	as	more	crowdfunders	are	needed	to	be	
successfully	funded,	this	could	also	be	a	reason	why	longer	campaign	durations	seem	to	
decrease	funding	success.	More	explanatory	research	on	this	area	is	therefore	needed	in	
order	to	know	the	real	effects	of	campaign	duration	on	funding	success,	but	either	way,	
entrepreneurs	considering	reward	crowdfunding	should	be	aware	that	campaigns	with	
longer	durations	are	statistically	less	likely	to	achieve	funding	success.	The	entrepreneur	
should	therefore	do	a	careful	consideration	of	what	duration	that	best	fits	her	campaign.	
	
Setting	a	low	goal	size	could	also	be	tempting	for	entrepreneurs,	such	that	the	goal-gradient	
effect	more	easily	occurs.	This	could	however	be	unwise,	as	pledging	activity	is	found	to	fall	
off	once	a	project	reaches	its	goal24	(Kuppuswamy	and	Bayus,	2015).	A	reason	for	this	might	
be	that	the	intrinsic	motivation	could	disappear	if	the	entrepreneur	has	already	reached	her	
necessary	funding	amount.	If	the	goal	is	too	low,	the	entrepreneur	risks	having	to	go	forward	
with	a	project	that	is	actually	underfunded,	increasing	likelihood	of	project	non-delivery	or	
need	to	raise	more	capital.	Moreover,	campaigns	with	high	project	goals	are	found	less	likely	
to	be	funded	(Mollick,	2014),	further	emphasizing	the	importance	of	setting	appropriate	
funding	goals.	
	
8.2.2. Equity	crowdfunding	
Equity	crowdfunding	has	been	restricted	by	legal	complications	in	many	countries25,	but	is	
starting	to	become	a	viable	alternative	for	early-stage	funding.	As	discussed	in	section	7.4.1,	
the	crowdfunding	model	has	yet	to	be	explicitly	mentioned	in	the	Norwegian	legislation,	but	
should	be	legal	as	long	as	there	are	no	binding	commitments	between	the	investor	and	the	
entrepreneur	during	the	funding	campaign.		
	
																																																						
24	Interestingly,	Kuppuswamy	and	Bayus	(2015)	find	that	the	opposite	occurs	for	Design,	Games	and	
Technology	projects,	i.e.	projects	that	offer	tangible	rewards	–	successfully	funded	projects	seem	to	receive	
even	more	funding	before	their	funding	cycle	ends.		
25	Legal	challenges	for	equity	crowdfunding	and	how	it	complicates	the	process	for	the	entrepreneur	is	covered	
in	previous	chapters	
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One	of	the	main	differences	between	crowdfunders	of	equity	(and	loan)	campaigns	and	
crowdfunders	of	reward	campaigns	is	that	for	the	equity	model,	the	crowdfunders	are	not	
necessarily	consumers	of	the	future	project.	They	expect	a	financial	return	on	their	
investment,	rather	than	non-financial	rewards.	This	financial	return	may	originate	from	
dividends	and	capital	gains	from	ownership	of	equity	in	the	entrepreneur’s	startup.	The	
main	focus	of	this	thesis,	however,	is	on	the	entrepreneur	and	how	she	can	use	the	model	to	
raise	capital	for	her	startup.	Thus,	financial	aspects,	e.g.	valuation	of	equity	or	crowdfunders’	
return	on	investment	compared	to	risk26	are	not	covered.	
	
Funder	and	entrepreneur	motivation	
To	the	authors’	knowledge,	there	is	not	much	empirical	research	on	the	motivation	for	
funders	to	participate	in	equity	crowdfunding	campaigns.	Still,	some	scholars	believe	that	
also	these	crowdfunders	experience	intrinsic	motivation	(or	increase	in	utility),	in	addition	to	
desire	financial	return	when	participating	(Pierrakis	and	Collins,	2013),	i.e.	community	
benefits	(Belleflamme	et	al.,	2013).	However,	in	contrast	to	reward	crowdfunding,	these	
community	benefits	are	assumed	to	be	equal	for	all	crowdfunders,	i.e.	the	crowdfunders’	
increase	in	utility	is	homogeneous	and	does	not	depend	on	the	identity	of	the	crowdfunder.	
This	makes	it	easier	(theoretically)	for	the	entrepreneur	to	exploit	community	benefits,	than	
if	the	reward	model	is	used.	This	is	especially	beneficial	if	the	entrepreneur	requires	a	high	
amount	of	capital	(e.g.	>$100	000).	The	rationale	is	that	if	a	lot	of	capital	is	required,	it	could	
be	difficult	to	attract	enough	consumers	(as	for	reward	crowdfunding)	to	pre-purchase	the	
product,	compared	to	investors	(as	for	equity	crowdfunding)	looking	for	a	financial	return.	
There	are	only	so	many	consumers	who	potentially	are	willing	to	buy	a	product	in	advance,	
as	it	will	depend	on	the	their	taste	for	the	product.	Investors	looking	for	a	financial	return,	
however,	are	not	necessarily	future	consumers.	Their	taste	for	the	product	is	therefore	
assumed	to	be	of	less	importance.	If	the	amount	of	required	capital	is	high,	then,	it	could	be	
easier	to	please	equity	crowdfunders	as	they	share	the	same	community	benefits,	than	with	
reward	crowdfunding,	where	the	crowd	is	assumed	to	be	heterogeneous	with	regards	to	
community	benefits	and	motivation.	
	
																																																						
26	To	the	authors’	knowledge,	there	is	very	little	(if	any)	empirical	research	on	risk-return	for	participants	in	
equity	crowdfunding,	specifically.	
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For	the	entrepreneur,	this	means	that	if	she	requires	a	high	amount	of	capital	to	start	her	
project,	equity	crowdfunding	could	give	higher	returns	than	reward	crowdfunding.	This	is	
because	it	will	then	(theoretically,	as	assumed	by	Belleflamme	et	a.,	2013)	be	easier	to	
convince	investors	who	gain	equally	from	community	benefits.	Alternatively,	if	the	amount	
required	is	smaller,	reward	crowdfunding	could	be	more	beneficial	for	the	entrepreneur.	She	
can	then	exploit	consumers	with	high	willingness	to	pay.	
	
However,	as	mentioned	in	the	literature	review,	Cholakova	and	Clarysse	(2015)	found	no	
significant	positive	relationship	between	the	intrinsic	motivators	(help	others,	belonging	to	a	
community,	support	a	cause)	and	the	decision	to	invest	in	a	project27.	Therefore,	more	
research	is	needed	before	one	can	make	any	credible	suggestions	about	whether	the	
theoretical	community	benefits	by	Belleflamme	et	al.	(2013)	exist	for	equity	crowdfunding,	
but	it	could	still	be	valuable	knowledge	for	entrepreneurs	experimenting	with	the	
phenomenon.		
	
An	illustration	on	how	the	motivation	for	equity	crowdfunders	might	differ,	compared	to	
traditional	investors,	is	given	in	figure	20	below:	
	
	
Figure	20.	Illustration	of	different	motivation	levels	for	equity	crowdfunding	
	
																																																						
27	Important	to	note	that	they	only	surveyed	participants	from	one	CFP,	Symbid.	It	is	impossible	to	know	if	the	
findings	apply	to	other	CFPs	as	well,	which	requires	more	research.	
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The	aim	of	figure	20	is	to	illustrate	that	the	motivation	of	equity	crowdfunders	might	differ,	
and	that	even	if	a	crowdfunder	is	not	motivated	enough	by	financial	returns	or	intrinsic	
benefits	alone,	they	can	choose	to	invest	if	the	motivations	combined	are	high	enough.	The	
traditional	investor,	however,	is	assumed	to	only	desire	financial	returns.		
	
One	might	also	argue	that	sometimes,	if	the	combination	of	a	crowdfunder’s	desire	for	
financial	returns	and	intrinsic	benefits	is	high	for	enough	crowdfunders,	they	could	even	
value	the	equity	more	than	traditional	investors.	
	
Crowdfunder	and	entrepreneur	liquidity	
Crowdfunders’	investment	liquidity	for	this	type	of	fundraising	is	low,	at	least	compared	to	
loan	crowdfunding	and	in	a	sense	also	reward	crowdfunding.	Loan	crowdfunders	set	dates	
on	when	they	want	their	loan	back,	whether	through	periodical	installments	or	everything	at	
once.	Reward	crowdfunders,	even	though	they	do	not	expect	a	financial	return,	are	likely	to	
get	their	desired	compensation	earlier	than	those	of	equity	crowdfunding	campaigns	(of	
course	depending	on	the	type	of	product	they	pledge	to).	As	secondary	markets	for	
crowdfunded	stocks	are	rare,	equity	crowdfunders	typically	have	to	wait	until	the	startups	
they	invest	in	are	acquired	by	other	companies	or	through	IPOs.	Furthermore,	startups	
rarely	pay	dividends,	at	least	not	before	they	are	profitable	(ESMA,	2014).	For	the	same	
reasons,	equity	(or	reward)	crowdfunding	affects	startups’	liquidity	in	a	more	positive	way	
than	what	loan	crowdfunding	does.	
		
Signaling	
In	order	to	successfully	raise	capital	via	an	equity	CFP,	startups	need	to	find	ways	to	clearly	
signal	their	value	to	small	investors28.	How	these	signals	are	interpreted,	as	previously	
discussed,	might	differ	from	what	prior	theory	suggests.	But	still,	if	one	assumes	that	
crowdfunders	are	rational	in	their	investing,	the	predictions	of	Spence	(1973)	should	hold:	
the	signal	must	be	observable	and	costly	in	order	for	it	to	be	effective.	Otherwise,	the	signals	
could	be	interpreted	as	“cheap	talk”.	Retaining	equity	and	providing	detailed	information	
about	risks	(reducing	uncertainty)	and	human	capital,	i.e.	education	of	board	members	
																																																						
28	Corporate	finance	literature	defines	small	investors	as	those	who	(1)	invest	relatively	small	amounts	of	
money,	and	(2)	receive	a	relatively	small	stake	of	a	company	in	return	(Ahlers	et	al.,	2015).	
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(indicating	project	quality)	are	signals	that	are	found	to	be	effective	for	equity	crowdfunding	
campaigns	(Ahlers	et	al.,	2015),	and	can	consequently	positively	impact	the	likelihood	of	
funding	success.	Further,	even	though	capital	gains	depend	on	it,	entrepreneur	exit-plans	
through	acquisition	or	IPO	did	not	increase	likelihood	for	funding	success	(Ahlers	et	al.,	
2015).	One	reason	could	be	that	since	such	plans	are	not	binding	and	consist	of	other	factors	
that	cannot	be	controlled	by	the	entrepreneur	(e.g.	the	macro	environment),	crowdfunders	
interpret	such	signals	as	cheap	talk.		
	
By	retaining	a	substantial	equity	share	in	the	company	that	is	not	offered	during	the	equity	
crowdfunding	campaign,	the	entrepreneur	can	effectively	signal	unobservable	
characteristics	of	her	project:	It	is	costly	to	retain	ownership	interests	and	the	potential	
benefit	is	future	cash	flows.	If	the	entrepreneur	does	not	believe	in	future	cash	flows	(i.e.	if	
the	entrepreneur	is	of	low	quality),	the	cost	of	producing	the	signal	would	outweigh	its	
benefits.	It	is	also	easily	observed	by	the	investor,	while	in	the	same	time	helping	to	align	the	
interests	of	the	entrepreneur	and	her	investors.	
	
In	order	to	further	reduce	uncertainty,	the	entrepreneur	could	include	financial	forecasts	of	
her	project,	e.g.	vision,	sales,	EBIT(DA)	and	net	earnings.	However,	the	authors	of	this	thesis	
are	skeptical	about	the	value	of	such	forecasts	for	crowdfunders.	Information	asymmetry	
creates	incentives	for	entrepreneurs	to	present	overly	optimistic	predictions	of	their	project,	
which	(rational)	investors	should	anticipate,	thereby	reducing	the	quality	of	the	signaling	
effect29.	
	
Percentage	of	MBA	graduates	among	executive	board	members	is	positively	related	with	the	
number	of	equity	crowdfunders	(Ahlers	et	al.,	2015).	If	the	entrepreneur’s	team	possesses	
education,	she	should	signal	this	clearly	during	her	funding	campaign.		
	
Lastly,	equity	crowdfunding	might	be	more	suitable	than	reward	crowdfunding	for	some	
types	of	ventures	where	pre-purchasing	is	difficult,	e.g.	restaurants	or	business-to-business	
ventures.		
																																																						
29	See	e.g.	Wickham	(2006)	for	a	description	of	the	entrepreneur-investor	Prisoners’	Dilemma	
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8.2.3. Loan	crowdfunding	
Loan	crowdfunding	is	another	financial	crowdfunding	model.	As	with	equity	crowdfunding,	
crowdfunders	of	this	model	are	not	necessarily	consumers	of	the	entrepreneur’s	future	
product.	The	expected	financial	return	originates	from	interests	on	the	supplied	loan,	which	
is	repaid	either	with	periodical	installments	or	at	the	end	of	its	duration.			
	
The	authors	of	this	thesis	found	considerably	less	research	on	this	crowdfunding	model	than	
on	reward	and	equity	crowdfunding30.	Furthermore,	loan	capital	is	more	difficult	to	get	for	
startups,	thereby	reducing	its	relevance	for	this	thesis	and	for	entrepreneurs	of	startups.	The	
model	may	be	most	relevant	for	businesses	with	established	revenues	and	credit	history.	
Loan	crowdfunding	is	therefore	not	covered	to	the	same	extent	as	reward	or	equity	
crowdfunding.		
	
Moreover,	one	might	argue	(not	based	on	any	empirical	research)	that	loan	crowdfunding	
share	many	of	the	psychological	characteristics	of	equity	crowdfunding,	as	both	models	offer	
financial	returns.	However,	many	loan	CFPs	require	the	companies	to	have	been	active	for	at	
least	two	years	and	to	generate	a	certain	amount	of	revenues	(e.g.	LendingClub,	Zopa).	This	
could	potentially	reduce	the	effect	of	mentioned	intrinsic	motivations	(e.g.	help	others	or	
support	a	cause),	as	the	companies	might	not	depend	on	the	funding	to	stay	in	business.	It	
could	also	serve	as	an	important	signal:	a	few	years	of	business	should	provide	at	least	some	
sort	of	credit	history,	which	crowdfunders	could	evaluate.	The	typical	entrepreneur	of	other	
crowdfunding	models	is	not	assumed	to	have	such	credit	history.	Effective	signals	might	
therefore	be	different,	but	research	on	the	topic	is	needed.	
	
A	table	that	summarizes	a	few	of	the	main	characteristics	of	the	three	crowdfunding	models	
is	presented	below.	
	
	
	
	
																																																						
30	Moreover,	the	research	that	was	found	often	focused	on	peer-to-peer	lending	to	individuals	(e.g.	the	CFP	
Prosper.com),	not	peer-to-peer	lending	to	businesses.	
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Crowdfunding	
model	
Reward	 Equity	 Loan	
Form	of	support	 Donation/pre-
purchase	
Investment	 Loan	
Form	of	return	 Rewards	and	
intangible	benefits	
Dividends	and	
capital	gains,	if	the	
business	does	well.		
Interests	and	
repayment	of	loan.		
Funder	motivation	 Intrinsic	and/or	
desire	for	reward	
Intrinsic	and/or	
desire	for	financial	
return	on	
investments	
Intrinsic	and/or	
desire	for	financial	
return	on	loan	
Importance	of	
network	prior	to	
campaign	
Very	high	 High	 Low31	
Marketing	value	 High	 Moderate	 Low	
Entrepreneur	
Liquidity	
Good	 Good	 Bad	
Creative	control	
over	project	
Good	 Bad,	depends	on	
share	of	ownership	
sold	
Good	
Suitable	for	B2C	or	
B2B	ventures?	
B2C	 Both	 Both	
Table	7.	Characteristics	of	different	crowdfunding	models	
	
8.3. Choice	of	CFP:	What	to	consider	
This	chapter	examines	five	CFP	alternatives	for	Norwegian	entrepreneurs.	Individual	traits	
and	what	the	CFPs	offer	entrepreneurs	(e.g.	marketing,	legal	help)	are	presented.	Loan	CFPs	
are	not	considered	due	to	less	relevance	for	Norwegian	startups.	
	
8.3.1. Choice	of	equity	CFP	
The	following	section	is	based	on	the	premise	that	the	entrepreneur	owns	a	startup	that	is	
classified	as	a	Norwegian	limited	company	(AS),	and	that	she	intends	to	obtain	additional	
funding	through	equity	crowdfunding.	Additionally,	the	first	discussion	is	based	on	the	
premise	that	the	Norwegian	Invesdor	affiliate	is	operational	and	ready	to	use	for	the	
Norwegian	entrepreneur.	
																																																						
31	Based	on	anecdotal	summary	of	information	obtained	by	the	authors.		
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If	the	entrepreneur	plans	to	do	an	equity	crowdfunding	campaign,	she	must	find	the	CFP	
that	offers	the	best	services	for	her	needs	and	that	best	fits	her	legal	environment.	As	
previously	mentioned,	there	are	a	limited	number	of	CFPs	that	offer	equity	campaign	
services	to	Norwegian	entrepreneurs.	Many	of	the	CFPs	that	the	authors	have	been	in	
contact	with	stated	that	in	theory,	they	could	work	with	a	Norwegian	startup,	but	that	it	
might	prove	difficult	in	practice	(due	to	the	legal	environment).	Based	on	our	research,	we	
suggest	three	equity	CFPs	that	a	Norwegian	entrepreneur	might	find	suitable:	Seedrs	(UK),	
FundedByMe	(Swe)	and	Invesdor	(Fin/Nor).	The	first	section	provides	a	brief	summary	on	
how	the	three	CFPs	assist	the	entrepreneur	in	the	campaign	process.	Furthermore,	table	7	
presents	key	information	from	each	of	the	three	CFPs.		
	
Pre-campaign	
Seedrs:	The	Seedrs	team	must	first	review	and	approve	the	entrepreneur’s	campaign,	
evidence,	business	plan	and	valuation	in	order	for	it	to	be	featured	on	the	platform.	This	
may	take	up	to	two	weeks	and	will	be	a	two-way	communication	process	between	the	
Seedrs	team	and	the	entrepreneur	(Seedrs,	2015b).	
Invesdor:	First,	the	Invesdor	team	will	do	a	background	check	and	evaluate	if	the	
entrepreneur’s	company	is	eligible.	Afterwards	the	entrepreneur	must	pitch	her	campaign	to	
Invesdor	and	its	partners	(Invesdor,	2015).		
FundedByMe:	Before	the	campaign	goes	live,	it	must	be	reviewed	and	approved	by	the	
FundedByMe	team.	The	entrepreneur	needs	to	present	executive	summary,	business	plan,	
financial	forecasts	and	valuation	(FundedByMe,	2015b).		
	
During	campaign	
Seedrs:	On	this	platform	the	entrepreneur	has	the	option	of	having	a	“hidden”	or	“public”	
campaign.	Hidden	campaigns	are	only	visible	to	the	entrepreneurs’	network	and	the	CFPs	
lead	investors.	Campaigns	often	start	out	as	hidden	and	become	public	when	a	minor	
funding	goal	is	reached	(Seedrs,	2015b).	
Invesdor:	Campaigns	on	Invesdor	also	start	as	hidden.	When	the	campaign	gains	enough	
support,	typically	between	20%-30%	of	the	funding	goal,	it	will	be	available	to	the	public.		
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The	entrepreneur’s	campaign	will	be	featured	on	social	media	updates	and	bi-weekly	email	
newsletters	from	Invesdor.	In	addition,	the	campaign	will	also	be	featured	on	all	the	partner	
CFPs	of	the	Nordic	Crowdfunding	Alliance	(Invesdor,	2015).	
FundedByMe:	The	campaign	will	be	public	by	default,	and	featured	on	social	media	updates	
from	FundedByMe	(FundedByMe,	2015b).	
	
Post-campaign	
Seedrs:	If	the	campaign	is	successful,	the	Seedrs	team	will	perform	a	legal	due	diligence	on	
the	company	and	the	entrepreneur.	If	the	company	is	a	Norwegian	AS,	Seedrs	will	help	the	
entrepreneur	to	incorporate	a	UK	limited	company	as	a	holding	company.	In	addition,	the	
Seedrs	team	will	also	assist	in	trying	to	obtain	SEIS	or	EIS	eligibility32	for	the	company	shares.	
Once	all	legal	documents	have	been	signed,	funds	from	the	campaign	will	be	transferred	to	
the	company.	Seedrs	holds	the	shares	that	are	purchased	in	an	SPV33	and	acts	as	a	nominee	
on	behalf	of	the	shareholders.	This	is	in	order	to	protect	investor	rights	and	also	to	mitigate	
the	investor	management	problem	that	the	entrepreneur	has	to	face	(Seedrs,	2015b).	
	
Invesdor:	Invesdor	checks	that	every	investor	has	paid	for	the	amount	of	shares	they	
subscribed	to.	The	entrepreneur	must	carry	out	the	registration	of	the	new	shareholders.	
Once	this	is	done,	the	funds	will	be	paid	out	to	the	entrepreneur’s	company	(Invesdor,	
2015).	
	
FundedByMe:	When	the	funding	round	is	successful	and	closed,	the	entrepreneur	contacts	
and	invoices	the	subscribed	investors	in	exchange	for	certificate	of	shares	purchased.	
FundedByMe	only	works	as	an	intermediary,	connecting	investors	with	the	entrepreneur	
(FundedByMe,	2015b).	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																						
32	See	chapter	6.2	for	an	explanation	of	the	terms	
33	Special	purpose	vehicle	
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Equity	 Seedrs	 Invesdor	 FundedByMe	
Initial	cost	 None	 €500	 €500	
Success	fee	 7,5%	 6%	+	legal	fee	€500	
+	€5	per	investor	
8%	
Transaction	fee,	
paid	by	investor	
7,5%	on	potential	
capital	gains	if	
stock	is	sold	
Depending	on	
investor’s	bank	
provider	
None	
Campaign	duration	 60	days	 30-90	days,	
determined	by	the	
entrepreneur	
90	days	
Who	can	invest?	 European	residents	 European	residents	 European	residents	
Overfunding	
possible?	
Yes	 Yes	 No	
KIA	or	AON?	 AON	 AON	 AON	
Advantages	 SEIS	and	EIS,	well	
established	
investor	base	
Partner	of	NCA,	
MiFID	license,	
Norwegian	CFP	
Quick	registration	
process,	
“Investeraravdrag34”	
(tax	benefits	for	
Swedish	residents)		
Disadvantages	 Additional	
taxation,	
transaction	costs	
(i.e.	UK	holding	
company)	
Long	registration	
process	
High	costs	 Not	properly	
regulated	through	
Swedish	law35,	can	
give	rise	to	future	
conflicts.	High	costs	
	
Table	8.	Equity	CFPs:	key	information	from	Seedrs	(2015b),	Invesdor	(2015)	and	FundedByMe	(2015b)	
	
	
	
																																																						
34	See	link	for	more	info	regarding	“investeraravdraget”:	
http://www.skatteverket.se/privat/skatter/vardepapper/investeraravdrag.4.10cbb69314111c2d94ba38b.html	
35	Swedish	laws	do	not	explicitly	regulate	crowdfunding	platforms,	and	FundedByMe	does	not	have	license	to	
operate	by	Swedish	financial	authorities	(they	believe	they	do	not	need	one	as	they	only	act	as	an	
intermediary).	This	could	be	problematic	in	the	future,	e.g.	if	fraud	occurs.	
	 90	
8.3.2. Choice	of	reward	CFP	
The	following	section	is	based	on	the	premise	that	the	entrepreneur	owns	a	startup	that	is	
classified	as	a	Norwegian	limited	company	(AS),	and	that	she	intends	to	obtain	additional	
funding	by	pre-selling	her	products	through	a	reward	crowdfunding	campaign.	
	
If	the	entrepreneur	intends	to	initiate	a	reward	campaign,	the	legal	environment	is	of	less	
importance	(less	regulation	is	required	when	there	is	no	possibility	for	investor	financial	
return).	The	choice	of	CFP	should	be	based	on	costs,	what	services	the	CFP	offers	(e.g.	KIA	or	
AON	campaign	model),	the	demography	of	its	members	and	the	CFPs	reputation.	Kickstarter	
(US)	and	Indiegogo	(US)	both	have	a	strong	reputation	and	are	well	established	in	the	global	
crowdfunding	industry.	FundedByMe	(Swe)	has	a	large	European	crowd	and	years	of	
experience	in	reward	crowdfunding.	The	three	CFPs	require	the	entrepreneur	to	provide	a	
certain	amount	of	information	about	the	project	prior	to	launching	the	campaign,	but	the	
requirements	are	less	strict	than	for	equity	crowdfunding	campaigns.	The	authors	also	
examined	Norwegian	CFPs	(e.g.	Bidra,	NewJelly),	but	found	most	characteristics	to	be	
inferior	relative	to	the	CFPs	mentioned	above.		
	
Pre-campaign:	
All	three	CFPs	provide	the	entrepreneur	with	a	simplified	step-by-step	tool	to	create	a	
campaign.	Prior	to	launch,	CFP	staff	will	review	the	campaign	and	project.	The	entrepreneur	
then	receives	either	refusal	or	constructive	feedback	and/or	approval.	The	campaign	usually	
goes	live	within	1-4	days,	which	is	a	lot	faster	than	for	equity	crowdfunding	campaigns	
(FundedByMe,	2015b;	Kickstarter,	2015b;	Indiegogo,	2015c).	
	
During	campaign:	
Campaigns	on	FundedByMe	will	be	featured	on	social	media	updates	(FundedByMe,	2015b).	
On	Kickstarter,	if	the	staff	finds	the	entrepreneur’s	project	compelling	and	interesting,	the	
project	may	have	the	opportunity	to	be	featured	under	the	category	“Staff	pick”,	which	gives	
the	project	increased	credibility	and	exposure	(Kickstarter,	2015b).	Indiegogo	provides	
entrepreneurs	with	access	to	Amazon	Launchpad,	which	can	be	characterized	as	a	marketing	
tool.	This	may	increase	the	campaigns	visibility	throughout	the	campaign	period	(Indiegogo,	
2015c).	
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Post-campaign:	
If	the	campaign	is	successful	on	FundedByMe	and	the	entrepreneur’s	bank	details	have	been	
verified	in	advance,	the	funds	will	be	transferred	to	the	entrepreneur	within	1-2	days	
(FundedByMe,	2015b).	A	successful	campaign	on	Kickstarter	gives	the	entrepreneur	access	
to	a	feature	that	works	as	a	blog	for	the	project.	There,	the	entrepreneur	can	post	updates	
about	her	production	and	communicate	with	crowdfunders.	This	can	be	characterized	as	an	
information	hub	and	a	communication	tool.	The	entrepreneur	will	receive	the	funds	within	
14	days	after	the	campaign	ends	(Kickstarter,	2015b).	If	the	campaign	is	successful	on	
Indiegogo,	the	entrepreneur	will	receive	the	funds	within	15	business	days	(Indiegogo,	
2015c).	
Reward	 	 FundedByMe	 Kickstarter	 Indiegogo	
Initial	cost	 None	 None	 None	
Success	fee	 6%	 5%	 5%	
Transaction	fee	 None	 3-5%	for	backers	 3-5%	for	backers	
Duration	 45	days	 1-60	days	 No	limit,	but	they	
recommend	40	
days	or	less	
Who	can	pledge?	 No	restrictions	 No	restrictions	 No	restrictions	
Overfunding	
possible?	
Yes	 Yes	 Yes	
KIA	or	AON?	 AON	 AON	 AON	&	KIA	
Advantages	 Overall	quick	
process,	
Scandinavian	
	
Reputation,	large	
crowd,	mid-	and	
post-campaign	
tools	
Reputation,	large	
crowd,	has	both	
AON	and	KIA	
models,	mid-
campaign	
marketing	
Disadvantages	 More	limited	
crowd	than	
Kickstarter	and	
Indiegogo	
Up	to	14	days	
between	campaign	
end	and	reception	
of	funds	
Up	to	15	days	
between	campaign	
end	and	reception	
of	funds	
Table	9.	Reward	CFPs:	Key	information	from	FundedByMe	(2015b),	Kickstarter	(2015b)	and	Indiegogo	
(2015c)	
	
This	subchapter	presented	three	CFPs	for	both	reward	and	equity	crowdfunding.	Which	CFP	
that	is	optimal	depends	on	the	needs	of	the	entrepreneur.	The	selection	of	CFPs	in	the	
discussion	above	is	based	on	the	subjective	evaluation	of	characteristics	by	the	authors.	
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8.4. Case	studies	
In	this	chapter,	two	case	studies	are	presented:	Future	Home	and	Someone.io.	The	case	
studies	are	not	representative	to	generalize	or	conclude	on	how	to	successfully	raise	capital	
through	crowdfunding.	The	purpose	is	rather	to	illustrate	how	a	crowdfunding	campaign	
may	proceed,	while	shedding	light	on	practical	aspects	and	implications.	
	
8.4.1. Future	Home:	Reward	campaign	
	
Front	page	of	Future	Home’s	Indiegogo	campaign.	From	Indiegogo,	2015.	
	
This	case	study	is	based	on	information	gathered	from	Indiegogo,	Future	Home’s	blog	and	
email	correspondence	with	Sigbjørn	Groven,	CFO	at	Future	Home.	
	
The	company	
Future	Home	is	a	Norwegian	startup	company	that	sells	an	app	and	a	control	unit	that	make	
it	possible	to	control	a	wide	range	of	household	electronic	devices.	The	four	founders	have	
years	of	relevant	work	experience	and	education	in	the	fields	of	electrical	engineering,	
management,	finance,	entrepreneurship	and	automation.	As	of	today	the	company	has	11	
employees,	including	the	founders	(PROFF,	2015).	
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In	early	November	2014,	the	company	ended	a	successful	60-day	AON	reward	crowdfunding	
campaign	on	Indiegogo,	raising	$200	870	from	pre-sales	and	donations	from	140	individuals,	
with	an	initial	goal	of	$200	000.	
	
The	campaign	
At	first,	the	team	was	under	the	impression	that	presenting	a	video	and	product	information	
on	the	campaign	would	be	enough	to	get	sufficient	orders,	but	throughout	the	campaign	
they	changed	their	approach.	Instead	of	telling	“the	story”	that	many	reward	campaigns	do,	
the	team	shifted	its	focus	towards	direct	sales	and	demonstrations.	Future	Home’s	campaign	
sought	to	present	information	in	an	easy	and	understandable	manner,	by	using	video	and	
illustrations.	The	campaign	also	provided	a	brief	introduction	of	the	team	and	a	short	
summary	of	why	they	needed	funds.	The	main	focus	of	the	campaign	seemed	to	be	showing	
the	applicability	of	the	products.	The	campaign	offered	12	reward	levels,	ranging	from	$5	to	
$15	000.	This	provided	backers	with	multiple	options,	from	merely	donating	$5	to	the	
development	of	Future	Home,	to	buying	a	$15	000	Villa-kit.		
	
The	initial	funding	goal	was	$200	000,	which	is	high	for	a	reward	campaign.	Sigbjørn	Groven,	
CFO	at	Future	Home	explained	that	the	high	goal	was	a	necessity,	as	Future	Home	needed	a	
pre-specified	number	of	units	sold	in	order	to	obtain	the	production	prices	that	they	had	
negotiated	prior	to	the	campaign.	This	also	excluded	the	KIA	model.	
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One	of	the	stunts	the	Future	Home	founders	performed:	Personally	thanking	backers	via	a	webcam.	
From	Future	Home’s	blog.	
	
As	mentioned,	sustained	funding	activity	throughout	crowdfunding	campaigns	is	very	
difficult	to	achieve	(cf.	U-shape).	Future	Home	managed	to	be	featured	in	news	media	prior	
to	and	during	the	campaign,	which	probably	helped	them	spread	awareness	of	their	product	
to	the	public.	Furthermore,	Future	Home	also	created	several	stunts,	intended	to	“go	viral”.	
One	of	the	stunts	was	“Control	our	office	–	Chaos	mode”.	This	provided	the	public	with	the	
opportunity	to	use	the	products	online	in	real-time,	in	Future	Home’s	offices.	For	a	limited	
period,	over	a	thousand	unique	users	controlled	the	office	lights,	coffee	maker	and	blinds.		
	
Even	though	attention	from	the	crowd	was	present,	Future	Home	struggled	to	obtain	
enough	sales.	A	week	before	the	campaign	deadline,	Future	Home	was	represented	at	a	
homeowner’s	exhibition	in	Stavanger,	Norway.	Here,	the	team	was	able	to	demonstrate	
Future	Home’s	product	to	target	customers	and	establish	contacts.	A	few	days	later,	one	
hour	prior	to	the	deadline,	Future	Home	successfully	secured	the	funding	goal.	
	
Post-campaign	
Initially,	Future	Home	wanted	to	run	their	campaign	on	Kickstarter,	based	on	the	CFP’s	good	
reputation.	At	the	time,	Norwegian	entrepreneurs	could	not	create	campaigns	on	
Kickstarter,	so	Indiegogo	served	as	the	second	best	choice.	In	retrospect,	the	team	
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recognizes	that	making	their	own	CFP	solely	for	the	purpose	of	the	Future	Home	campaign	
could	also	have	served	as	a	viable	alternative,	so	they	would	not	have	been	subject	to	
Indiegogo’s	success	fee.	Several	CFPs	defend	their	fees	based	on	the	marketing	tools	they	
provide.	The	Future	Home	team	ended	up	bringing	in	approximately	95%	of	total	sales	
themselves,	without	assistance	from	Indiegogo.	
	
Prior	to	the	campaign,	the	team	focused	on	understanding	success	factors	and	differences	
between	good	and	bad	campaigns.	The	team	spent	one	month	on	preparations	for	the	
campaign,	and	in	hindsight	they	recognize	they	should	have	spent	more.	For	future	
crowdfunding	entrepreneurs,	they	emphasize	the	importance	of	understanding	how	a	
campaign	works,	along	with	the	importance	of	lining	up	backers	and	news	media	from	the	
beginning	of	the	campaign.		
	
Future	Home	today	
The	company	has	successfully	brought	in	more	investors.	Board	members,	a	business	angel,	
employees	and	the	initial	founders	have	invested	a	total	of	NOK	10	million	($1,16	million)	in	
the	company.	Based	on	the	recent	emission	of	shares,	the	company	is	valued	at	NOK	50	
million	($5,78	million)	(Gjerde,	2015).	
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8.4.2. Someone.io:	Equity	campaign	
This	case	study	is	based	on	information	gathered	from	FundedByMe,	Someone.io’s	blog	and	
email	correspondence	with	Dan	Hesketh,	brand	strategist	at	Someone.io.	
	
	
Front	page	of	Someone.io’s	crowdfunding	campaign.	From	FundedByMe,	2015.	
	
The	company	
Someone.io	is	a	Norwegian	IT	company	that	sells	a	Social	Task	Management	app.	The	
purpose	of	the	product	is	to	increase	employee	job	satisfaction	and	overall	team	
productivity.	Their	team	consisted	of	four	experienced	and	highly	educated	individuals.	
Combined,	their	background	comprised	of	management,	creative	studies,	web	development,	
computer	science,	communication,	analytics,	marketing,	advertising,	sales	and	branding.		
	
The	company	launched	a	beta-version	of	the	app	in	May	2015	and	simultaneously	created	
the	campaign	on	FundedByMe,	and	the	campaign	went	live	on	September	11,	2015.	The	
campaign	ended	successfully	November	9,	2015,	receiving	€129	508	from	45	different	
investors,	7,9%	more	than	the	initial	goal	of	€120	000.	Someone.io	sold	12,7758%	of	total	
company	equity	via	FundedByMe.	
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The	campaign	
The	campaign	included	an	informative	video	with	the	goal	of	highlighting	the	customer	need	
and	potential	for	their	product.	Furthermore,	business	plan,	financial	forecast	and	valuation	
were	also	included,	although	very	simplified	so	that	most	people	would	understand	it.	After	
the	campaign	went	live,	approximately	€40	000	was	raised	within	the	first	three	weeks,	
where	many	of	the	investments	came	from	existing	shareholders.	After	that,	funding	activity	
dropped	significantly	for	five	weeks.	During	those	five	weeks,	the	team	participated	in	
several	pitching	contests	in	Norway	and	Sweden,	they	advertised	online,	had	personal	
meetings	with	potential	investors	and	provided	updates	about	their	campaign	to	
crowdfunders.	The	team	used	the	feedback	from	crowdfunders	to	improve	the	campaign	
pitch.	Even	though	Someone.io	worked	hard	to	sustain	funding	activity,	they	did	not	manage	
to	avoid	mentioned	U-shape.	The	turning	point	came	when	Someone.io	was	featured	in	a	
headline	article	in	the	online	newspaper	“Hacker	News”.	The	team	used	this	opportunity	to	
build	momentum,	i.e.	general	interest	and	funding	activity,	before	the	last	four	weeks	of	the	
campaign.		
	
	
Figure	21.	Aggregate	funding	from	campaign	start	until	end.	Numbers	in	Euro.	Figure	not	self-
constructed	(Someone.io,	2015)	
	
After	this,	Someone.io	pitched	their	campaign	on	several	Norwegian	investment	forums,	
which	attracted	domestic	and	international	attention.	In	the	beginning	of	the	final	week,	the	
campaign	had	still	raised	less	than	50%	of	the	funding	goal.	From	their	previous	experience,	
they	knew	that	investors	responded	well	to	positive	key	performance	indicators	(KPIs).	The	
team	included	updated	KPIs	in	the	campaign,	which	showed	potential	investors	historical	
growth	in	demand	for	Someone.io’s	product.	This	update	caused	an	immediate	spike	in	
funding	activity,	and	resulted	in	the	funding	goal	being	reached	within	days.	
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While	not	representative	to	generalize,	financial	forecasts	and	growth	estimates	did	not	
have	the	desired	effect	on	funding	activity	(could	be	because	investors	know	the	
entrepreneur	has	incentive	to	be	overly	optimistic).	What	seemed	to	work	for	this	particular	
campaign	were	hard	facts,	i.e.	historical	data	from	sales.	Investors	might	have	interpreted	
such	data	as	a	credible	signal	for	the	quality	of	the	product,	as	it	would	be	more	difficult	to	
manipulate	by	the	entrepreneur.		
	
Post-campaign	
Someone.io	chose	to	use	FundedByMe	mainly	because	the	application	process	was	
considerably	quicker	than	other	equity	CFPs.	The	process	took	them	one	week,	whereas	e.g.	
Seedrs	has	a	minimum	application	process	of	3-4	weeks.	An	advantage	by	using	
FundedByMe	is	that	Someone.io	could	use	the	Norwegian	limited	company	structure	(AS).	
The	team	also	emphasized	that	entrepreneurs	considering	using	equity	crowdfunding	should	
start	by	securing	funding	from	existing	shareholders	(to	gain	momentum),	plan	marketing	
and	update	the	campaign,	pitch	and	presentation	throughout	the	campaign.	One	trait	that	
Someone.io	had,	was	the	fact	that	their	product	was	already	being	bought	and	used.	This	
provided	the	team	with	the	opportunity	to	“brag”	about	KPIs	on	their	campaign.		
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9. Summary	and	final	thoughts	
Crowdfunding	represents	a	new	way	for	entrepreneurs	to	raise	capital	for	a	variety	of	
projects,	made	possible	with	the	existence	of	Web	2.0.	This	thesis	has	examined	the	
crowdfunding	industry	and	the	leading	European	crowdfunding	markets,	in	order	to	
ascertain	the	possibilities	for	Norwegian	entrepreneurs	to	participate	in	the	crowdfunding	
environment.	Our	research	suggests	that	reward	crowdfunding	could	serve	as	a	viable	
alternative	to	raise	funds	for	Norwegian	entrepreneurs,	irrespective	of	country	borders.	In	
contrast,	equity	and	loan	crowdfunding	are	still	often	restricted	to	domestic	residents	due	to	
legal	constraints,	limiting	both	the	crowd	and	the	amount	of	CFPs	available	to	the	
entrepreneur.	However,	the	crowdfunding	environment	is	likely	to	adjust,	as	legislators	
across	Europe	strive	to	reduce	barriers	and	facilitate	the	concept,	both	for	domestic	and	
cross-border	transactions.	With	this	in	mind,	one	can	expect	loan	and	equity	crowdfunding	
to	evolve	into	more	viable	alternatives	for	Norwegian	entrepreneurs	in	the	future.		
	
An	extensive	review	of	related	literature	has	been	performed	in	order	to	study	the	
characteristics	of	traditional	fundraising,	signaling	and	crowdfunding.	The	literature	
emphasized	the	importance	of	network	and	preparedness	for	achieving	crowdfunding	
success,	which	is	also	illustrated	in	the	case	studies.	In	addition,	the	literature	suggested	that	
crowdfunders	are	heterogeneous	with	respect	to	motivation	and	goals,	although	more	so	for	
non-financial	crowdfunding	than	for	financial	crowdfunding.	A	reason	for	this	heterogeneity	
is	argued	to	be	that	crowdfunders,	in	addition	to	extrinsic	motivation,	often	experience	
intrinsic	motivation	to	fund.	It	is	further	suggested	that	in	reward	campaigns,	this	
heterogeneity	can	be	exploited	by	entrepreneurs	by	enabling	crowdfunders	to	self-select	
reward	levels	that	maximize	their	individual	utility,	thereby	increasing	both	consumer	and	
producer	surplus.	Crowdfunders	in	equity	campaigns	are	generally	more	motivated	by	
financial	gain	and	therefore	less	heterogeneous.	Even	so,	equity	crowdfunders	who	are	less	
motivated	by	financial	returns	could	still	choose	to	invest	as	long	as	they	have	intrinsic	
motivation	towards	the	project	that	increases	their	willingness	to	support	(illustrated	in	
figure	20).		
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Both	crowdfunding	and	traditional	funding	have	unique	individual	benefits.	Therefore,	if	
both	sources	of	capital	are	available	to	the	entrepreneur,	a	trade-off	evaluation	has	to	be	
made	when	deciding	how	to	raise	capital.	However,	crowdfunding	and	traditional	funding	
are	not	necessarily	substitutes.	Crowdfunding	could	serve	as	a	viable	seed-capital	
fundraising	tool,	which	would	give	the	entrepreneur	enough	funding	to	start	a	business.	She	
would	then	have	obtained	credible	validation	from	the	crowd	that	her	project	is	of	value,	
signaling	quality	to	potential	external	investors	and	banks.	Therefore,	it	might	be	more	likely	
that	crowdfunding	serves	as	a	complementary	form	of	funding,	serving	a	gap	previously	
unserved	by	traditional	funding	sources.	How	the	phenomenon	is	adopted	by	entrepreneurs	
remains	to	be	seen.	
	
Moreover,	there	are	distinctive	variations	in	the	characteristics	of	the	different	
crowdfunding	models	that	should	be	addressed	by	the	entrepreneur,	which	are	presented	in	
the	guide.	Furthermore,	the	optimal	choice	of	model	depends	on	several	entrepreneurial	
factors,	e.g.	venture	stage	and	entrepreneur	risk-profile.	One	can	therefore	not	recommend	
one	model	over	the	others:	It	depends	on	entrepreneur	preferences,	and	every	
entrepreneur	is	different.	
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